Inter-mission Cooperation

Reflecting on Sudan and Central Africa Experiences

Victor Angelo

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## Central Africa Experiences

Victor Angelo

About the Author

Mr Victor Angelo, a Portuguese national, is a Former Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General (Peacekeeping Operations), at the level of Under-Secretary-General. He retired from the UN in April 2010, after 32 years of work with the organization.

He is currently the chief executive of DuniaMundo, a consultancy firm, and senior international advisor on governance and security. He is also a columnist on world affairs of the Portuguese weekly magazine Visão, a board member of the PeaceNexus Foundation as well as a member of the North-South Think Tank of the Council of Europe. He has written several academic papers and many weekly opinion columns.

Mr Angelo, who has a postgraduate degree in Sociology, has extensive experience on UN affairs, Africa, economic development, humanitarian, security and political affairs, as well as on opinion-making and media. He is fluent in English, French, Spanish and Portuguese. Mr Angelo holds decorations granted by Portugal and other governments.

Map of Region

Source: The United Nations

Executive Summary

The need for greater coordination and cooperation between UN missions operating in geographic proximity is more urgent than ever before. Two central factors define this reality: 1) the current global economic climate necessitates a more cost-effective approach to UN peacekeeping expenditures; 2) the changing nature of violent conflict throughout the world is increasingly characterized by cross-border conflict systems, where national boundaries are of diminishing importance and regional dimensions acquire greater relevance.

Informed by extensive hands-on UN experience, this report draws out lessons from the field in order to identify new areas for policy consideration and to propose a set of concrete recommendations for more effective operational interaction between UN missions. Serving as a multi-faceted case study, the report examines five UN peacekeeping missions in four countries: BINUCA (the Central African Republic), MINURCAT (Chad and the Central African Republic), MONUSCO (the Democratic Republic of Congo), UNAMID (Darfur) and UNMIS (Sudan). Approximately 50% of UN peacekeepers active throughout the world were deployed to this part of Africa in the years 2008 to 2010.

Given such an unprecedented level of operational concentration, the UN Security Council has recognized the considerable scope for more effective and efficient use of resources, as well as opportunities to benefit from the synergies resulting from the continuity of these various missions. Looking at key best practices and critical challenges, this report identifies six shared issues as initial focal points for enhancing inter-mission cooperation: security, non-state armed groups, confidence-building measures, the referendum on independence in Sudan, resistance from host governments, and institutional challenges within the UN system.

These issues indicate the growing necessity to take better account of regional factors in planning and executing mission mandates. Such a development will allow UN missions to be more effective on the ground, particularly in relation to fulfilling their mandates, improving delivery of services and streamlining activities in increasingly collaborative ways. It also will be valuable for assisting the missions to implement complementary and coherent approaches in their relations with critical regional partners like the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States and the Intergovernmental

Authority on Development, and with key countries in the region, such as Libya, Uganda and Nigeria. More effective inter-mission cooperation also can make a useful contribution to the greater success of regional mediation initiatives.

This report concludes with a range of practical recommendations and specific proposals for better facilitating inter-mission cooperation on multiple levels. Even minor adjustments and small-scale changes, in the field and at UN headquarters, can have a large-scale impact in terms of significantly improving all aspects of a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission.

List of Acronyms

AU	African Union
BINUCA	United Nations Integrated Peace Building Office in the Central African Republic
BONUCA	United Nations Peace Building Office in the Central African Republic
CAR	Central African Republic
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DSS	Department of Security and Safety
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
HQ	United Nations Headquarters (New York)
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IOTs	Integrated Operations Teams
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JM	UN/AU Joint Mediation Team for Darfur
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MONOC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MONUSCO	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NUPI	Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt/ Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
OMA	Office of the Military Advisor
PBC	Peace Building Commission
PBSO	Peace Building Support Office
SC	Security Council of the United Nations
SG	Secretary-General of the United Nations
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNAMID	Africa Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UPDF	The Ugandan People's Defence Force

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I. Introduction[1]

A. Rationale

Of all UN peacekeepers active throughout the world, approximately half – working for a total of five missions in four countries – were deployed to Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) during the period 2008–2010. Given this unprecedented level of operational concentration, the Security Council has recognized that there was considerable scope for more effective and efficient use of resources, as well as opportunities to benefit from the synergies resulting from the continuity of these various missions. Consequently, the Security Council has encouraged greater inter-mission cooperation and coordination in this region of the world.[2]

The need for greater coordination and cooperation between UN missions operating in geographic proximity is more pressing than ever before. Two central factors define this reality: 1) the current global economic climate necessitates a more cost-effective approach to UN peacekeeping expenditures; 2) the changing nature of violent conflict throughout the world, particularly in Central Africa and Sudan, is increasingly characterized by cross-border conflict systems, where national boundaries are of diminishing importance and regional dimensions acquire greater relevance. In this environment of fragile and porous border areas, along with shifting political allegiances across borders and against a social background where the same ethnic groups can be found on either side of the frontier lines, it is evident that both

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[1]   The author wishes to acknowledge Dr. Kate McGuinness, a Berlin-based international consultant with expertise in the field of peace and conflict studies, and John Karlsrud, former Special Assistant to the SRSG, MINURCAT, and currently with NUPI, for their invaluable assistance and in-put on this text.

[2]   For key UN references on inter-mission cooperation, see Security Council Resolution 1778, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/N0751615.pdf; Security Council Resolution 1861 http://minurcat.unmissions.org/Portals/MINURCAT/SCR1861_ ENG.pdf; Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations, http://www. undemocracy. com/ S-2009-398.pdf; and *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon or UN Peacekeeping*, a joint report by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support, July 2009, http://www.un.org/en/ peacekeeping/documents/newhorizon.pdf. For an earlier document from 2005, see *Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and possible cross-border operations between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire*, http://unipsil.unmissions.org/portals/unipsil/media/documents/scrpt/sgrsl16.pdf. The Capstone Doctrine (2006), which lays the foundations for UN peacekeeping operations, does not mention inter-mission cooperation:http://www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/Pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_EN G.pdf.

UN policy and peacekeeping field operations must take such regional dimensions into better account.

Overstretched financial resources and cross-border conflict are not unique to Central Africa and Sudan. As such, there is additional scope for extrapolating the insights that follow to other areas of the world where the UN is present or may be in the future. Despite a burgeoning literature on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the interrelationships between UN missions have received relatively little attention in this context. This report is meant as an initial attempt to address an important gap in the literature. It can also spur efforts to enhance inter-mission cooperation, as well as stimulate further reflection and research on this important topic.

B. Outline of Analysis

This report draws out lessons from the field in order to identify new areas for policy consideration and propose a set of recommendations for more effective operational interaction between UN missions. Taking Central Africa and neighbouring Sudan as a multi-faceted case study, a region where there is a strong UN peace and security deployment, this reflection benefits from the author's long-term experience within the UN at leadership level. During the time frame covered by this analysis, the author was the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Chad and the CAR, and Head of MINURCAT. Prior to this, he headed the UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, and in this capacity participated in early efforts to stimulate initial forms of inter-mission cooperation (also see Section III.A below).

This report discusses and analyses concrete examples of inter-mission cooperation involving four DPKO missions and one Department of Political Affairs-led field operation: MINURCAT, UNAMID, UNMIS, MONUSCO (previously MONUC) and BINUCA (previously BONUCA).[3] The focus of the time frame is the period 2008–2010.

