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# Role of South–South Cooperation and Emerging Powers in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding

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# Executive Summary

1. In the wake of recurring conflicts, there has been a renewed focus on the use of political tools of diplomacy and mediation combined with the provision of long-term capacity-building support to conflict-affected countries to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and, through peacebuilding, to *build effective and inclusive institutions as a basis for sustainable peace*. This has created new opportunities as well as challenges for the United Nations (UN) across its peace and security pillar, in particular for the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), the political arm of the UN Secretariat, for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).
2. The complex demands and expectations of building core national capacities in fragile societies in the areas of conflict prevention, mediation and inclusive political processes, while ensuring that UN good offices, crisis response and peacemaking services were easily and rapidly deployable, have required the UN to construct enhanced partnerships with traditional as well as non-traditional partners with a view to bolstering the resource base, scaling up capacity, developing best practices and harmonizing policies. In particular, the preference indicated by conflict-affected countries for assistance from the South, recent mandates by intergovernmental bodies, and initiatives taken by other stakeholders within and outside the UN system have created a pressing context for the Organization as a whole and its constituent departments to *consider enhancing partnerships with the Global South to realize the potential of South-South cooperation* in the shared interest of building sustainable peace.
3. Noting the gap between increasing demands and resources available for mobilization in support of conflict-affected countries in five priority areas, including in the area of ‘inclusive political processes’ where the DPA was identified as the lead UN actor for delivery of support,<sup>1</sup> a 2011 Civilian Capacity Review recommended the need to deepen/widen the pool of deployable civilian expertise, particularly from countries in the Global South with relevant experience in post-

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<sup>1</sup> The other four priority areas identified were basic safety and security, justice, economic revitalization, and core government functionalities.

conflict peacebuilding and democratic transitions. These recommendations, subsequently endorsed by the Security Council and the General Assembly, represented a first attempt to harness systematically the wealth of knowledge, expertise and resources in the Global South and broaden the application of the developmentally-focused framework for *South–South cooperation* to include the peace and security pillar as part of a comprehensive and coherent system-wide strategy to provide long-term, effective, tailored and sustainable support to conflict-affected countries.

4. Recognition of the Global South as a potential source of relevant civilian expertise has evolved against the background of the emergence of major democratic powers (‘emerging powers’) in the Global South,<sup>2</sup> such as India, Brazil and South Africa,<sup>3</sup> and their growing engagement in fragile societies within the framework of bilateral and multilateral arrangements. In addition to contributing resources at a time of global austerity, the emerging powers can offer *alternative models* of conflict management and development, shaped by their recent transition experiences that could be more easily replicated and adapted to the local contexts of other developing countries. Rejecting Western donor–recipient models of assistance in favour of a South–South framework for cooperation that underscored a partnership among equals for mutual benefit and relying on their own experiences in successful democratic transitions as well as peace agendas and strategic interests, the emerging powers have redefined international assistance and peacebuilding as an expression of solidarity and shared experiences and also pushed for a more inclusive and representative global governance architecture. Consequently, any efforts to enhance partnership with the Global South and the emerging powers as providers of civilian assistance and expertise require a keen understanding of these global dynamics and the South–South cooperation framework within which the countries of the Global South prefer to operate – bilaterally and multilaterally.

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<sup>2</sup> The significance of the emergence of the Global South and resurgence in South–South cooperation were the main themes of several UN annual publications in 2013, including the UNDP’s *Human Development Report, The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*, 2013, which examines the profound shift in global dynamics that were being driven by the fast-rising powers of the developing world – and the implications of this phenomenon for human development and progress; and UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)’s, *Global Development Report, A Renewed Global Partnership for Development*, 2013.

<sup>3</sup> The observations in this report are largely restricted to the experiences of the IBSA group of emerging democratic countries: India, Brazil and South Africa.

5. An appreciation of the *'new normal'* in the international order, defined by resurgence in South–South cooperation and the dynamic engagement and leverage of the emerging powers in fragile societies and multilateral forums, is critical to the UN for implementation of its core mandate in the maintenance of international peace and security, a mandate that has become increasingly more operational, complex and expansive. It would allow the UN to better align resources with its responsibilities and increase its effectiveness and impact, including by tapping into the enormous potential of South–South cooperation to provide relevant models and capacity. With the recognition that most conflicts are fundamentally political in nature, the role of the DPA in particular has become central to initiating and coordinating system-wide conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts.<sup>4</sup> The recent resistance of emerging powers to bring South–South cooperation support activities and OECD–DAC assistance under a common framework of aid effectiveness has underscored the need for the DPA and other UN stakeholders to play an effective role in bringing fragmented international responses to conflict under a coherent framework. By genuinely helping to incorporate the perspectives and approaches of traditional and non-traditional actors alike and contributing to the formulation of a UN position, the DPA, in close coordination with the PBSO, could better position itself to play a *catalytic role* and work with the wider UN membership in implementing conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding mandates. With its robust network at headquarters, proximity to the workings of key intergovernmental bodies such as the Security Council, and an expanding presence in the field, the DPA is uniquely positioned to play such a policy role.
6. The substantial experience of the various UN agencies, funds, programmes and offices, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in supporting and mainstreaming South–South cooperation in all aspects of their work could allow the UN Secretariat, in particular the DPA, the DPKO and the PBSO, to leverage the existing architecture, normative consensus and work processes in facilitating triangular and South–South cooperation in areas of their work related to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. This becomes relevant also in view of the increasing collaboration between the Secretariat, UNDP and other agencies, funds and programmes in areas of conflict prevention and management and efforts to *'Deliver as One'* – not

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<sup>4</sup> This report focuses on the work of DPA only within the UN Secretariat.

just in terms of logistics but in developing substantive system-wide coherence. For example, in the proposed post-2015 framework, there is a strong push to rectify the omission of peace and security in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) framework as development goals and formulate a global agenda that fosters the nexus between peace, security and development, ensures coherent and consistent policy frameworks, strengthens purpose-oriented and long-term partnerships through concrete mechanisms, such as South–South cooperation, and enables realization of an ambitious agenda and priorities.

7. This report focuses on the potential for the UN Secretariat, particularly the DPA, to benefit from the above-discussed set of circumstances. Currently there is no clear, deliberate strategy that systematically operationalizes and mainstreams the South–South cooperation framework in the DPA to address country-specific as well as thematic peace and security challenges – although several initiatives within the DPA, however anecdotal and unintended, including in its Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), Policy and Mediation Division (PMD), Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR) and others, could be viewed as supporting and facilitating South–South cooperation. Developing a strategy that can bring together these aspects, coupled with outreach to increase awareness and realization of these initiatives, could strengthen the DPA’s ties with South–South cooperation and the emerging powers, stimulating serious policy dialogue aimed at furthering the DPA and the UN’s impact on issues of importance to the Secretary-General and the broader membership.
8. The present report aims to stimulate an informed and evidence-based dialogue in the UN Secretariat by reflecting on compelling developments and added value for the DPA’s work through institutionalization of South–South cooperation as a key modality for enlarging and bettering collaborative, coherent and effective political initiatives at the national, regional and interregional levels in support of conflict-affected countries, in mission as well as non-mission settings.
9. The report is divided into six thematic parts, each part containing summary observations and recommendations that are also compiled in the annex:
  - *Part I (Resurgence of South–South cooperation: the game-changer?)* explains the South–South cooperation framework and briefly traces enhanced efforts system-wide to facilitate and mainstream it in context of development and peacebuilding goals.



- *Part II (The new normal: exercise of soft power by Southern powers)* considers the emergence of major powers in the Global South, their role and exercise of soft power in fragile societies and multinational forums, and the implications of their strong preference for functioning within a South–South cooperation framework.
  - *Part III (Peacebuilding: a paradigm shift)* explores the mutual complementarity between the current approach to peacebuilding, with its emphasis on long-term capacity building in conflict-affected countries, and South–South cooperation.
  - *Parts IV and V (South–South cooperation in peacebuilding mandates; Mapping and matching Southern capacities)* provide evidence of extensive support for and mainstreaming of South–South cooperation in intergovernmental mandates relating to peacebuilding, as well as noteworthy initiatives of national and multilateral organizations to map and match demand with supply among countries of the Global South.
  - *Part VI (South–South cooperation, emerging powers and the DPA: charting the way forward )* looks at the DPA’s transformation and fusion of its analytical capacities at headquarters with operational capacities in the field, draws attention to its inadvertent support of South–South cooperation in several areas of work, and offers actionable recommendations that would lead to the DPA aligning its support of South–South cooperation with that of other UN actors with a view to strategically playing a catalytic role in harnessing the resources of the Global South, formulating a coherent policy framework that enhances its partnership with the emerging powers and other UN and non-UN actors, and effectively implementing its mandate within the recognized resource constraints.
10. The report has benefited from a four-month-long UN sabbatical leave programme.<sup>5</sup> The findings could be further enriched through additional study of the DPA's collaboration with regional and sub-regional organizations as well as the role of DPA regional offices in facilitation of South–South cooperation.

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<sup>5</sup> For the duration of the sabbatical programme, Prof. Jean Krasno, International Studies Program, Yale University, served as the supervisor.