The analysis begins with an overview of the regional context. It includes reference to the political relations between the four countries concerned and identifies shared issues faced by the five UN missions deployed there. The discussion then shifts to an assessment of inter-mission cooperation. This segment presents a brief summary of events related to fostering inter-mission cooperation, with specific attention to examples that disclose the strengths and weaknesses of these ef-

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[3] See Appendix 1 for an overview of each of these deployments, with emphasis on their particular mandates.

forts. The analysis finishes with a series of recommendations aimed at better facilitating inter-mission cooperation in the future.

The main objectives of this analysis are fourfold:

- Identify key best practices, as well as critical challenges, for inter-mission cooperation; 'best practices' encompass both logistical and substantive concerns, in particular those related to field support, information sharing, political analysis and security planning
- Contribute to the overall body of knowledge on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, based on hands-on experience
- Review the impact of cooperation on the efficient use of resources and on mission preparedness, to enable better response to given mandates
- Determine relevant operational and policy issues requiring further analysis and study.

This study has been commissioned by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) as part of a larger body of Norwegian research on improving peacekeeping and highlighting best practices. It constitutes an initial reflection about a subject area in need of further attention, by the research community and policy-makers. This is, then, a tentative exploration of some of the basic potentials and limitations related to better enabling inter-mission cooperation. What progress has been achieved in the region of Central Africa and Sudan? What are the key impediments to greater cooperation?

II. Regional Context

The five missions examined here represent new opportunities and challenges for UN policy and peacekeeping field operations. There is a growing necessity to take better account of regional factors, as regards both planning and executing mission mandates. This development will better enable UN missions to be more effective on the ground, particularly in relation to fulfilling their mandates, improving delivery of services and streamlining activities in increasingly collaborative ways.

Better coordination is also valuable for assisting the missions to implement complementary and coherent approaches in their relations with critical regional partners, such as the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and with key countries in the region, like Libya, Uganda, Nigeria, and others. Importantly, effective inter-mission cooperation can be useful for facilitating more successful regional mediation initiatives – such as the Dakar Process, which is geared toward establishing diplomatic rapprochement between Sudan and Chad.

As understood here, the term 'inter-mission cooperation' refers to greater political coherence and enhanced effectiveness of UN operations at regional levels. A more focused and consolidated approach to inter-mission cooperation will not only benefit host governments and their populations, but will also enable better use of the financial resources of UN member states.

A. Political Relations

Political relations between the four states in this region vary greatly. The Central African Republic (CAR) has good relations with both Sudan and Chad, but is generally perceived as the weak link in the region because it is unable to exercise effective state authority in its own territory. As a result, the CAR is not seen as an important political actor in the region, and its government is perceived as being particularly fragile and unstable.

Although distant, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) also has good diplomatic relations with its three neighbours. At the same time, the DRC government tends to perceive Sudan as an outsider to Central Africa and thus sees no reason for the country to influence regional

politics – for example, Sudan is not a member of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).[4] The size and centrality of the DRC suggest that it might play a more active role in Central Africa. However, focused attention on its own domestic affairs (with the challenges of an intensive post-conflict reconstruction process) has effectively restricted DRC interest in regional politics.

In stark contrast, tensions between Sudan and Chad have been quite high, especially since 2008. Recently, however, this strained situation has begun to ease. Despite this, poor relations between Chad and Sudan have tended to dominate the political landscape of the region, creating a general atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust. This has posed serious obstacles to inter-mission cooperation. At the end of January 2008, for example, Chadian armed opposition groups based in Sudan entered Chad and attacked N'Djamena in early February of that year.[5]

In March 2008, Chad and Sudan, along with several other states in the region, agreed to initiate a diplomatic process of appeasement known as the Dakar Process. Led by Libya and Senegal, several meetings were held during 2008, but failed to produce any concrete results. In May 2009, the diplomatic process was further hindered when the Sudan-based rebels launched another attack, this time in eastern Chad. A strong counterattack by Chadian government forces left the rebel groups seriously weakened.

Some months later, Chad and Sudan decided to initiate rapprochement, and in October 2009 a high-level Sudanese delegation visited N'Djamena, with both sides agreeing to the following solution: On the one hand, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) would no longer be allowed to to use the terriory in Chad for their campaigns in Darfur. On the other, Chadian armed rebel groups were to be moved away from the border area and their leaders banned from Sudan. The agreement also included an arrangement for joint border patrols by both armies in order to prevent territorial incursions and arms smuggling. Finally implemented in 2010, this bilateral agreement has somewhat improved diplomatic relations between the two countries.

This political overview indicates that the disposition of the host countries to UN missions plays a significant role in relation to efforts oriented toward greater cooperation at the regional level. From the be-

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4   Whilst understandable, this perspective on Sudan is short-sighted. The largest country in Africa, Sudan is currently undergoing a sensitive internal process that will undoubtedly have repercussions for the entire region.

5   In the end, President Déby's regime survived because of the lack of leadership in the attacking rebel groups. In particular, the rebels could not agree on what tactical moves to make during their assault on the presidential palace.

ginning, Sudan has portrayed MINURCAT as an attempt by Western actors to gain influence in Sudan and the region as a whole. Poor political relations between Chad and Sudan have also presented opportunities for obstructing inter-mission cooperation.

When tensions between Chad and Sudan were very acute, the Government of Sudan regarded contact between the two UN missions – UNAMID and MINURCAT – with great suspicion. Once tensions had abated to some degree, Sudan demanded that the Government of Chad withdraw the MINURCAT presence from their shared border area. UNAMID has no Western personnel, and is not perceived by the Government of Sudan as a threat. Nonetheless, Sudan has consistently refused to accept exchange visits between the two missions – even preventing the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for MINURCAT from visiting UNAMID headquarters in Al-Fasher. Although the SRSG regularly informed the Government of Sudan, via the embassy in N'Djaména, about developments related to MINURCAT, this did not serve to reduce mistrust in Khartoum.

Shared Issues[6]

Six key issues bear on the operations of each mission. These are defined by mission experience and political analysis of the regional context. While the host countries in this region share some similar characteristics, they also have specific dynamics. Where relevant, these are discussed below.

1. Security

All five missions are faced with low-intensity threats to security. Most of the military components of these missions have a protection mandate (except BINUCA) to provide security for refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), host populations, the humanitarian community, and UN personnel and assets. These threats include attacks from non-state armed groups, rebel and paramilitary groups, and national security forces, along with on-going criminal activities by many different types of heavily-armed bandits. Although a direct attack on UN troops and personnel by a large force is unlikely, there is a widespread and

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6   In addition to these six key issues, the role of other regional actors, such as Libya and Uganda, as well as other partner organizations also factor into the equation of better facilitating inter-mission cooperation. Taking such actors into account can enrich and deepen regional analyses, thus better enabling UN peacekeeping missions to be more effective. At present, the overall understanding of regional issues tends to be superficial. In general, elections are also a key issue in this region. On a more operational level, the drawdown of MONUSCO will also have an impact on the region. However, consideration of these issues is outside the scope of the current analysis, which focuses on what the author deems the most critical challenges facing these five UN missions. Each of the topics discussed here also merits more in-depth analysis.

growing risk of hijacking, kidnapping and hit-and-run strikes on small groups of soldiers, foreigners and humanitarian workers.

Weak state authority in the periphery of the host countries, especially in border regions, is also a security challenge. Hence, an integral part of all of the mission mandates is to help to strengthen and stabilize state authority at local levels. This includes building local capacity to resolve conflicts between communities in a peaceful manner so as to prevent escalation to armed confrontations. Because the same ethnic groups can be found on both sides of the frontier, many of these conflicts spill over border areas, confronting neighbouring missions with similar issues. These shared experiences require a complementary approach to enable these challenges to be addressed more constructively.

Conflicts that range across borders are also a primary source of population displacement in these areas, often resulting in an influx of refugees into a neighbouring country. Experience on the ground indicates that even if one mission is aware of an imminent refugee flow, a neighbouring mission may be oblivious to this upcoming event and its security implications, and may thus be unable to pre-position its resources and personnel to deal with this new problem.

2. Non-state Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups operate in all of the four countries examined here. The JEM in Darfur and the Chadian armed opposition groups are better organized than others. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) is also active in the region, particularly in Southern Sudan, the DRC and the CAR.

Most of these agents of instability reside in border areas, with some travelling widely throughout the region. Some have been part of proxy warfare between neighbouring states (as in the case of Chad and Sudan). Cases in point are the JEM, a Darfuri rebel movement, and the Chadian armed opposition groups based in Darfur. The JEM, for example, has used refugee camps in Chad as sites for rest and recuperation, as well as for recruitment of combatants. Recently, however, the Government of Chad has taken a stronger stance against the JEM as part of a détente with Sudan, and the JEM can no longer use Chadian territory as a launching ground or background base.

The LRA is a persistent scourge for the entire region. This group has attracted significant attention in some Western capitals because of the brutality of its operations, the threat it represents to isolated villages, and the risks to international NGO staff and religious missionaries. Moving around in the border areas between Uganda, the DRC, Sudan

and the CAR, small scattered LRA groups continue to terrorize local populations, causing displacement and undermining state authority. The Ugandan People's Defence Force (UPDF) led an operation in eastern DRC to round up remaining members, with some success. Although several fighters have been apprehended or killed in action, the leader, Joseph Kony, and other key members remain at large. The UPDF have officially ended their operation in eastern DRC, but still maintain a few intelligence squads.

In 2009, a bilateral agreement between Uganda and the CAR allowed for the deployment of approximately 2,000 Ugandan soldiers in south-eastern CAR. They are tasked with combating LRA irregulars, because it is believed that the latter group has been moving north, possibly towards Darfur. Over the last several years, the LRA has been weakened to such an extent that it no longer poses a military threat to host governments and/or UN forces. Nonetheless, remnant elements operating in small groups are a major source of distress and panic for the populations of those remote regions. As they operate in densely forested areas, these LRA groups are likely to resort to banditry and other heavily-armed criminal activities, thus exacerbating the overall security situation.

3. Confidence-building Measures

Confidence-building measures are crucial for improving relations between these neighbouring states, and as such can contribute to enhancing regional security. One of the primary concerns of inter-mission cooperation was to identify a set of initiatives that could be taken by the UN missions, or that the missions could advise the host governments to take, in order to generate a greater political confidence in the region. In the case of Chad–Sudan relations, for example, MINURCAT prepared a coherent set of proposals that were later discussed with UNAMID. Aiming to create conditions for improved relations between N'Djamena and Khartoum, these proposals were to be implemented by both governments, with the assistance of the missions if required.

Confidence-building measures are also closely linked to the task of strengthening and stabilizing national authority in fragile states, as reflected in the mandates of all peacekeeping missions in Central Africa and Sudan. Such measures are equally crucial for creating local ownership for peace agreements and in supporting the capacity of locally-led peacebuilding efforts. Where effective formal administration and state structures are weak, local populations rely more on traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution, including confidence-building

measures.[7] However, in many areas these have been impaired by years of conflict and unrest. They have been further undermined by political interference coming from the capital cities, e.g., N'Djamena in Chad, and Khartoum in relation to Darfur.

Increasingly, peacekeeping operations undertaken on behalf of the international community are criticized for applying top–down, 'blueprint' strategies that overlook the needs, interests and political dynamics at the national, regional and local levels. The experience of all five of the missions studied here shows that there is often tension between peacekeepers and peacebuilders in the field and those at the headquarters of an operation. It has become painfully clear that, to achieve sustainable peace operations and effective state-building, there is a critical need to contextualize operational activities in relation to the local setting. This requires consultation with local stakeholders for a better understanding of community needs: what structures are already in place and can be built upon? It is necessary to identify and nurture traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution, as well as to see how they can be integrated with new, formal justice and security sector reforms.

Focusing on confidence-building measures – between host governments in the region, between governments and their citizens, and between conflict parties – is a dimension of inter-mission cooperation that is particularly innovative and should be more actively encouraged.

4. The Referendum on Independence in Sudan

The referendum for the independence of South Sudan, which took place in early January 2011, poses significant security, political and humanitarian risks for the entire region. In the near to medium term, this is the most important event for all of the four countries. Led by Thabo Mbeki, the joint UN–AU negotiation team have been championing a 'peaceful coexistence strategy'. This approach had envisioned two separate countries with close ties and soft borders, or a confederate model. This scenario accounts for the fact that South and North Sudan are heavily dependent on one another for survival.[8]

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[7]   Importantly, traditional mechanisms are typically more sustainable because they involve fewer external resources and impose lower socio-economic transaction costs on the local societies. See e.g. Hannah Neumann, 2010, 'Looking at the Recipients – What Impact Do Peacebuilding Interventions Have on Rural Citizens?,' Paper presented at *ECPR Graduate Conference,* Dublin City University.

[8]   Failure to acknowledge this interdependence is entirely counterproductive for both parts of Sudan. For example, South Sudan would not be able to transport its oil to the shore, and North Sudan would not be able to access important sections of the Nile River.

The secession by South Sudan can potentially derail the Darfur Peace Process and lead to a call for a referendum on secession there. It could also spark unrest and destabilize several neighbouring countries, particularly those with religious and cultural divides similar to the one existing in today's Sudan. Renewed conflict in South Sudan could result in significant refugee flows into Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, CAR and northern Sudan. In turn, protracted conflict and suffering could easily spread across borders along with refugee flows, as was the case with the Rwandan refugee camps in the DRC.

In a worst-case scenario, a 'Balkanization' of Sudan could lead to long-term conflict in both Sudan and the broader region as well, requiring an international presence there for years. While other powers in the region may want to see a weaker Sudan, they do not want the country to fragment into its constituent parts. The broader regional impact of events within Sudan, following the outcome of the referendum, indicates that this issue will pose challenges for inter-mission cooperation in the years to come. Today, however, there is no common perspective or complementary strategy, at UN headquarters or in the field, for addressing the potential destabilizing dimensions of this process.

5. Resistance from Host Governments

As indicated in the overview of the political relations among these four states, some host governments have been highly suspicious of regional approaches, regional meetings, and joint work by the UN missions. They have sent very clear messages to mission leadership about their lack of enthusiasm for regional cooperation. This was particularly the case in Sudan when the government refused to issue visas to participants in an inter-mission meeting scheduled to be held in Khartoum.