# I. Resurgence of South–South cooperation: the game changer?


11. South–South cooperation, originally referred to as ‘technical cooperation among developing countries’ (TCDC), has emerged as a powerful mechanism or framework for cooperation among developing countries that pursue their individual and/or shared national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships involving governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia and the private sector. South–South cooperation activities have been initiated, organized and managed by developing countries themselves and were intended to complement, not substitute, North–South cooperation. The participation of developed countries and multilateral organizations, through triangular cooperation,<sup>6</sup> is deemed critical to facilitating and fostering South–South cooperation.
12. The two sets of guiding principles of South–South cooperation as confirmed in the Nairobi outcome document adopted in 2009 by the High-level Committee are as follows:
  - (a) Normative principles, including respect for sovereignty and national ownership, non-interference in domestic affairs, partnership among equals, demand-driven engagement for mutual benefit, non-conditionality
  - (b) Operational principles; including mutual accountability, development effectiveness (transfer of knowledge with a view to strengthening local capacity and developing national

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<sup>6</sup> According to the Note by the Secretary-General on *Framework of operational guidelines on United Nations support to South–South and triangular cooperation*, triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or more developing countries supported by a developed country(ies)/or multilateral organization(s) to implement development cooperation programmes and projects. For details, see SSC/17/3, p.5.

resources), coordination of evidence- and results-based initiatives, and a multi-stakeholder approach.<sup>7</sup>

13. Persistent calls by the UN Secretary-General and the General Assembly<sup>8</sup> for the substantial scaling up and institutionalization of South–South cooperation have underscored the effective knowledge-sharing systems, proven development policy options, tested institutional capacity-building solutions and affordable and appropriate technologies offered by the Global South. They have called upon the UN system to act as promoter and catalyst of triangular and South–South cooperation by undertaking key actions, as summarized in Figure 1.<sup>9</sup>



<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.7.

<sup>8</sup> For example, see A/RES/67/226, paras. 59, 74–79.

<sup>9</sup> SSC/17/3, p.8.

14. Recognizing the potential of South–South cooperation for development as well as the need to systematically create an enabling environment for it, in 1978 the Special Unit for South–South Cooperation was established within the UNDP as the secretariat for the General Assembly High-level Committee on South–South cooperation.<sup>10</sup> Renamed in 2012 as the United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation (UNOSSC), it has been mandated to promote, coordinate and provide support for South–South and triangular cooperation on a global and UN system-wide basis by leveraging its global reach as well as its policy and institutional capacities.<sup>11</sup> Various entities of the UN system biennially report to the High-level Committee through UNOSSC on progress and achievements on mainstreaming South–South cooperation and the state of such cooperation in their respective areas of competence.
15. South–South cooperation has been increasingly mainstreamed as a cross-cutting issue in the work and agendas of UN agencies, funds and programmes. Through UNOSSC and its Resident Coordinator (RC) system, the UNDP has played a key coordinating role, at headquarters and in the field. Since 2003, South–South cooperation has been integrated into the framework of several UNDP practice areas, including democratic governance, poverty reduction, and crisis prevention and recovery. Under its multi-year funding framework for 2004–2007 and 2008–2011 Strategic Plan, the UNDP recognized South–South cooperation as one of the ‘drivers of development effectiveness’, requiring country offices and teams to identify issues, help to establish the conditions

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<sup>10</sup> The High-level Committee is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly and primary policymaking entity on South–South cooperation in the United Nations system. For details, see <http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/about/Background.html>

<sup>11</sup> UNOSSC has facilitated South–South policy dialogues and development as well as analysed trends, emerging issues and opportunities for promoting South–South and triangular cooperation approaches to development. It has also worked to build new partnerships; identify new funding mechanisms, mobilize resources and manage various intergovernmental South–South trust funds, like the UN Fund for South–South cooperation (UNFSSC), the Pérez-Guerrero Trust Fund (PGTF) for Economic and Technical cooperation among Developing Countries (with the Group of 77) and the India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) Fund for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation. Through its three-pronged service architecture – the Global South–South Development Academy, the Global South–South Development Expo and the South–South Global Assets and Technology Exchange, UNOSSC has provided support for partnerships and linkages among institutions and thematic centres of excellence to promote South–South cooperation in several countries, such as the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth in Brazil, the Human Development Centre in India and the International Public Service Excellence Centre in Singapore.

necessary for cooperation, and promote the engagement of governments, the private sector and civil society.<sup>12</sup> Through its role in the United Nations Development Group, the UNDP has supported integration of South–South cooperation into the United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) and work of the UN Country Teams (UNCTs).<sup>13</sup>

16. Since 2008, the UNDP and other agencies, funds and programmes have increasingly included South–South cooperation as an element of their policy and programming; they have used South–South approaches in all focus areas through their global, regional and country programmes; entered into strategic partnerships with several emerging powers to leverage their relevant experience and expertise; and generally increased their support to South–South cooperation. While acknowledging this progress, a 2011 Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) audit report called upon the agencies, funds and programmes to establish dedicated and identifiable structures and sufficient resources to initiate, coordinate, monitor and report South–South cooperation across programmatic activities, and to develop a systematic approach and operational guidelines for implementing South–South cooperation as a cross-cutting issue in all programmatic decisions at corporate and system-wide levels. The report also underscored that national governments were responsible for setting national priorities and the South–South cooperation agenda, and called upon developing countries to identify in concrete terms the support they required from the UN system.<sup>14</sup> As a follow-up to the JIU report, in 2012 a guidance note was issued, (a) defining South–South cooperation; (b) identifying possible entry points and thematic priorities at the global level where UN organizations could apply South–South and triangular cooperation approaches when engaging with traditional and Southern development partners, developing South–South cooperation policies and shaping global norms and standards; and (c) offering a step-by-step practical approach to mainstreaming South–South and triangular cooperation in UN

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<sup>12</sup> A/64/504, p. 16.

<sup>13</sup> *Review of progress made in implementing the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, the new directions strategy for South–South cooperation and the Nairobi outcome document of the High-level United Nations Conference on South–South cooperation.* SSC/17/1, p. 14.

<sup>14</sup> JIU/REP/2011/3, pp.35 and 47–58. Out of 109 countries surveyed, 17 countries had included an explicit reference to South–South cooperation in their UNDAFs, including seven from Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico and Venezuela.

country and regional common planning and programming processes.<sup>15</sup>

17. The recent accelerated system-wide drive for effective mainstreaming of South–South cooperation in the design, formulation and implementation of UN programmes came as a delayed response to the exponential growth in South–South cooperation witnessed outside the UN framework. Within the framework of bilateral agreements, involving governments, private sector and civil society, South–South cooperation reached between USD12.9 billion and 14.8 billion in 2010<sup>16</sup> as a result of resurgence in South–South trade, flows of foreign direct investment, technology transfer, movement towards regional integration and various other forms of exchanges. Foreign direct investment among countries in the South grew by 20 per cent each year 1996–2009, driven largely by the rapid ascendancy of major powers in the Global South and their willingness to step up assistance to co-developing countries.<sup>17</sup> India, for example, invested about 65 per cent of its outward foreign direct investment in developing countries.<sup>18</sup> South–South and triangular development cooperation have particularly been relevant for in-kind contributions (including human resources as seconded personnel or volunteers, equipment, products and services), exchange of skills, technical support and best practices. Such peer learning as well as knowledge, experience and technology sharing have proved vital to developing innovative forms of partnerships.<sup>19</sup>
18. Beyond bilateral exchanges of knowledge and experience, South–South cooperation has increasingly involved collective actions in addressing trans-regional thematic problems such as food security, climate change and HIV/AIDS by multiple countries in the pursuit of mutually beneficial development and enhanced bargaining power in multilateral negotiations.<sup>20</sup> In this context,

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<sup>15</sup> SSC/17/3, p.3.

<sup>16</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on trends and progress in international development cooperation', E/2012/78, para. 111.

<sup>17</sup> For more information, see Human Development Report, *The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*, UNDP, 2013, pp. 46–47 and Global Development Report, *A Renewed Global Partnership for Development*, United Nations (DESA), 2013, p.16.

<sup>18</sup> Anita Mathur, '*Multinational from Developing Countries: the case of India*' (PhD diss., University of Alberta, 1989).

<sup>19</sup> Global Development Report, *A Renewed Global Partnership for Development*, United Nations (DESA), 2013, p. 16.

<sup>20</sup> SSC/17/3, p. 6.

proponents of the New Deal<sup>21</sup> have seen the initiative as an example of South–South and triangular cooperation, involving sharing of successful experiences and expertise among fragile states in the area of peacebuilding and statebuilding.<sup>22</sup> These emerging trends have underlined the need for a wider view of South–South cooperation, one that can incorporate a stronger peace and security dimension and become a catalyst for successful peacebuilding, particularly in the complex task of building state capacity.<sup>23</sup>

19. Furthermore, through the creation of the Group of 77 in 1964 and more recently the IBSA Dialogue Forum (India, Brazil and South Africa), together with the strengthening of regional organizations, the South–South cooperation platform has increasingly been used by developing countries to advance common positions on issues of importance in international negotiations and global governance. While the number of countries actively participating in South–South cooperation has grown tremendously, certain developing countries have continued to play a pivotal role. India, Brazil and South Africa have emerged in a category of their own because of

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<sup>21</sup> The conflict-affected group of countries, g7+ including Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal, Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste (<http://www.g7plus.org/>), had noted that 'aid delivery, interventions and programmes instigated by international actors are often inapplicable, unsustainable and incompatible with our in-country national agendas ... they are often not conducive to addressing the immediate or long-term needs of our countries and regions'. They challenged the global community and international actors 'to reform, re-invent and commit to a new paradigm of international engagement in fragile and conflict-affected countries', noting that 'external mandates and ideas can no longer be imposed on our countries or regions and our peoples' (S/2011/85). In November 2011, the g7+ countries and their development partners outlined the New Deal focusing on country owned pathways towards peace and resilience through the framework of peacebuilding and statebuilding. For further details, see Vanessa Wyeth, *Knights in fragile armor: the rise of 'G7+', Global Governance*, 18 (2012), pp. 7–12.