In general, Sudan has been the most active opponent of regional inter-mission cooperation because it sees MINURCAT in terms of Western interference in its own internal affairs. The government has viewed any attempt by MINURCAT to establish contact with the other missions, especially UNAMID, with great displeasure. Along similar lines, the government has not wanted to open space for any type of cooperation between UNMIS and UNAMID. For the Sudanese leaders in Khartoum, these missions have their own specific genesis, along with separate mandates, and therefore should not share assets, collaborate or have structured contact.

Experience indicates that the more fragile a host government is, the more suspicious it will be toward inter-mission cooperation, as well as

any other type of regional initiatives (led by the UN or not).[9] Weak governments easily feel threatened and come to regard efforts geared toward greater coordination among UN missions as part of an overall conspiracy against them.

Governments that have fundamental difficulties in relationships with the UN missions they host also tend to have a significant degree of mistrust about inter-mission consultations. In such cases, inter-mission cooperation is largely regarded as strengthening the UN side of the equation, the effect of which is to create more leverage for the mission they are hosting and to which they have a difficult rapport.

The Central African Republic stands out as an exception to these obstructive tendencies. Feeling neglected and forgotten by the UN and the international community as a whole, the CAR has sought a stronger MINURCAT presence in its territory, and would have welcomed a change in mandates in order to allow for greater complementarity between MINURCAT and BONUCA. Although the CAR has been more amenable to UN intervention than some of its neighbouring states, opportunities to utilize this goodwill in relation to mitigating suspicions from others are limited.

6. Institutional Challenges at the UN

The Security Council may have deemed inter-mission cooperation an important step forward, but commensurate changes at UN headquarters have either not yet been fully implemented or have suffered from serious flaws. Most notably, the lack of formal consultation and coordination processes at headquarters level – between the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), but also within both of these departments and with the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) – has posed a range of strategic and operational challenges for all five of the missions. In turn, this has hindered opportunities for creating a coherent and credible regional presence for the UN in Central Africa and Sudan.[10] For extended discussion of this issue, see Section III.B.4 below.

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[9] This type of dynamic also bears on the issue of confidence-building measures.

[10] Missions must also contend with a continuous mismatch between the political statements and promises made by HQ and timely delivery to the field, e.g., with respect to military personnel, large-scale infrastructure projects (some of which are critical for mission credibility vis-à-vis the host country and the international community), housing and other tasks essential for the effective functioning of field presences. These and other institutional shortcomings at the UN serve to undermine mission authority in the field: host governments and local populations can become sceptical and disillusioned when their expectations to the UN are unfulfilled. This creates unnecessary challenges for already overburdened peacekeeping field operations. Newly established missions like UNAMID and MINURCAT were particularly affected by similar difficulties, but had little incentive to share the lessons learned.

III. Efforts related to Inter-mission Cooperation

This segment of discussion reviews concrete examples of cooperation between the five missions, with attention focused on the actual processes and content of joint efforts. It begins with an overview of activities related to fostering inter-mission collaboration and then moves on to a more detailed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of cooperation.

In advance of this analysis, it is important to note that there are already a range of institutional mechanisms in place designed to facilitate inter-mission cooperation, both in the field and at UN headquarters. Chief among these are, respectively: Joint Mission Analysis Centres, Joint Operation Centres and the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF); Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) and Integrated Missions Task Forces. See Appendix 2 for elaboration of these mechanisms.

In particular, the ISF deserves mention here because MONUC and MINURCAT were two of the first missions to start applying this process (also see Section III.B.4 below). Launched during the 2008–2010 period, the ISF process is designed to enhance collaboration among and between missions and other UN actors in the country, such as the UN Country Team (UNCT), humanitarian initiatives and development-related projects. The ISF is focused on outlining key benchmarks for implementing mandates and planning the exit strategy of missions.

Whereas the ISF process has been partially successful, as the ensuing analysis demonstrates, other institutional mechanisms have been far less effective in terms of facilitating inter-mission cooperation.

A. Background Context

An initial effort to stimulate inter-mission cooperation began in 2005 under the sponsorship of the UN Office for West Africa, headquartered in Dakar, Senegal.[11] A DPA-supervised field presence, this UN regional office initiated the practice of convening regular meetings of

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[11] For information about subsequent developments in West Africa, see *Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and possible cross-border operations between the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire, 2 March 2005*:
http//unipsil.unmissions.org/portals/unipsil/media/documents/scrpt/sgrsl16.pdf.

the DPKO missions based in three West African countries – Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. These meetings may be considered as forerunners of the inter-mission cooperation efforts later carried out in Central Africa.

The main objective of these early meetings was related to the exchange of information as a way of keeping mission leadership teams abreast of developments in each of the countries concerned. In some highly specified areas (like youth employment programmes), a tentative effort was undertaken to design country programmes that were intended to be better coordinated and operated in parallel directions. This effort also hoped to take advantage of the lessons learned by each mission in implementing such programmes. This small-scale effort aside, the West Africa experience remained almost entirely focused on an information-sharing exercise. While valuable, this did not create additional opportunities that could be utilized to develop these early experiences more broadly.

Several recent developments, however, may allow for further developments in inter-mission cooperation. The forthcoming establishment of a similar DPA office in Gabon offers new opportunities both to revive the initial attempt in West Africa, and deepen existing efforts in Central Africa (see Section III.B below). The Gabon office will monitor and assess political developments in the Central African region. In order to be most effective in this task, it will require a clear mandate from the Security Council to play such role. It will also need a detailed memorandum of understanding between DPA and DPKO, defining the modalities of their interaction and cooperation at the field level.

Crucially, however, this new DPA office does not cover Sudan in its areas of responsibility. It includes only the member states of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), to which Sudan does not belong. Whilst the reasons for this limited geographic coverage are understandable within the ECCAS context, the exclusion of Sudan will nonetheless pose a major obstacle if this political mission is to be able to play a comprehensive role in the region. This is particularly the case at this historic juncture, when Sudan – the largest country in the vicinity, and in Africa – is currently engaged in a sensitive domestic process, the ramifications of which will affect the region for years to come.

B. General Overview of Activities

In addition to frequent contact through day-to-day work, two high-level meetings focusing on inter-mission cooperation took place between 2008 and 2010. On average, meetings were attended by six to

ten people representing each mission. With a much smaller field pre-
sence and limited logistics capacity, BONUCA was an exception, and
was not always able to be fully represented at the meetings.[12]

While some mission leaders regarded inter-mission cooperation as
important, others gave it less priority. In the latter cases, it was often a
Special Assistant in the SRSG's office who took the lead to ensure
that the mission leader was made aware of the initiative and provided
substantive guidance in terms of participation. The fact that inter-
mission cooperation was not specifically included in the mandated
tasks of senior mission personnel was a serious policy gap. Such co-
operation was not even included in the job assignments of other senior
managers, such as the Deputy SRSG or the Chief of Staff. In the case
of MONUC, the issue was dealt with through the Director of Political
Affairs, a level not sufficiently senior to mobilize the support of
UNPOL (the police component) or the Force (the mission's military
component).