<sup>22</sup> Maureen Quinn, 'Ministers Pires and Friis Bach: Fragile States Not Too Fragile to Engage in Post-2015 Development Agenda,' *The Global Observatory*, 25 April 2013, <http://www.theglobalobservatory.org/interviews/487-ministers-pires-and-friis-bach-fragile-states-not-too-fragile-to-engage-in-post-2015-development-agenda>.

<sup>23</sup> Fritz Nganje, 'Decentralized South–South cooperation: A Complementary Vehicle for State-Building in Post-Conflict Societies in Africa?', March 2013, *Africa Up Close*, <http://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/decentralised-south-south-cooperation-a-complementary-vehicle-for-state-building-in-post-conflict-societies-in-africa/>.

the scale and agenda of their intra- and inter-regional South–South cooperation agendas.<sup>24</sup>

20. Several developed countries have also mainstreamed South–South cooperation within their overall foreign policy frameworks, advocated moving beyond the traditional cooperation to incorporate South–South and triangular cooperation perspectives, experiences and models, and have underscored the need to build further understanding of the advantages, complementarities and synergies. Japan was one of the first developed countries to recognize the complementarity between North–South and South–South cooperation and offer substantial and sustained support to the latter.
21. However, overall support for triangular cooperation from traditional donors has not kept pace with the rise in cooperation among developing countries, due partly to lack of consensus within developing countries about aligning North–South aid and South–South and triangular cooperation.<sup>25</sup> Arguing that these are two different concepts (see Figure 2), most developing countries, including the emerging powers, have expressed concern that the alignment would have serious political and policy implications and could put into question the very basis and core principles of South–South cooperation: sovereignty, solidarity, collective self-reliance, national ownership and non-conditionality. It would also not capture regional or interregional cooperation which South–South cooperation and triangular cooperation usually entail.<sup>26</sup> These differences found expression at meetings of the seventeenth session of the High-level Committee on South–South cooperation held in May 2012 where developing countries objected to inclusion of references to the New Deal or the ‘Busan Partnership for Effective Development cooperation’ in the draft framework of operational guidelines on UN support to South–South and triangular cooperation, on the grounds that the former was not an outcome document of a UN process and thus should not be considered as a source of guidance on any UN process. As South–South cooperation required policy space for developing countries, they could not be ‘straitjacketed’ in terms of rigid rules and

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<sup>24</sup> *Promotion of South–South cooperation for development: a thirty-year perspective*, A/64/504, pp. 8–9.

<sup>25</sup> JIU/REP/2011/3, p. 38. See also the note by the Secretary-General transmitting his comments and those of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for coordination on the report of the Joint Inspection Unit (A/66/717/Add.1).

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*



regulations or policy prescriptions, including in the name of aid effectiveness. It was noted that the effectiveness of aid had to be judged by the results in each case, and that no across-the-board standard would be relevant. Furthermore, there was a paradigm difference between North–South and South–South assistance (see Figure 2) that no common approach could bridge.<sup>27</sup>

Figure 2. Peacebuilding and South–South cooperation: Partnership Models

Principle	Peacebuilding	South–South cooperation
Ownership	Multilateral programmes, in consultation with national leadership, set peacebuilding priorities across sectors	National leadership articulates need for specific projects and ensures participation of national entities on a long-term basis
Mutual Benefit	Programmes are designed to build peace in host societies	Projects are designed for mutual benefit
Equality and Horizontality	Donor–recipient relationship	Partnership among equals; mutual respect for sovereign equality
Non-conditionality	Extension of programmes based on progress achieved towards pre-determined benchmarks	Policy conditionality eschewed
Mutual accountability	Greater accountability through targets and indicators	Transfer of skills, knowledge and best practices
Complementarity	Programme objectives aligned with the priorities of the country concerned	Demand-driven programmes aligned with the priorities of the host country and complementary to North–South cooperation. Emphasis on the replication and adaptation of successful experiences already implemented in other developing countries.

<sup>27</sup> *Report of the High-level Committee on South–South cooperation, A/67/39, p.7.*

22. To achieve internationally agreed security and development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and related peacebuilding goals, various stakeholders have recognized that renewed efforts by the UN are required to optimize, intensify and mainstream Southern approaches and tap into the potential of South–South and triangular cooperation. The expanded mandate of the UNOSSC, recent efforts to develop a system-wide approach and operational guidelines, and the signing of several strategic partnership agreements by the UNDP and other agencies and programmes with countries like Brazil, India and Indonesia to jointly promote South–South cooperation – all indicate enhanced efforts to facilitate South–South cooperation for development. However, there remain major challenges to mainstreaming South–South cooperation, challenges that can be addressed only by linking the security and development pillars, developing system-wide coherence and enhancing cooperation between a diverse range of stakeholders, both traditional and new, governments, the private sector, civil society and academic institutions.<sup>28</sup> Because of its global presence and political neutrality, the role of the UN system is considered critical, not least for regaining the confidence of major provider countries from the South.
23. Recent developments underscore the need for the UN Secretariat across its peace and security pillar to join the ongoing deliberations and define South–South cooperation as it relates to that area of work. As a starting point, with a view to formulating effective joint strategies, an attempt should be made to understand and evaluate the practical implications of the UNDP's enhanced efforts to facilitate triangular and South–South cooperation, including in context of the DPA–UNDP *Programme on Building National Capacities for Conflict Prevention* ('the Joint Programme') that continues to focus on a number of strategic initiatives to assist national actors in addressing political tensions and build infrastructures for peace and assign Peace and Development Advisors (PDAs) to the Office of the Resident Coordinators (RCs) in over 50 countries. The DPA also co-chairs, alongside the UNDP, the *Inter-Agency Framework Team for Preventive Action* ('the Framework Team'), which supports the RCs and UNCTs in developing integrated conflict prevention strategies. In the context of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, there is also growing

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<sup>28</sup> For the 68th Session of the General Assembly, UNOSSC is expected to submit three reports and papers: Milestone Report 2008–2012: A Tribute to Our South–South Partners; a second South Report; UNOSSC White Paper on South–South cooperation.

integration between DPA-led political field missions with a mandate to support South–South cooperation (see part IV of the report) and Country Teams.

### **Summary observations & recommendations**

- South-South cooperation, involving exchanges of affordable and appropriate knowledge, skills and solutions among developing countries, has been mandated as a priority by intergovernmental bodies, requiring the entire UN system to take steps towards integrating and institutionalizing it in their programmes and approaches.
- Emergence of major economies in the Global South and their eagerness to assist other developing countries, including conflict-affected countries, has resulted in the mainstreaming of triangular and South-South cooperation in peacebuilding activities, particularly in the complex task of building state capacity.
- The nexus between security and development, fostered also in the post-2015 framework, has further underscored the need for the wider application of the developmentally-focused South-South cooperation across the peace and security pillar of the UN's work.
- UN system-wide efforts in 2012 towards developing a more systematic approach and operational guidelines for implementation of South-South cooperation has made it opportune for the DPA and concerned departments across the peace and security pillar to advance their understanding of processes and mechanisms facilitating South-South cooperation and assess the added value of triangular and South-South cooperation to areas of their work.

## II. The new normal: exercise of soft power by Southern powers

24. The emergence of such fast-track economic performers as India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) in the Global South, their increasing influence in multinational forums like the Security Council, G-20 and the World Bank, as well as their growing role in supporting fragile societies, has yet to be adequately reflected as a key policy consideration in efforts to expand and enhance effectiveness of UN support to conflict-affected countries.<sup>29</sup> This includes paying greater attention to their transition experiences, solidarity with co-developing countries within the framework of South–South cooperation, political aspirations for regional stability and dominance, desire to serve as a voice for the developing world and build legitimacy for a bigger role in global governance, including a permanent seat on the Security Council, and significant commercial interests in the conflict-affected countries combined with an interest in maintaining peace and stability.<sup>30</sup> Above all, for all forms of effective international interventions, it is important to recognize the challenges posed by the political bias of the emerging powers towards the state, sovereignty, national ownership and non-intervention, their emphasis on the intrinsic linkage between security and development, and their weariness at serving as ‘instruments’ of OECD-led policy frameworks developed outside the UN.
25. Despite their own economic and political challenges and ambiguous status as both contributors and recipients of assistance,<sup>31</sup> the emerging powers, in a spirit of solidarity, have set up extensive bilateral assistance programmes with other developing countries within the framework of South–South cooperation that extend from the economic sphere to political and

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<sup>29</sup> Hardeep S. Puri, ‘Rise of the Global South and its impact on south–south cooperation’, *Perspectives*, October 2010, pp. 7–9; Human Development Report, ‘*The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World*’, UNDP, 2013.

<sup>30</sup> Jake Sherman, Megan Gleason, W.P.S. Sidhu and Bruce Jones (eds), *Engagement on development and security: new actors, new debates*, New York University Center on International Cooperation, 2011, pp. 2–13.

<sup>31</sup> For example, see Sabine Cessou, ‘South Africa’s new apartheid’, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 2012.

security areas in conflict-affected countries. These demand-driven programmes, mostly arranged at the governmental level and based on the principles of mutual benefit and partnership, have expanded by leaps and bounds at a time when Western donors have been forced to slash their programmes. While traditional donors still vastly outspend these non-traditional donors, by one account, between 2005 and 2010 Brazil and India increased their foreign aid spending by more than 20 per cent while the US budget grew by just 1.6 per cent over the same period and those of Britain, France and Germany by less than 5 per cent annually.<sup>32</sup> During the same period, bilateral trade between emerging powers and co-developing countries, within and outside the region, rose significantly.<sup>33</sup> For example, the volume of trade between India and Africa increased from USD1 billion in 2001 to USD53.3 billion in 2010–2011.<sup>34</sup> All three IBSA countries offer enormous technical/vocational capacity centred programmes (commonly in the form of technical assistance, capacity building, training, deputation of experts, study tours, and foreign investment) designed to ensure transfer of knowledge and skills to co-developing countries. The Indian Technical and Economic cooperation (ITEC) programme has a network of more than 156 participating countries and 1,000 national training institutes offering a range of programmes, including a programme in parliamentary studies and legislative drafting.<sup>35</sup> Brazil and South Africa have similarly structured programmes with a focus on development and capacity building.<sup>36</sup> In an OECD and World Bank assessment, 25 per cent of Brazil's technical cooperation exists with the 'fragile states' in Africa, Asia and Latin America.<sup>37</sup> Between 2008, 2010 and 2012, Brazil's donations to UN humanitarian appeals for some of the poorest countries increased by USD3.3 million, 26 million and 54.4 million, respectively.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> 'Look who's saving the world: BRICS pump up foreign aid', *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 March 2012.

<sup>33</sup> It is projected that by 2020 the combined economic output of Brazil, India and China will surpass that of the top six traditional economic leaders of the North, driven by new trade and partnerships within the South itself. UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 2013, Foreword, p.ii.

<sup>34</sup> *India in Africa: Implications for Norwegian Foreign and Development Policies*, report produced by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), 2012.

<sup>35</sup> For details, see <http://itec.mea.gov.in/>.

<sup>36</sup> Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta, *Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on Civilian Capacity*, NUPI, 2012.

<sup>37</sup> Information provided by a researcher at Instituto Igarapé ([www.igarape.org.br](http://www.igarape.org.br)).

<sup>38</sup> In recognition of Brazil's contribution and appeal to non-traditional donors, the OCHA launched its annual 2013 humanitarian appeal in Brasilia. For details, see

The growing economic clout of the emerging powers is also reflected in new arrangements among them.

26. Confronted with relatively limited resources and increasing demands, Brazil, India and South Africa have employed novel modalities, including partnerships among themselves and with traditional donor countries. To promote cooperation among themselves, to pool resources and deepen policy coordination in joint efforts to assist one another and other developing countries, as well as to increase collective bargaining power in multilateral forums, the three emerging powers formed the IBSA Dialogue Forum as well as the BRICS grouping, which includes China and Russia (**B**razil, **R**ussia, **I**ndia, **C**hina and **S**outh Africa).<sup>39</sup> They have also leveraged the convening role of regional organizations to discuss responses to major improvements or deteriorations in governance in their respective regions. Examples include South Africa's active participation through the African Union's mediation efforts, the African Peer Review Mechanism, and deployment of regional peacekeeping missions.<sup>40</sup> The three powers have also entered into triangular cooperation with other donor countries and multilateral institutions to garner financial and institutional support for their assistance programmes. The IBSA Fund, established with contributions from the three partner countries and located in the UNDP, serves one such example of triangular cooperation.<sup>41</sup> This arrangement, drawing upon the UNDP's global presence in 170 countries, has allowed the IBSA countries to continue to expand their joint and bilateral assistance

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Jamil Chade, 'With an eye on getting greater influence in international politics, Brazil multiplies by 50 its help to foreign governments', *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 6 March 2013.

<sup>39</sup> Flexing their growing influence, the BRICS announced at the 2013 summit in Durban, South Africa, the start of negotiations for establishing a BRICS-led Development Bank, a 25-member Business Council and a Think Tanks Council. For details, see *BRICS birth a new revolution in South–South cooperation in Durban*, [http://indrus.in/world/2013/03/28/brics\\_birth\\_a\\_new\\_south-south\\_revolution\\_in\\_durban\\_23305.html](http://indrus.in/world/2013/03/28/brics_birth_a_new_south-south_revolution_in_durban_23305.html), 28 March 2013.

<sup>40</sup> In the context of deployment of civilian capacity to peace operations, South Africa appears to have developed the most focused approach, which has included supporting development of the civilian component of the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Standby Arrangement and the African Union's African Standby Force (ASF).

<sup>41</sup> The IBSA Fund is an effort to implement South–South cooperation through the multilateral system. Its purpose is to identify replicable and scalable projects that can be jointly adapted and implemented in interested developing countries as examples of best practices in the fight against poverty and hunger. For details, see <http://tcdc2.undp.org/IBSA/>.

programmes while developing, strengthening and aligning domestic institutions and capacities with their growing economic clout and foreign policy ambitions.<sup>42</sup> Diplomats from IBSA countries have unreservedly expressed frustration at their inability to respond promptly to requests for assistance or frame multilateral policy proactively such as the OECD-initiated Busan ‘New Deal’.<sup>43</sup> To overcome the current constraints, they have demanded that the UN facilitate policy dialogues and development as well as programme implementation and coordination under its framework.<sup>44</sup>

27. Furthermore, having transitioned into vibrant and stable democracies, India, Brazil and South Africa see themselves as ‘powerful symbols of the potentiality of democracy’ in non-Western societies.<sup>45</sup> However, retaining a commitment to the principle of national sovereignty and traditional inhibitions to impose democratic values abroad,<sup>46</sup> especially through regime change,<sup>47</sup> the emerging powers have been reluctant to make promotion of democracy a key element of their bilateral foreign policies or align themselves publicly with Western efforts to

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<sup>42</sup> Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta, *Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on Civilian Capacity*, NUPI, 2012, p. 22.

<sup>43</sup> India has the about the same number of diplomats as ‘little’ New Zealand. See ‘United by a catchy acronym’, *International Herald Tribune*, 1–2 Dec. 2012, p.8.

<sup>44</sup> Author interviews with government officials.

<sup>45</sup> The emerging powers are viewed as possessing unique experiences with democratization that could be relevant to co-developing countries, including the ‘Arab Spring’ countries. In a statement delivered in New Delhi, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that ‘as a successful democracy and with its pluralistic diverse society, India had relevant experiences to share with other emerging democracies in the Middle East and Africa’, *DPI News Bulletin* #1, 27 April 2012.

<sup>46</sup> Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, *Looking for help: Will rising democracies become international democracy supporters?* Carnegie Papers, 2011.

<sup>47</sup> The long-standing commitment of IBSA to national sovereignty and wariness with intervention was evident during the Security Council debates on the situations in Libya and Syria. In case of Libya, Brazil and India abstained in the vote on Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) authorizing ‘far-reaching measures’. In case of Syria, India and South Africa maintained an anti-interventionist approach. For details, see studies on the situations in Libya and the Middle East in the *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2010–2011*, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20I/10-11.shtml>. Even in case of a General Assembly resolution, Arab countries dropped the demand that the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad resign, because of lack of support from BRICS which was likely to have shaken confidence in the resolution among many developing countries. The resolution did, however, take a swipe at Russia and China by ‘deploring the Security Council failure’ to act. See *Washington Examiner*, 2 August 2012, <http://washingtonexaminer.com/un-draft-drops-call-for-syrias-assad-to-step-down/article/feed/2019067>.

advance democracy.<sup>48</sup> Instead, they have held that ‘successful democracy is always home-grown’ and defended the right of people to determine their own fate – as in Palestine. More recently, in collaboration with multilateral and regional institutions, they have supported efforts to build strong, vibrant and critical civil societies – a bottom–up rather than a top–down approach. For example, in partnership with the USA, India is the second largest contributor to the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDF) which promotes a bottom–up approach to promoting democracies, having contributed USD25 million since 2005 – far more than Germany or Britain.<sup>49</sup> Brazil helped to found the Rio Group, a forum of Latin American democracies that are seeking Latin American solutions and a peaceful end to armed conflicts in the region.<sup>50</sup> It has pressed for the incorporation of democracy requirements within regional mechanisms such as Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States, Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). South Africa has been a major force behind the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) promoting good governance in the region. Thus, coordinated by the UN and regional organizations, consent-based multilateral efforts in conflict-affected countries provide an avenue for the emerging powers to balance the tensions in their policies and engage in low-visibility, sustained support in politically sensitive areas, including the promotion of democratic values and inclusive political processes.

28. The extensive history of the emerging powers of sharing their unique and diverse experiences, expertise, best practices and resources, through development, peacekeeping and peacebuilding programmes closer to home-grown efforts, has brought recognition and created demand for replication of their successful programmes in certain niche areas. For example, Brazil has been

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<sup>48</sup> ‘BRICS won’t walk with the West on international democracy issues’, *The Hindu* (New Delhi), op-ed, 15 November 2011.

<sup>49</sup> According to the Indian Permanent Mission at the UN, ‘UNDEF supports projects that strengthen the voice of civil society, promote human rights, and encourage the participation of all groups in democratic processes...The large majority of funds go to local civil society groups – in both the transition and the consolidation phases of democratization. UNDEF plays a unique role complementing the UN’s traditional work with Governments to strengthen democratic governance around the world.’ For details, see *South Asia Daily*, 16 April 2012, [http://southasia.typepad.com/south\\_asia\\_daily/2012/04/building-democracies-from-the-ground-up-and-not-top-down.html](http://southasia.typepad.com/south_asia_daily/2012/04/building-democracies-from-the-ground-up-and-not-top-down.html).