The first meeting was held in Entebbe on 7–8 June 2009. This built on
a precursor meeting, held in 2008, between the SRSGs for
MINURCAT and UNAMID, and their direct collaborators. The En-
tebbe meeting had been planned for more than half a year but was re-
peatedly postponed. These successive postponements may be interpre-
ted as an indication of the difficulties involved in launching such a
process among the missions. Senior mission leadership, as well as rep-
resentatives from Political Affairs, Mission Analysis, Security,
UNPOL, the Force and Mission Support, attended the June 2009
meeting. However, participation was uneven and patchy. Neither
MONUC nor the Joint Special Mediation Team for Darfur sent repre-
sentatives. At this first meeting, participants nonetheless recognized
the value of the initiative and therefore agreed to meet three times a
year, sharing responsibility for arranging subsequent meetings.

The second meeting was initially expected to be in Sudan, but it soon
became clear that the Government of Sudan viewed a meeting of all of
the regional SRSGs in Khartoum with mistrust. Visas were not gran-
ted. Instead, the meeting was held in Entebbe on 10–11 December
2009, at the MONUC Support Base, which proved to be a neutral
space where subsequent meetings could be held unimpeded.

Initial lack of interest on the part of MONUC was due to the fact that
they saw these meetings as focused solely on the situation in Sudan
and the neighbouring states of Chad and the CAR. Only later on in the
process did they become more active in attending. This change of po-

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[12] In fact, BONUCA's participation depended on the capacity of MINURCAT to provide air
transport from Bangui.

sition was prompted by two developments that directly impacted on the Kinshasa-based mission: the northward movement of the LRA towards the tri-border area of Sudan, the CAR and the DRC; and the fact that the MONUC base in Entebbe was scheduled to become a regional logistics centre, outside the full control of MONUC.

The Joint Special Mediation Team for Darfur (JM) was never invited to the meetings. UNAMID in particular was not very keen to involve the JM, for fear of adding another dimension of complexity to an already difficult relationship between these two actors in the region. From the JM's perspective, there likewise was never any special interest in attending meetings or developing closer contact with the missions, specifically with respect to UNAMID and MINURCAT. Cooperation between these two peacekeeping missions and this political office was rather formal and merely administrative. This reveals an important aspect of inter-mission cooperation: the lack of vigilance on the part of the international community, whereby none of these players were ever questioned about their levels of substantive collaboration. In the end, it all boiled down to how strong personalities could (or could not) work together to identify the complementarities between their mandates. In turn, this indicates a need for more stringent institutional mechanisms oriented toward facilitating inter-mission cooperation.

It soon became clear that aiming for two high-level meetings per year was ambitious, despite considerable agreement about the need for these meetings. They were perceived as having the potential to make positive contributions to information sharing and political analysis, developing scenarios and joint planning, and facilitating access to common assets. However, it was equally clear that some important conditions for holding these meetings at regular intervals were not in place: encouragement from the UN Secretariat, and commitment from the leadership of the various missions.

C. Inter-mission Cooperation: Strengths and Weaknesses

The six shared issues identified in Section II.B above – security, non-state armed groups, confidence-building measures, the referendum in Sudan, resistance from host governments and institutional challenges at the UN – combined with existing UN mechanisms for facilitating inter-mission cooperation, raise at least four cross-cutting themes: information sharing and joint analysis; coordination of security; civil affairs, including peacebuilding at the local level; and institutional challenges internal to the UN. Extended attention is given to the latter as it is a primary obstacle to greater inter-mission cooperation.

1. Information Sharing and Joint Analysis

Perhaps the greatest achievement of efforts to facilitate inter-mission cooperation has been that regional meetings have offered an opportunity for participants to brief one another about the internal situation in their host country and the work of each mission. Equally evident is the on-going need to take a much more focused approach to information sharing. Specifically, attention must be given to establishing more formal and structured practices of information sharing geared toward bringing greater strategic and operational benefits to the missions, enabling better understanding of regional dynamics and fostering a more active approach to sharing lessons learned and the exchange of experiences.

At the strategic level, there have been no institutionalized mechanisms for information sharing and comparison of political analyses. Neither the Joint Mission Analysis Centres nor the Political Affairs Sections of each mission have formalized platforms for exchanging this type of information. For example, when Sudan expelled 10 international NGOs from Darfur in the aftermath of President Al-Bashir's indictment by the International Criminal Court, there was great concern about the potential for a massive displacement of people and a refugee flow across the border to Chad. However, this scenario was never jointly analysed by the two neighbouring missions, nor did the Joint Mediation Team for Darfur become involved at any time.

Although plans were made on both sides of the border for the eventuality of such a population movement, this was not underpinned by any type of formal or structured consultations, beyond the exchanges between the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) within the UN Secretariat, UN Security and humanitarian colleagues on both sides of the line. Moreover, DPKO headquarters and OCHA were not in a position to encourage the missions to plan together. OCHA remained highly protective in relation to preserving its humanitarian neutrality, and approached DPKO and the missions only with very specific security-related requests.

Similarly, there has never been a joint analysis of the impact of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan on the other countries hosting missions. Although all the missions recognize the watershed dimensions of the North–South Sudan issue, there was no interest in developing a common understanding of its implications for the region, including the broader consequences of a possible split. This was reinforced by the failure of headquarters to offer incentives for or to encourage this type of joint reflection.

The 'information is power' phenomenon proved the greatest obstacle to information sharing. Such an attitude prevails in most organizations, but is especially evident in the UN Secretariat's organizational culture, with its long-term habit of compartmentalizing or withholding key information. This approach clearly has an adverse impact on joint information analyses and operational decisions. The LRA has been a central issue for all these missions – but the tendency to withhold information is the primary reason that a more detailed and accurate understanding of the LRA issue has not yet been compiled.[13] Integrated and automated reporting, alongside focused and directed information-sharing sessions, could have been one way to overcome this challenge.

While solutions at the regional level have been proposed (like a Regional Information Fusion Cell), they have not yet been adopted, as they are not explicitly included in the mandates of the missions and therefore risk generating serious opposition within the host countries. In addition, the capacity to analyse information has been more advanced in some missions than others. Those analysis centres with greater capacity have not seen the need to collaborate with colleagues who were less well-prepared for performing this task. They have not deemed it relevant to assist the latter in enhancing their level of situation awareness and knowledge, nor have they been encouraged by HQ to do so.

There is thus a continued need to improve and rectify the common understanding of and missing links in the knowledge of the individual missions. There is also a need to identify mission focal points and establish systematic forms of information sharing across missions. While *ad hoc* informal exchanges are beneficial, such an approach is far too limited when it comes to more effectively enabling communication in the large-scale context of regional cooperation. Instead, a combination of both *ad hoc* and structured patterns of information sharing must be developed.

2. Coordination of Security

Efforts to better coordinate responses to the security issues in the region offer an example of successful inter-mission cooperation. Taking best advantage of operational mechanisms for sharing information and enabling cooperation, for example, UNAMID and MINURCAT

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[13]   Spearheaded by MINURCAT, belated collaboration around this issue did occur at the last regional meeting in December 2009. However, this initial effort received no follow-up attention because MINURCAT shifted its focus to the complex process of mission withdrawal from Chad by the end of 2010.

practised regular exchange of their military liaison officers, who were posted to the Joint Operations Centres.