<sup>50</sup> Jean-Paul Marthos, *Brazil’s emergence and potential for Norwegian peacebuilding*, NOREF Working Paper, Nov. 2010.



involved in scores of programmes in other developing countries, mainly in the corrections, wider policing and community-violence reduction sectors; India in public works, democratization and disaster relief; and South Africa in mediation, transitional justice and truth and reconciliation processes.<sup>51</sup> Under an arrangement with the Government in Afghanistan, India has funded more than USD1.3 billion worth of local governance and capacity-enhancing and civil-society projects.<sup>52</sup> Over the last few years, the UNDP has entered into strategic partnerships with each of the emerging powers to leverage their domestic transition and capacity-building experience with a view to accelerating progress and development in other developing countries and increasing its role in South–South cooperation.<sup>53</sup>

29. Guided by historical, political, security and economic considerations and ambitions for soft power, the emerging powers have prioritized South–South cooperation in all aspects of their programmes and reshaped the approach to international assistance and sustainable peace, refocusing on approaches and innovation conceived in and for the Global South. The three IBSA countries have promoted alternative models and strategies that prioritize democratic and liberal norms, national ownership, inclusive negotiated settlements, unity governments, reconciliation, peace consolidation, political stability, and capacity building as the building blocks of states.<sup>54</sup> They have underscored the intrinsic link between security and development and promoted the ‘human approach’ with its emphasis on poverty elimination and food security, as root causes of conflict, in efforts to reduce violence. Particularly concerned about any dilution of sovereignty, they have defended the political bias towards the state and non-

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<sup>51</sup> Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta, Synthesis Report of the Baseline Study on Civilian Capacity, NUPI, 2012, pp. 13 and 15; *World Bank’s annual World Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development*, 2011.

<sup>52</sup> India expanded its political engagement in Afghanistan, despite its traditional reluctance and concerns about antagonizing Pakistan, due to pressures from several fronts and its own security concerns in the face of the pull-out of NATO forces by 2014. For details, see Jake Sherman, Megan Gleason, W.P.S. Sidhu and Bruce Jones (eds), *Engagement on development and security: new actors, new debates*, New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2011, p. 10.

<sup>53</sup> <http://www.in.undp.org/content/india/en/home/ourwork/humandevlopment/successstories/undp-and-india-sign-partnership-agreement-to-boost-development-p.html>.

<sup>54</sup> Jake Sherman, Megan Gleason, W.P.S. Sidhu and Bruce Jones (eds), *Engagement on development and security: new actors, new debates*, New York University, Center on International Cooperation, 2011, p. 5.

intervention as enshrined in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. They have spurned what they view as a concerted attempt by the OECD countries to ‘superimpose’ the elements of donor–recipient relationships flowing out of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda onto South–South cooperation and ‘co-opt’ the Southern providers into the international aid architecture.<sup>55</sup> For this reason, the IBSA (and BRICS) countries have not signed the New Deal, looking instead to the UN to coordinate a process that outlines a set of principles for international engagement in fragile societies that can encompass both traditional and non-traditional donors.

30. The strong commitment of the IBSA countries to multilateralism, the UN and the existing international order is matched by an equally strong desire to gradually reform them to make them more inclusive, including expanding the membership of the Security Council to allow a bigger role for the emerging powers. Commensurate with their global engagement and soft-power ambitions,<sup>56</sup> the emerging powers have brought their collective voice to bear on global issues of importance to them such as opposition to intervention in domestic affairs and an obligation, while exercising the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P), to the principle of ‘responsibility while protecting’ (RwP), especially after the NATO-led military intervention in Libya.<sup>57</sup> Having contributed significantly to UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions, they have sought greater recognition of the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding – the role of peacekeepers as early peacebuilders, particularly in areas of national reconciliation, security sector reform, national institution-building and economic-social development; and application of the lessons and principles of the international development cooperation regime to improve coherence between the security and

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<sup>55</sup> <http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>. See also, Hardeep S. Puri (Indian Permanent Representative to the UN), ‘*Rise of the Global South and its impact on South–South cooperation*’, Outreach, World Bank Institute, October 2010.

<sup>56</sup> As the United States and Europe consider stronger action in the Security Council, the Assad Government has gone on a political offensive, calling on developing countries, particularly the BRICS, to find a political solution to the situation in Syria. *New York Times*, 17 March 2013, p. 15.

<sup>57</sup> Oliver P. Richmond & Ioannis Tellidis, ‘The BRICS and international peacebuilding and statebuilding’, NOREF Report, January 2013 ([http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow\\_site/storage/original/application/5f8c6a3d43ec8fff5692d7b596af2491.pdf](http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/5f8c6a3d43ec8fff5692d7b596af2491.pdf)).

development pillars in field missions.<sup>58</sup> At a Security Council meeting held on 21 January 2013, the three countries observed that peacebuilding was intrinsic to peacekeeping; that mutual complementarities between peacekeeping and peacebuilding should be harmonized rather than being zoned as civilian versus military aspects, and civilian component of peacekeeping missions needed to be strengthened to assist national governments in providing early peace dividends.<sup>59</sup> Increasingly, the emerging powers have displayed confidence in adopting different approaches and methods while working with the existing international order, as demonstrated by Brazil and Turkey's joint engagement with Iran in 2010 in connection with its nuclear programme.<sup>60</sup>

31. The emerging powers in the Global South have served as growth poles and drivers of connectivity. They have become critical sources of experiences and best practices to fragile societies. They are important to regional solutions. Further expansion of their engagement within a coherent policy framework will necessitate reflecting their perspectives and supporting the principles of South-South cooperation that underpin their regional, inter-regional and global engagements. Attempts to co-opt them into existing structures would disregard their concerns about legitimacy and serving as the voice of the developing world. Such attempts would also underestimate the extent to which the emerging powers have developed their own policies and approaches, influenced by their experiences, partnerships and interests. Unless the perspectives of the emerging powers can be genuinely reflected in policies developed through a UN-facilitated process, there is a real risk that the emerging powers may give up on the current global governance system, in favour of an alternate system – as glimpsed in recent initiatives taken by IBSA and BRICS countries. To harness the full potential of the Global South and the emerging powers, minimize duplication of efforts among traditional and non-traditional donors and prevent them from

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<sup>58</sup> Similar positions were echoed at the 6903rd Security Council meeting by several speakers, including the Secretary-General, South Korea, China and the UK. See also resolution 2086 (2013) adopted at the meeting.

<sup>59</sup> S/PV.6903, p. 26 (Brazil), p. 27 (South Africa), p. 32 (India).

<sup>60</sup> Oliver P. Richmond & Ioannis Tellidis, 'The BRICS and international peacebuilding and statebuilding', NOREF Report, January 2013 ([http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow\\_site/storage/original/application/5f8c6a3d43ec8fff5692d7b596af2491.pdf](http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/5f8c6a3d43ec8fff5692d7b596af2491.pdf)). In 2012, IBSA countries had also sent a joint high-level delegation that unsuccessfully met with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and opposition groups to mediate an end to the violent conflict.

working at cross-purposes, the UN, including the DPA, has a meaningful role to play in developing a policy framework that can adequately take into account the implications of the ascendancy of the emerging powers in the global hierarchy of power, mainstreaming South–South cooperation as a cross-cutting issue at the heart of sustainable peace and security.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Jake Sherman, Megan Gleason, W.P.S. Sidhu and Bruce Jones (ed.), *Engagement on development and security: new actors, new debates*, New York University, Center on International cooperation, 2011, p. 11. See also the *Report of the High-level Committee on South–South cooperation* to the 17th session, A/67/39, para. 15.

### **Summary observations & recommendations**

- The emerging powers have become major players in the provision of tailored and long-term assistance to conflict-affected countries within the framework of South-South cooperation as well as their broader development cooperation programmes, growing commercial interests and foreign policy aspirations for regional stability, dominance and a bigger role in global governance.
- The emerging powers have promoted alternate models and approaches that prioritize national ownership and capacity-building, an intrinsic link between security and development, the 'human approach' with its emphasis on poverty elimination and food security as root causes of conflict, and the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
- To take their engagement to the next level, the emerging powers have explored novel modalities and partnerships to deepen policy coordination and pool resources in efforts to help each other and other developing countries as well as increase their collective bargaining power in multilateral forums.
- The emerging powers have favoured consent-based regional, triangular and multilateral interventions and institutional support over bilateral arrangements to scale up their engagement in politically sensitive areas, including promotion of democratic values and inclusive political processes, while balancing commitment to South-South cooperation principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and national ownership.
- Wary of attempts to co-opt them into OECD-led international aid structures, the emerging powers have looked to the UN to play a meaningful role in the development of an integrated and coherent policy framework that reflects and harmonizes their priorities, perspectives and approaches, including the South-South cooperation framework, with that of OECD countries and other key stakeholders.
- Given the growing centrality and political influence of the emerging powers, the UN system has an important role to play in harnessing their full potential and facilitating development of a common policy framework that can sufficiently reflect their perspectives and priorities.

### III. Peacebuilding: a paradigm shift

32. Over the past decade, field-based multidimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions have become the most visible expression of a *comprehensive approach* to peacebuilding, underscoring the interrelationship between peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian action.<sup>62</sup> However, given that 90 per cent of conflicts between 2000 and 2009 occurred in countries that had previously experienced civil war,<sup>63</sup> this approach began to be questioned as a short-term ‘missions only’ approach, severely handicapped by the lack of long-term funding, rapidly deployable and skilled civilian capacity, coherent policy and coordination between various actors. It came to be recognized that, to break the vicious cycles of conflict, sustainable peacebuilding perspectives would have to be mainstreamed from the very first stages of peace initiatives in fragile societies, furthering national ownership, the development of national capacities and empowerment of people affected by conflict.<sup>64</sup> National leadership and ownership were considered crucial to enabling national actors to set priorities and engage international partners in support of a common vision.<sup>65</sup> This approach, however, further exacerbated the challenge of deploying the range of civilian expertise needed for transferring skills and knowledge to national actors from the start of a peace process, and required considerable enhancement of the partnership between the UN and member states.<sup>66</sup>
33. While reasons for relapse into conflict varied from country to country, a deficit in confidence and trust between political parties and social groups and between state and society, due to problems

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<sup>62</sup> For instance, at its 6479th meeting (S/PV.6479) and in the relevant presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/4), the Council underscored a comprehensive approach that strengthened coherence between political, economic and social support activities and addressed the underlying causes of each conflict.