The Office of the Military Advisor (OMA), a headquarters-based structure, also organized regular bi-annual meetings between the Force Commanders of all four DPKO missions (BONUCA had no military component). This initiative was well appreciated by the Force Commanders, as they were able to discuss the different challenges they faced. In particular, these meetings offered them the opportunity to compare how the various host countries related to the UN Force, especially their relations with national armies. These meetings also allowed Force Commanders to share experiences about dealing with the non-state armed groups operating in their areas of responsibility.

Exchange of information about the civilian protection mandates of the Security Sections of each mission is probably the best example of the way forward. There was daily contact among the heads of these sections or their key staff, fully encouraged by the Department of Security and Safety (DSS) at the UN Secretariat, and critical information was sent across the border regions. In the future, more can be done along these lines, to build on the synergies that do exist between the civilian security components of each mission. For instance, the missions could establish a joint early-warning system, as well as be requested to devise a regional approach to assessing shared threats. They could also be authorized to establish DSS liaison desks in each of the Joint Operations Centres, the primary task of which would be the identification and transmission of relevant security information to the parent mission.

Although these examples of best practice in the context of security-related issues stand as positive developments in regional cooperation, crucial shortcomings still exist. These cut across both the security sections of each mission, as well as the missions as a whole. Four of these merit discussion here.

First, while successful in themselves, the OMA regional meetings were not fully integrated into the larger inter-mission collaboration processes, due largely to time constraints. Where the military components of the missions did discuss their force-protection mandates, the protection of civilians was never taken up at inter-mission meetings. In fact, it became evident that there was a range of understandings and misunderstandings on this matter. No common or coherent view emerged on how to present this issue to host countries, to the other states in the region or to the NGO community. This prevented the UN from establishing a coherent regional military position regarding vulnerable civilians at risk. Given more time, however, it should be pos-

sible to capitalize on the success of OMA regional meetings and work out constructive ways for better linking the consultative process among the military with an overall strategy of regional collaboration.

Second, there is the continuing mismatch between OMA announcements about timelines for the deployment of pledged forces and their actual arrival on the ground. This has created serious problems for the missions in terms of managing the security threats with which they have had to contend. It has also undermined their legitimacy vis-à-vis the host governments, humanitarian actors and the populations they are there to protect. For example, the agenda for the ECCAS regional meeting in N'Djamena in November 2009 included the issue of delayed deployments and the related poor performance of the military components of the peacekeeping operations. The ECCAS member states were obviously frustrated with the deployment aspects of the DPKO missions. In the DRC, Darfur and Chad, delays in the deployment of military forces had similar causes, but the matter was never jointly discussed by the missions and the OMA. Consequently, there were no opportunities for the exchange of information and lessons learned by each mission to mitigate the impact of such delays – or, better still, to avoid these delays in the first place. Moreover, there was no shared narrative about this critical issue that could be used for public information purposes and for the policy dialogue with the host governments.

Third, disparities over security phases on different sides of common borders also pose a challenge. Where MINURCAT classified Eastern Chad as a Phase IV security threat, UNAMID put their side of the border on a Phase III alert. For an outside observer at least, this indicates that the two missions did not coordinate their security threat analyses. Crucially, this lack of consensus between the two missions allowed Sudan to take advantage of and play on this difference. For example, without a common analysis, UNAMID was in a weaker position to respond to pressure to lower the security phase to III on its side of the border. Conversely, this created the opportunity to single out MINURCAT as being excessively concerned with a security situation that its sister mission considered less threatening.

Fourth, there is a continued need for better contextualization of responses to the situation on the ground as regards military planning. On the one hand, the low-intensity, banditry-like security threats facing the missions indicate that it is necessary to recalibrate responses to and military planning for field operations so that the security components of these missions are provided with the right assets for the right tasks. Although dealing with unconventional threats, the missions have tended to respond in conventional ways that are not best suited to the nature of the threats, nor do they have hardware and resources

adapted to these types of challenges and environments. For instance, more helicopters and aerial surveillance could provide more effective and efficient support to the forces on the ground.

On the other, there is also a need for greater inter-mission uniformity in available security resources, as appropriate. Although each mission is faced with similar security threats, the security components of these missions are differently designed from one country to the next. For example, Formed Police Units[14] were deployed to Darfur – but mission planners at HQ did not deem them important for eastern Chad, despite their clear suitability for that part of the country. For many actors in the region, including the Government of Chad and the foreign embassies in N'Djamena, such disparities are difficult to apprehend. In turn, this creates unnecessary confusion and frustration with respect to UN operations in the region.

3. Civil Affairs, Including Support to Local Peace Building Efforts

There is a clear need to strengthen the capacity of local authorities to better enable them to undertake conflict resolution activities and develop more effective peacebuilding mechanisms at the local level. However, mission efforts to this effect have failed to take into account the different levels of legitimacy that local authorities enjoy vis-à-vis the populations they represent. In general, most local authorities have been appointed by capital cities instead of gaining office through local elections. Local populations have differing attitudes toward this state of affairs – local government appointees are better accepted in some countries than in others. However, no comparative analyses have been undertaken on the impact these differences of perspective have on the civil affairs activities of the missions.

The need for such analyses is underscored by the fact that there has been a breakdown in relations between the local administrative authorities and traditional leaders in all four countries. By and large, the missions have preferred to work with the local administrative structures because they represent the central government. Nonetheless, there have been some positive experiences of working with traditional chiefs and customary leaders. However, these experiences have never been explored on a broader basis. Moreover, there has been no inter-mission sharing of lessons learned on these matters, notwithstanding the fact that success in this domain will greatly contribute to the consolidation of achievements and the harmonious resolution of conflicts.

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14   The Formed Police Unit concept is inspired on the French gendarmerie corps of police. It is a police force that has a paramilitary training and is basically employed to deal with serious mass disruptions of public order.

Even though the missions have often faced similar circumstances, there has been no coherent approach to civilian affairs or peacebuilding efforts on the ground. In fact, there are as many approaches to these activities as there are missions in this region. For example, MINURCAT has focused on intercommunity dialogue to facilitate reconciliation between opposed groups and ease the return of displaced populations. As part of a larger strategy, this contributes to addressing some of the root causes of the conflict, as well as stemming recruitment by rebel groups. It also facilitates the return of IDPs to their villages of origin – one of the main benchmarks of the mission. In contrast, the military component of UNAMID used the construction of water points to facilitate dialogue and reduce tension while it was doing border patrols along porous national boundaries.

Peacebuilding is a highly context-specific challenge, but there is some scope for taking a more coordinated approach, perhaps especially in border areas where ethnic groups migrate back and forth between mission host countries. There is also a need for a more active exchange of experience which could serve to strengthen these crucial activities.

4. Institutional Challenges Internal to the UN

Inadequate Mission Mandates
When the Security Council encouraged greater inter-mission collaboration, it did not ensure that such a requirement was included in the different mandates of these five missions, nor did it ensure consistency and/or complementarity between the mandates. Moreover, the Security Council did not formally request the missions to include in their periodic reports any concrete references to inter-mission cooperation – such as benchmarks for cooperation, joint activities, shared issues for focused consideration, coherent approaches to the same set of challenges, and so on.

This lack of political direction from the member states was never acknowledged by the UN Secretariat as a matter to be included in the advice the SG provided to the Security Council. This indicates that there is too little institutional sensitivity at HQ as regards the regional dimensions that impact on each of these missions, despite their geographic proximity and the shared challenges they face. Rather, it appears that member states and the UN Secretariat view each mission in discrete terms – from country-specific perspectives.

This tendency has been further exacerbated by the missions themselves, never seeking to jointly advise the Secretary-General or the Security Council on region-wide issues. Missions have neither been

required to report on regional perspectives, nor have they taken the initiative to develop a common position that could be shared with the SG and the SC. As with HQ, each mission has remained more focused on its own specific context. Without an institutional framework developed and approved at the policy level by headquarters to facilitate inter-mission cooperation, daily pressure on the domestic front of each mission has served to crowd out regional collaboration from their agendas.

HQ Operational Disjunctions: Communication
Disjunctions at HQ level between DPKO and DPA, as well as within these departments, have created additional obstacles to inter-mission cooperation. In particular, there has been very little high-level substantive exchange, in New York, between DPA and DPKO on matters pertaining to the CAR.[15] Even when preparing for Security Council meetings, those at DPA responsible for overseeing BONUCA have not consulted their DPKO counterparts in charge of MINURCAT in an organized fashion, despite the obvious complementarity that should have been established between the two missions. This has adversely impacted on both missions as to their ability to take a consistent approach in terms of priorities. For example, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Programme in the CAR was considered a top priority for BONUCA. Implemented in the particularly sensitive Vakaga Region, an area of operations for MINURCAT in the CAR, this DDR programme required a security environment that MINURCAT had not been mandated to implement, nor had the means to guarantee.

This lack of communication is also a problem within DPKO headquarters. For example, Integrated Operations Teams (IOTs) have been set up for each mission in order to provide backstopping. So far, however, the IOTs have not consulted amongst themselves in a structured manner.[16] This has been made more complex by the fact that MONUSCO is in a separate directorate at DPKO and BONUCA is at DPA, which is an entirely different department from DPKO.

Resource Deficits in the Field
The concept of operations adopted within DPKO is not matched with resources coming from the Department of Field Support (DFS). Moreover, questions must be raised about the procedures for awarding

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[15] The fact that the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) have not been properly linked to the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the department responsible for BONUCA/BINUCA, offered additional coherence challenges. The PBSO and the PBC likewise have not consulted the other missions in the region. However, events in the other host countries could have an impact on the political and security situation in the CAR.
[16] This suggests the urgent need for an impartial strategic review of the IOT mechanism.

contracts to international firms that have an established record of poor performance. What, for example, are the requirements and impediments at HQ for briefing neighbouring missions about difficulties related to the substandard performance of major international contractors that have been encountered in another country? Contractors may fail to operate effectively in one environment (e.g., Darfur) – how then do they come to be offered similar jobs across the border, for instance in Chad?

Shortcomings in the ISF Process
More substantively, it is relevant to mention the links between headquarters and the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) processes in the host countries. Although MINURCAT was one of the first missions to engage in the ISF process, in this context it is an exceptional case because the mission did not have a political mandate, nor was it an integrated mission. Nonetheless, the ISF process proved useful in aligning the mission with the UNCT around a common understanding of the challenges they were facing, the key milestones necessary for the mission to achieve in order to start phasing out, and what tasks would be handed over to the UNCT once MINURCAT had completed its mandate. Due to the withdrawal of consent by the Government of Chad for MINURCAT in early 2010, and the subsequent phased withdrawal of the mission (finalized by 31 December 2010), the ISF was transformed into an exit strategy for the mission, in particular outlining the responsibilities of the Government of Chad, MINURCAT, and the UNCT.

In the DRC, President Kabila has signalled his wish for the exit of the peacekeeping mission by the time of the elections in October 2011. On 28 May 2010, MONUSCO had the word 'stabilization' added to its name in order to indicate that the DRC has moved from a peacekeeping to a stabilization phase. This is in keeping with the ISF process, which outlines key benchmarks for consolidation of peace in the country.

While MINURCAT and MONUSCO successfully utilized the ISF process, this was not extended to the regional meetings because the other three missions had not undertaken this process. Nonetheless, the ISF offers a structured framework for better positioning all of the missions in relation to a strategic harmonizing process that can combine peace and security issues with humanitarian responses and development assistance within a larger geopolitical context.

At UN headquarters, in contrast, there is no mirror process that reflects the ISF process in the field, even though headquarters actively encouraged the missions to initiate an ISF exercise. Moreover, support

from New York to the country-specific ISF processes has been of low intensity. The Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF), designed to bring together DPKO, DFS, OCHA, UNDP and other funds and programmes, was active only at the very start of mission planning. Although the IMTF was useful during the ISF process, it remained dormant during crucial stages of mission activity, even when various crises occurred in each of the four countries hosting missions, and notwithstanding the fact that such crises required a comprehensive response from different parts of the UN system. Furthermore, there has never been any substantive attention given to the possibility of a regional perspective in the strategic collaboration between the peacekeeping operations and the regional offices of the UN, such as the Economic Commission for Africa.

IV. Final Considerations

While there are sound reasons for increased cooperation, pooling of resources, information sharing and joint analysis, as the preceding discussions have indicated, obstacles emerge in attempts to put all this into practice. This final section indicates directions for further analysis, research, discussion and review. It also identifies several operational and policy issues that require additional study to increase the cooperation between neighbouring missions in order to make them more efficient, cost-effective and better linked to the implementation of their mandates and the resolution of peace and security issues with cross-border and/or regional dimensions.

In shedding light on the issue of inter-mission cooperation as this relates to field experiences as well as operations at UN headquarters, it becomes clear that even simple adjustments can make significant improvements to all aspects of a peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission. It is often difficult to generalize and apply lessons learned to specific new contexts. Nonetheless, it is evident that when two or more peacekeeping operations are engaged in the same region, and even share borders, they can gain much from comparing and exchanging experiences on a regular basis.

This report is intended as a modest contribution to further developing these potentials. At the same time, it is equally clear that more research and analysis are needed, to invigorate and stimulate the untapped potential for improving peacekeeping operations.

A. Dealing with Low-level Threats to Security

1. Joint mapping of armed groups and criminality across borders.
2. Documenting lessons learned on DDR in the region and more active sharing of experiences between the missions.
3. Inter-community dialogue, confidence-building measures and other efforts by Civil Affairs to deal with local-level conflicts may be a promising way to address grievances and stem recruitment to rebel groups. However, this requires careful attention to local power dynamics to better facilitate local ownership and sustainability.
4. Sharing experience on programmes designed to prevent violence against women and children.

B. Administrative Issues

1. Reshuffle of administrative staff and synergizing selected administrative functions co-located at the Entebbe Support Base – human resources, induction, contingent receiving centres, payroll, supplies, logistics, travel and air services, etc.[17] The position of troop-contributing countries and police-contributing countries also needs to be better understood and be part of the policy dialogue.
2. Missions should provide some support to the Entebbe Support Base, including staff and vehicles to better enable it to function as a regional hub; this needs to be conceptualized and discussed with the 5th Committee (Administrative and Budgetary) of the UN General Assembly.
3. Air assets could be shared more effectively. There is no reason to have significant air assets parked on the ground when they are needed in neighbouring missions.