<sup>63</sup> Statement delivered by the Secretary-General at the 6847th meeting of the Security Council, S/PV.6847, p.2.

<sup>64</sup> S/PRST/2010/18, p. 3.

<sup>65</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, S/2010/386, p. 7.

<sup>66</sup> S/2011/527. Also see a DPKO/DFS non-paper, *A new partnership agenda: charting a new horizon for UN peacekeeping*, 2009.

of inclusion and accountability, emerged as a major factor in triggering a relapse into conflict.<sup>67</sup> Differentiating between fragile and stable developing environments, the *2011 World Development Report* noted that, although institutional legitimacy was the key to stability, restoring public confidence in the political process was even more important before institutions could be transformed so as to deliver security, justice and jobs.<sup>68</sup> An inclusive process, representing and reconciling the views and needs of a broad cross-section of society on matters related to peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian action, would build confidence among parties to the conflict and other stakeholders that their core objectives could be achieved through negotiation rather than violence. Inclusive processes, mechanisms and participatory dialogue that allowed for the inclusion of diverse perspectives were also likely to enable development of sustainable local and national capacities for the peaceful resolution of disputes. In fragile societies, therefore, inclusivity needed to be deliberately built and applied throughout the peacebuilding process, starting with analysis, design and planning.<sup>69</sup> The linkages between inclusivity, institution building and sustained international support were seen as central to securing a sustainable peace. Consequently, in a mere five years, integrated field missions and the DPA witnessed a tripling of their mandated tasks and responsibilities related to the facilitation of political processes, inclusive dialogue and reconciliation, preventive diplomacy, good offices, mediation, support to peace processes and peace agreement monitoring and implementation, and more interaction with and support to regional and subregional organizations.<sup>70</sup> This pattern has been most evident for missions located in Africa.<sup>71</sup>

34. The imperatives of inclusivity, national leadership and ownership emphasize demand-driven, targeted and context-specific international assistance, adapting lessons and solutions from

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<sup>67</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, S/2012/746, para. 2.

<sup>68</sup> *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*, pp. v and 11.

<sup>69</sup> S/2012/746, paras. 35–40.

<sup>70</sup> Cedric de Coning (2011): Civilian Peacekeeping Capacity: Mobilizing Partners to Match Supply and Demand, *International Peacekeeping*, 18:5, pp. 577–592.

<sup>71</sup> For a detailed analysis of mandates of field missions, see *the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 2010–2011, Part X*, [http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary\\_organ/overview.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/subsidiary_organ/overview.shtml).

potential partners to the local political, economic and social context. The changing landscapes of peacebuilding and focus on building sustainable national capacities over long term have underscored the relevance of exchange of experiences, expertise, policy input and assistance with countries from the region and the Global South that share regional, political or socio-cultural characteristics and had recently experienced transitions of their own, within the framework of South–South cooperation. With the emphasis on partnership among equals for mutual benefit, it has not been uncommon for the same country to serve both as a provider as well as a recipient of expertise. Botswana, for example has collaborated with Liberia on the capacity development of the Liberian police force,<sup>72</sup> similar to cooperation between Guinea Bissau and Angola on the capacity development of Angolan armed forces. At the same time, both Botswana and Guinea Bissau have been recipients of expertise in other sectors. South–South cooperation, with its emphasis on national leadership and building national capacities, has offered the potential to become a catalyst for successful conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts, and create sustainable conditions for shared prosperity, peace and stability – when situated in a coherent and mutually reinforcing policy framework for peace and development.<sup>73</sup>

35. The potential of development-focused South–South cooperation is increasingly being recognized for channelling long-term, cost-efficient and relevant support to conflict-affected countries facing urgent demands for greater national ownership, development of national capacities and empowerment of people affected by conflict. For the DPA, as the lead for delivering UN system-wide support as regards inclusive political processes, the enhancement of partnerships with emerging powers like Brazil, India, South Africa and others holds tremendous relevance: such countries have experience and skills in transitioning into vibrant and inclusive political systems and increasing willingness to support home-grown and bottom–up democratic and inclusive processes in conflict-affected countries and promote the ‘human approach’ that intrinsically linked poverty elimination with security. Besides historical ties and sense of solidarity, these countries have significant commercial interests in the conflict-affected countries

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<sup>72</sup> S/2012/645, para. 21.

<sup>73</sup> Fritz Nganje, ‘Decentralized South–South cooperation: A Complementary Vehicle for State-Building in Post-Conflict Societies in Africa?’, March 2013, *Africa Up Close*, <http://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/decentralised-south-south-cooperation-a-complementary-vehicle-for-state-building-in-post-conflict-societies-in-africa/>.



on the agenda of the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission and consequently share a strong interest in maintaining peace and stability in those countries. However, despite the increasing role of emerging countries in fragile societies and the contacts, leverage and 'entry points' they could offer, relatively little has been done to systematically reflect their interests and influence into a coherent policy framework or harness the potential of South–South cooperation to effect security and development gains.

36. Since sufficient infrastructure is lacking for South–South cooperation as regards conflict prevention, mediation and peacebuilding, such exchanges have generally been facilitated by a Western donor country or a multilateral organization like the UN in a triangular cooperation setting. One high visible example of such triangular cooperation is the initiative for capacity enhancement in South Sudan, developed by the Government of South Sudan and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), with UNDP support, and involving the deployment of civil servants from select English-speaking countries in the region (Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda) for one-on-one coaching of their South Sudanese counterparts ('twinning').<sup>74</sup> A similar project has been implemented in Afghanistan with collaboration between the Governments of Afghanistan and India and UNDP.<sup>75</sup> Increasingly, conflict-affected countries have favoured facilitation and mainstreaming of South–South cooperation through such long-term triangular cooperation arrangements, also in situations where a UN political and peacebuilding mission was operational. The new peacebuilding approach and South–South cooperation framework can act to complement and reinforce each other.

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<sup>74</sup> For details, see Kristoffer N. Tarp and Frederik F Rosen (2012): Coaching and mentoring for capacity development, *African Security Review*, 21:1, pp. 15–30. See also 221\_91202\_NOREF\_Report\_DaCosta\_web.pdf; Diana Felix da Costa et al, *Triangular cooperation for government capacity development in South Sudan*, NOREF Policy Brief, April 2013 (Triangular cooperation for capacity development Noref.pdf); pb2013 Civilian Capacity frro web.pdf; Diana Felix da Costa et al, *With a little help from my friends: cultural affinity in regional support for capacity development in South Sudan*, NUPI Policy Brief No. 8, da Costa, Karlsrud, Rosén, Haldrup, Tarp-1.pdf; GG Turning to the South.pdf.

<sup>75</sup> Frederik F Rosen (2011): *No words will deliver anything. Coaching and mentoring as neoliberal governance strategy in the Afghan State Administration*, *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, vol. 5(2) 2011, pp. 151–173.

**Summary observations & recommendations**

- Evolving approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding have given salience to national ownership and development of self-sustaining institutions, capacities and inclusive processes that can provide basic security, social cohesion, governance, justice and a sufficient foundation for democratic and equitable development in the long term.
- South–South cooperation, with its emphasis on demand-driven, context-specific, long-term partnerships among equals, and involving sharing of relevant expertise and experiences between developing countries, has shown the potential to become a catalyst for successful peacebuilding efforts, also as regards inclusive political processes.
- In the absence of sufficient national support structures, triangular cooperation has become indispensable to the expansion of developmentally-focused South–South cooperation to the peace and security pillar.

## IV. South–South cooperation in peacebuilding mandates

37. Recognizing on the one hand that peacebuilding was primarily a national challenge and responsibility, and on the other hand that fragile societies often face a critical shortage of capacities needed to prevent relapse into conflict and secure a sustainable peace,<sup>76</sup> in 2009 the Security Council stressed the need to deepen and broaden the pool of rapidly deployable expertise, particularly *relevant expertise from the region and developing countries*:

...stresses the need, in countries emerging from conflict, to draw upon and develop existing national capacities at the earliest possible stage, and the importance of rapidly deployable civilian expertise to help achieve this, including, where appropriate, relevant expertise from the region. The Council, in this regard, welcomes the recommendation of the Secretary-General for a review to be undertaken to analyse how the United Nations and international community can help to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacities from developing countries and especially women. (S/PRST/2009/23)

38. Subsequently – in view of the recommendations contained in the civilian capacity review report,<sup>77</sup> thematic reports of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict,<sup>78</sup> civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict,<sup>79</sup> and the country-specific report on South Sudan<sup>80</sup> – the Council reiterated in several related decisions the importance and relevance of tapping into civilian expertise from the Global South. In a presidential

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<sup>76</sup> UNDP is coordinating an interagency group to develop system-wide principles and guidelines to better use and develop national capacities.

<sup>77</sup> The report defined ‘civilian capacity’ as personnel with the requisite substantive expertise who could be deployed to the field. It did not deal with other important aspects of capacity such as funding, policy, guidance, training and logistics. The recommendations were presented within a vision called OPEN, thus called because the aim was to enable national ownership; work in global partnership; deliver expertise; and be nimble in the face of often very turbulent interventions. For details, see S/2011/85.

<sup>78</sup> S/2010/386 and S/2012/746.

<sup>79</sup> S/2009/304, S/2011/527 and S/2012/645.