C. Information-Sharing, and Analysis of Political and Security Dimensions

1. A Joint Missions Analysis Centre and a Regional Information Fusion Cell should be established in Entebbe.
2. Inter-mission meetings should take place every second month on the operational level, between heads of the appropriate sections, and every half year on the strategic level – for instance, Head of Mission and other key mission managers, such as the Force Commanders, the Police Commissioners, the Directors of Administration, JMAC, Political Affairs and Human Rights Chiefs, either in person in Entebbe or by video conference.
3. A joint Regional Security Threat Assessment prepared by UN Security/UNDSS, including possible scenarios and responses, should be prepared jointly at the end of each quarter.
4. Missions should also facilitate closer cooperation between the UN Country Teams as they have necessary logistical equipment at their disposal. UN Country Team Coordination meetings, bringing together the UN representatives from each host country, can be held at the margins of the inter-mission coordination meetings, as they take place every six months.

D. Military Capabilities and Cooperation

1. Commercial provision of some of the military capabilities required in order to make efficient use of technology available to imple-

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[17] In other words, the Entebbe Support Base should function as a type of field office for DSF, the effect of which would be to bring in better, more efficient services whilst allowing for economies of scale and greater savings. Solely focused on operational concerns, this approach is entirely distinct from issues related to policy considerations.

ment mandates and concepts of operations in a cost-effective manner should be considered from a regional perspective; such means could be made available on a cost-sharing basis among the different missions.

2. In light of the fact that most missions today are given protection mandates and are dealing with low-intensity threats to security, there is a need for general revision of the type of military capabilities and assets deployed for peacekeeping missions, whilst also making sure that similar approaches are adopted throughout a region facing similar problems.

3. The Force Commander meetings organized by the OMA should be integrated with inter-mission meetings in order to avoid 'meeting overload' and duplication of efforts.

E. Headquarters and Changes in UN Incentive Structures

1. In each mission, one of the DSRSGs should have in her/his terms of reference the responsibility to promote inter-mission cooperation.

2. Inter-mission coordination should be monitored by the Security Council. The periodic reports of the Secretary-General to the Council should include a section describing progress achieved by the missions in terms of inter-mission cooperation and the promotion of regional approaches.

3. Senior members of the Integrated Operations Teams should participate in strategic-level inter-mission meetings.

Appendix 1: The Missions[18]

BINUCA (formerly BONUCA until 31 December 2009)

Established on 01 January 2010, the United Nations Integrated Peace Building Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA) is a field office of the Department of Political Affairs. The mission operates under a mandate from the Security Council to promote peace and stability in the country and reduce cross-border insecurity.

In particular, BINUCA works in cooperation with the broader UN presence in the CAR to encourage national dialogue and reconciliation and to help the Central African Republic enact military reforms, implement human rights policies, train civilian police, and disarm, demobilize and reintegrate former soldiers. This mission also supports the development of professional media services.

MINURCAT

Established on 25 September 2007, the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) is mandated to contribute to the protection of civilians (including IDPs, refugees and humanitarian workers), to promote human rights and the rule of law, widen the humanitarian space, and promote regional peace. On 14 January 2009, the UN Security Council authorized the mission to take over responsibility for the military component from the European Union military force (EUFOR), which it assumed on 15 March 2009.

MINURCAT also provided support to the Government of Chad to create a Chadian police/gendarme force, the *Détachment Intégré de Securité* (DIS). Selected, trained and mentored by MINURCAT, DIS officers are deployed around the main refugee camps and the key towns of eastern Chad. As part of its exit strategy (MINURCAT leaves on 31 December 2010), the mission mandate was revised to focus on working with the Government of Chad to consolidate gains achieved to date and to help develop plans for their sustainability.

Security Council Resolution 1778: 25 September 2007
Security Council Resolution 1861: 14 January 2009 (deployment of military component)

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[18] This appendix is based on information from the homepages of the various missions, which are presented in alphabetical order here.

Security Council Resolution 1923: 25 May 2010 (end of mission 31 December 2010)

MONUSCO (formerly MONUC until 01 July 2010)

Established on 28 May 2010, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) took over from an earlier UN peacekeeping operation, MONUC, on 1 July 2010. This handover reflects the fact that the DRC has now reached a new phase of post-conflict reconstruction.

The new mission has been authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate. Among other things, this relates to the protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders under imminent threat of physical violence, and to support the Government of the DRC in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts

Security Council Resolution 1925: 28 May 2010

UNAMID

Established on 31 July 2007, the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) formally took over from the African Union Mission in the Sudan (AMIS) on 31 December 2007. The core mandate of the mission is the protection of civilians. It is further tasked with providing support for the early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and preventing the disruption of its implementation.

UNAMID is specifically responsible for making a contribution to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

Security Council Resolution 1769: 31 July 2007 (repeatedly extended)

UNMIS

Established 24 March 2005, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) is charged with supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed by the Government of Sudan

and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army on 9 January 2005. In addition, the mission is mandated to perform certain functions relating to humanitarian assistance, and the protection and promotion of human rights.

UNMIS remains on the ground to provide good offices and political support to the Sudanese political parties. It also monitors and verifies their security arrangements and offers assistance across a range of areas, including good governance, post-conflict recovery and development.

Security Council Resolution 1590: 24 March 2005

Appendix 2: Institutional Mechanisms

The following overview describes the primary institutional mechanisms already in place at the UN for facilitating inter-mission cooperation.

Field-based Mechanisms

1. JMAC: The Joint Mission Analysis Centre
The Joint Mission Analysis Centre is a mission-based structure under direct SRSG supervision. It compiles information received from open sources and mission components (military, police, security and civil affairs). The central tasks of the JMAC are to identify relevant trends, early-warning indicators, assess information and formulate political analyses.

2. JOC: Joint Operations Centre
The Joint Operations Centre is the mission situation room. Working on a 24-hour basis, the JOC collates all the information received and produces daily situation reports.

3. ISF: Integrated Strategic Framework
The Integrated Strategic Framework is designed to provide strategic direction to the entire UN presence in the country. It identifies the key medium-term objectives the UN should achieve, as well as defining the role of the DPKO and other UN entities, agencies, programmes and funds in the country in pursuing these objectives. The ISF also determines the main parameters of the transition from a peacekeeping phase to peacebuilding and development.

Headquarters-based Mechanisms

1. IOT: Integrated Operations Teams
The Integrated Operations Teams are based at DPKO headquarters in New York. Convening officers from the political, administrative, logistics, police and military areas, IOTs are tasked with providing integrated and coherent support to field missions. This approach aims to improve the guidance and services that headquarters is intended to provide to the field mission. Importantly, however, it is necessary to

review the actual usefulness of IOTs – a matter requiring urgent atten-
tion and independent evaluation.

2. IMTF: Integrated Mission Task Force

The Integrated Mission Task Force concept was adopted to assist with
the initial phases of mission planning and launching. It brings together
headquarters personnel from DPKO, DFS, and other relevant depart-
ments, funds and programmes. Mission design is one of the key tech-
nical tasks of the IMTF. Experience in the field has shown that it
would be useful to keep the IMTF active for the entire duration of a
field mission, as it allows for greater coherence at headquarters level.