<sup>80</sup> S/2012/486. In case of South Sudan, the recommendation has been mainstreamed and embedded in the mandate of UNMISS.

statement adopted on 20 December 2012,<sup>81</sup> underlining the usefulness of sharing the experiences of countries which had gone through conflict and post-conflict situations and comparable transitions, the Council for first time emphasized ‘the importance of effective regional, south–south and triangular cooperation’. Furthermore, by resolution 2057 (2012), the Council underscored the importance and relevance of tapping into civilian expertise from the Global South in the specific context of South Sudan and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan.<sup>82</sup>

The Security Council recognizes the need to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian experts, in particular from developing countries and women, to help develop national capacity, and encourages Member States, the United Nations and other relevant partners to strengthen cooperation and coordination in building such capacities. (S/PRST/2010/7)

Recognizing the need to broaden and deepen the pool of available civilian experts, especially women and experts from developing countries, to help develop national capacity, and encouraging Member States, the United Nations and other partners to strengthen cooperation and coordination to ensure that relevant expertise is mobilized to support the peacebuilding needs of the Government and people of the Republic of South Sudan (S/RES/2057 (2012))

The Security Council encourages national Governments, the United Nations, regional and sub-regional organizations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacities from developing countries and from women, as vital for successful United Nations peacebuilding endeavours. The Council also encourages national Governments, the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations to use existing civilian expertise and further develop them, bearing in mind the necessity to minimize possible duplication of efforts and to ensure their consistency and complementarity. The Council further underlines the importance that intergovernmental deliberations take forward the process in accordance with General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/255 and the imperative of mandating and deploying civilian expertise in compliance with relevant United Nations rules and procedures. (S/PRST/2012/29)

The Security Council underlines the usefulness of sharing the experience of countries which have gone through conflict and post-conflict situations and

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<sup>81</sup> S/PRST/2012/29.

<sup>82</sup> In collaboration with IGAD and UNDP, the Government of South Sudan chose to implement a capacity-building initiative involving three regional capacity providers. UNMISS was not a partner although it was mandated by Security Council resolution 2057 (2013) to mobilize relevant expertise to support the peacebuilding needs of the Republic of South Sudan.

comparable transitions, and emphasizes the importance of effective regional, south–south and triangular cooperation. (S/PRST/2012/29)

Encourages national governments, the United Nations, regional and subregional organizations to continue to use existing civilian expertise and also to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian capacities for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacities from developing countries and from women, and in this regard, stresses the imperative of mandating and deploying civilian capacities in compliance with relevant United Nations resolutions and rules and procedures, and with a view to minimizing duplication of efforts and ensuring consistency and complementarity. (S/RES/2086, 2013)

39. Similarly, by resolution A/RES/66/655, the General Assembly affirmed:

... the fundamental principle of national ownership, and stressing the importance of supporting national civilian capacity development and institution building, including through peacekeeping operations in accordance with their mandates, as well as enhanced regional, South–South and triangular cooperation,

*Encouraging* national Governments, the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations to broaden and deepen the pool of civilian expertise for peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, including from countries with relevant experience in post-conflict peacebuilding or democratic transition, giving particular attention to mobilizing capacities from developing countries and of women as vital to the success of United Nations peacebuilding endeavours

40. The recent calls for tapping into the expertise and experiences of the Global South and mainstreaming of the modality of South–South cooperation for effective peacebuilding have come in the wake of identification of critical gaps in deployable civilian capacity, as well as the identification of potential suppliers of such important capacities in the Global South – including emerging powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa (the ‘IBSA coalition’), on three different continents but sharing socio-economic, cultural or linguistic composition and a history of solidarity support with their neighbours and other developing countries. Most importantly, several countries of the Global South have evolved into vibrant democracies and possess unique experience with democratization, experience that might serve as models for countries in transition, including the ‘Arab Spring’

countries.<sup>83</sup> All three IBSA countries have had bilateral technical assistance programmes with conflict-affected countries within the umbrella of South–South cooperation and have acquired extensive peacekeeping and peacebuilding experience in fragile and unstable settings. The frameworks of regional and multilateral programmes could offer these countries the necessary systematic support and political legitimacy to upscale their support in transforming and building national institutions and inclusive political processes in conflict-affected countries.

### **Summary observations & recommendations**

- Mandates of key intergovernmental bodies have stressed the need to broaden and deepen the pool of rapidly deployable civilian expertise and experiences from countries which have undergone post-conflict situations or democratic transitions, in particular from developing countries; and to strengthen cooperation and coordination in building such civilian capacities, minimizing possible duplication of efforts and ensuring consistency and complementarity.
- These mandates have emphasized the importance of regional, triangular and South–South cooperation for effective international assistance to conflict-affected countries, and have encouraged the UN and its partners to play a catalytic role in facilitating development of a coherent policy framework and relevant structures and processes.

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<sup>83</sup> International Peace Institute (IPI), *Managing Transitions in the Arab World*, seminar report, June 2012. See also IPI, *Should emerging Arab regimes look to Turkey as a model?* Global Observatory update, 16 January 2012.

## V. Mapping and matching Southern capacities

41. With a view to bridging the gap between demand and supply and making a global civilian capacity partnership effective, the 2011 Independent Civilian Capacity Review identified five priority areas or clusters where countries emerging from conflict tend to experience critical capacity gaps: safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core government functionality, and economic revitalization. It also listed the lead actors within the UN system responsible for delivering the specialized capacities in each of the identified five priority sectors/subsectors, as well as key UN and non-UN providers of those capacities by sector. Building on this information, in September 2012, a self-service online platform *CAPMATCH*<sup>84</sup> or an ‘inclusive and transparent market place’<sup>85</sup> for providers and requestors of civilian capacities was launched, aimed at broadening the range of potential providers, primarily from the Global South, in precisely the five areas identified above.<sup>86</sup>
42. Serving a similar ‘global connector’ role, the World Bank and several UN departments, agencies and programmes have also developed knowledge-sharing platforms and rosters of experts in their respective areas of expertise for purposes of bilateral and multilateral cooperation programmes in mission as well as non-mission settings. For example, the World Bank Institute has launched an action learning and south-to-south Knowledge Exchange Programme for g7+ countries. This programme captures lessons in New Deal pilot countries and connects practitioners and key national stakeholders to innovation in fragile states (and beyond). It shares cross-country lessons and experiences that make it possible to design and implement concrete national level reforms. Transparency and related open government agenda issues such as natural resource management and citizen

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<sup>84</sup> For more information, see <https://capmatch.dfs.un.org> or [www.civcapreview.org](http://www.civcapreview.org)

<sup>85</sup> Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta, *CIVCAP 2012: laying concrete foundations*, NUPI Policy Brief, September 2012.

<sup>86</sup> For a sampling of exchanges of practical South–South experiences, see S/2012/645, p. 8.

engagement and participation feature as initial priority areas of the Knowledge Exchange programme. Similarly, the United Nations Environmental Programme has established a South–South cooperation exchange mechanism (<http://www.unep.org/south-south-cooperation/uneppscc/history.aspx>) to enhance its ability to deliver environmental capacity-building and technology-support activities in developing countries and regions of the South. The African Development Bank also has a specific facility for South–South cooperation in fragile states.<sup>87</sup>

43. Recognizing the opportunities offered by South–South cooperation, several governments, directly or in partnership with regional organizations, and private organizations have made triangular and South–South cooperation an integral part of their overall foreign policy assistance frameworks. The Norwegian government, for example, has collaborated with several semi-autonomous national institutions – among them, the Norwegian Refugee Council, which maintains the NORCAP roster with a wide mix of nationalities, including from the South, in its register. Norway has been assisting the African Union to build a civilian standby roster for the civilian component of the African Standby Force, mediation and post-conflict reconstruction and development. Through the Training for Peace (TFP) programme, a collaborative arrangement between African training and conflict resolution institutions, the Norwegian Police Directorate and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway is also supporting the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Missions (AFDEM).<sup>88</sup>
44. To address the need for in-depth exchanges among international actors on technical issues and find solutions regarding policy frameworks, institutional arrangements and enabling legislation, governments and institutions have established dedicated focal points and civilian capacity programmes with web portals, communities of practice, rosters, training and evaluation frameworks.<sup>89</sup> Such efforts have increasingly included countries from the Global South. NUPI has established a South–South–North network, with partners in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,

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<sup>87</sup> 2011 World Development Report, Overview, p.44, footnote 104.

<sup>88</sup> For details, see John Karlsrud, *Adapting Norwegian civilian capacity for the future: implications of the Guehenno Report*, NOREF Policy Brief, No. 5, September 2011.

<sup>89</sup> See for example, CIVCAP, a project led by Center for International Peace Operation-ZIFs, in collaboration with the German Federal Foreign Office <https://www.civcap.info/about-civcap.html>.



Norway, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, to promote exchange of information and experiences on the development of policies, strategies, mechanisms and structures in the participating countries, which have emerged as important providers of civilian capacities for peace operations.<sup>90</sup> A similar project has been undertaken by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).<sup>91</sup>

45. Revolutionary improvements in connectivity within and among developing countries themselves, as a result of complex networks of experts, officials, institutional linkages and knowledge exchange programmes, have promoted South–South cooperation portals and greater opportunities for exchanges of Southern solutions and innovations among countries facing challenges like conflict and natural disasters and cross-border issues such as arms transfers and HIV/AIDS.

### **Summary observations & recommendations**

- Member states, multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations have made significant progress in developing instruments and tools for mapping and matching relevant expertise and experiences from the Global South in the areas of peace and security, and widening and deepening the pool of deployable civilian capacities and models of transition in support of fragile societies.
- Instead of reinventing the wheel and duplicating efforts, the UN and the DPA should take stock of and attempt to connect the various instruments – including rosters of experts and knowledge-sharing networks existing within (e.g. CAPMATCH) and outside – with a view to mainstreaming triangular and South–South cooperation in their work, and forming effective partnerships to facilitate South-to-South exchanges.

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<sup>90</sup> For details, see <http://www.nupi.no/Virksomheten/Forskningsprosjekter/Network-Civilian-Capacity-for-Peace-Operations-in-a-Changing-World-Order>.

<sup>91</sup> [http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/pko/civilian\\_contribution](http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/pko/civilian_contribution).

## VI. South–South cooperation, emerging powers and the DPA: charting the way forward

46. The DPA has evolved from a traditionally desk-bound, analytical organization into an increasingly operational and results-oriented organization in response to the rapidly changing peace and security landscape and demands from intergovernmental bodies to provide more effective and strategic political leadership in conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding. As the Department is yet to make the transition to service both the Secretariat and the field in areas of its core mandate, there have been even greater demands for its services, given the renewed focus on the use of political tools of diplomacy and mediation combined with the provision of long-term capacity-development support to conflict-affected countries in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts as well as building effective and inclusive institutions as a basis for sustainable peace.<sup>92</sup>
47. Given the need to deliver promptly a wide range of complex and specialized services in a context of limited resources, evolving approaches to conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding that underscore national ownership, long-term tailored international support, and collaboration with increasingly active and capable actors from the Global South, including regional and subregional organizations (as detailed in parts I–V of this report), it has become necessary for the DPA to reassess and redefine its priorities, tools and approaches, including the value added for its work, operational effectiveness and partnerships of a resurgent South–South cooperation framework.
48. Select divisions within the DPA have already, albeit on an *ad hoc* basis, recognized the enhancement of partnership with emerging powers in the Global South as critical to the success of their programmes, and have indirectly supported the South–South

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<sup>92</sup> This section of the report draws extensively upon the DPA website and the 2011–2013 Multi-Year Appeal documents prepared to explain the work of the DPA to donor countries.

cooperation framework. Awareness and evidence of these scattered initiatives and shared understanding of the value added by South–South cooperation could encourage more consistent mainstreaming of South–South cooperation in all areas of the DPA’s work; development of an enabling DPA-wide policy framework that has otherwise significantly lagged behind the evolving practice; and buy-in within the DPA to lead system-wide efforts to formulate a coherent policy framework to facilitate expansion of South–South cooperation into the peace and security pillar of the UN’s work, as a cross-cutting issue.

### Political capacity-building and knowledge-sharing

49. Facilitation of triangular and South–South cooperation within the DPA is evident in the assistance activities and initiatives of, *inter alia*, the Electoral Assistance Division (EAD), the Policy and Mediation Division (PMD) and the Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR). The EAD, with a key policy development role<sup>93</sup> at headquarters and extensive support to electoral assistance activities in mission and non-mission settings,<sup>94</sup> offers a pertinent case. In addition to providing political guidance,<sup>95</sup> quality control, electoral roster management and institutional memory, it has built strong partnerships with regional and other intergovernmental organizations to ensure appropriate working arrangements with them and to help build their electoral capacity where appropriate. It has also contributed to initiatives that have helped to promote exchanges and partnerships through an electoral information network, as well as South–South election assistance. Such cooperation has involved members of the Federal Electoral

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<sup>93</sup> The DPA and the EAD, as the focal point for electoral assistance, considered vital to implementation of peace agreements and inclusive transitions, have ensured system-wide coherence and consistency within a broad array of UN entities. For example, in 2010 the DPA and UNDP signed a revised note of guidance on electoral assistance to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities. For details, see A/66/314, p.6.

<sup>94</sup> In 2012, the UN and EAD assisted some 60 member states and territories through technical support to electoral processes, as well as support to mediation exercises dealing with election-related issues, dispatch of ‘good offices missions’ to help increase confidence in election processes while mitigating the risk of election-related violence, and the establishment of high-level electoral panels providing recommendations based on an assessment of the political and electoral environment.

<sup>95</sup> EAD, UN Focal Point for Electoral Assistance, Policy Directive, *Principles and Types of UN Electoral Assistance*, 11 May 2012.

Institute of Mexico and the Electoral Tribunal of Panama,<sup>96</sup> among others. In addition, the DPA and EAD have maintained a roster of pre-screened electoral experts who can be quickly deployed to any UN assistance presence.<sup>97</sup> Other recent knowledge-sharing and partnership-building initiatives have included arranging workshops between election stakeholders to build on comparative experiences in order to develop improved electoral processes.<sup>98</sup>

50. While providing substantive and operational support to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the DPR has both facilitated South–South cooperation and partnered with emerging powers that have favoured a peaceful solution to the Palestinian question. In the latter context, the Division has closely monitored and recorded perspectives of the emerging powers and of regional groups in the UN Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL). Through its programme of meetings and workshops, the Division has served as a knowledge broker and partnership builder, bringing together experts from governments, civil society and academia in the search for peaceful solutions. For example, in 2013 the UN International Meeting on the Question of Palestine was dedicated to drawing upon the experience of African states in anti-colonial and anti-apartheid struggles, as well as in post-colonial efforts to build effective governments and economies.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, the Division maintains a roster of experts and a roster of civil society organizations, including from the region and the Global South.
51. Nowhere has the need for harnessing systematically the wealth of knowledge, expertise and resources in the Global South and promoting South–South cooperation been underscored more than in the context of the Security Council-mandated multi-dimensional special political missions (SPMs) and expanding their assistance for peacebuilding, good governance and democratization.<sup>100</sup> In

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<sup>96</sup> <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections/partnerships>.

<sup>97</sup> For example, in the case of Libya, EAD set itself a concrete target of pre-screening and including in the team of electoral experts half of whom were Arabic-speaking and 30 per cent were women.

<sup>98</sup> For example, in 2010, EAD and UNDP, in cooperation with the government of Romania, organized a workshop on out-of-country voting in order to identify a set of good practices and guidelines.

<sup>99</sup> <http://unispal.un.org/databases/dprtest/ngoweb.nsf/f12fded4d0597000852573fc005b9471/aa987555796e811085257b3300638819?OpenDocument>.

<sup>100</sup> DPA Strategic Plan, 2014–2015.

2000, when there were eight DPA-supported SPMs, the typical mission had four different core sets of mandated tasks. In 2003, the average number of mandated tasks had increased to seven, and by 2010 half of such missions had mandates for some 12 to 24 complex tasks,<sup>101</sup> including the provision of assistance to national and local-level initiatives to foster dialogue, build capacity, and prevent violence.<sup>102</sup> In the follow-up to the 2011 Civilian Capacity Review,<sup>103</sup> the DPA proposed to support triangular and South–South cooperation in ‘every cluster and sub-cluster of its work and include in the terms of reference of each global service provider’.<sup>104</sup> For the first time, a civilian capacity gap model<sup>105</sup> was employed to identify requirements of the DPA-led UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and mobilize civilian capacities and approaches from the region, as appropriate – including police trainers from Jordan, strategic planners from the Palestinian Authority and specialists from Gaza to counsel combatants.<sup>106</sup> Similarly, with support from the Peacebuilding Fund, Liberian experts with security-sector reform experience were deployed to the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire.<sup>107</sup>

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- <sup>101</sup> Report of the Secretary-General, *Review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions*, A/66/340, p. 6.
- <sup>102</sup> Cedric de Coning (2011), *Civilian Peacekeeping Capacity: Mobilizing Partners to Match Supply and Demand*, *International Peacekeeping*, 18:5, pp. 577–592.
- <sup>103</sup> The Review identified five priority areas where there were gaps in deployable civilian capacities in support of fragile societies, including in the area of inclusive political processes, consisting of the following clusters: constitutional processes; elections and electoral processes; mediation, good offices and conflict resolution; support to civil society; political party development; and public information and media.
- <sup>104</sup> In a 2011 internal inter-agency paper, the DPA further proposed that instead of regulating how the support was provided, innovation would be encouraged through sharing of experiences of one cluster with another. It also considered existing partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, including desk-to-desk meeting, as another avenue.
- <sup>105</sup> One of the three key lessons on which the civilian capacity model was based was that South–South cooperation had a special role. Countries from the Global South often had knowledge and expertise from their own experience of conflict, democratic transition or building capacities for conflict prevention. Sharing this could be of great practical value to countries facing similar challenges. For more information, see <http://civcapreview.org/>.
- <sup>106</sup> Multi-year Appeal, 2013 Update, p.13; and author interviews with select DPA staff and a consultant.
- <sup>107</sup> In the case of South Sudan, while the United Nations Mission for South Sudan was mandated by resolution 2057 (2012) to ensure that ‘relevant’ expertise was mobilized to ‘support the peacebuilding needs of the Government and people of the Republic of South Sudan’, the national Government limited its partnership to

52. The vast majority of South–South interactions have taken place within the region owing to commonality of history, language, culture, ethnicity, geographical proximity and shared interest in peace and stability.<sup>108</sup> By strengthening the position and functional capacities of regional organizations in mediation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the DPA has played a catalytic role in facilitating South–South cooperation at the regional as well as interregional level. Through information sharing and joint analysis of country and regional issues of mutual concern, regular ‘desk-to-desk’ dialogues, comprehensive capacity-building assistance programmes, including the 10-Year Capacity-Building Programme for the African Union launched in 2006,<sup>109</sup> joint training programmes for staff from regional organizations and the UN, establishment of regional and liaison offices, including the UN Office at the African Union (UNOAU), UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), UN Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and UN Regional Center for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, the DPA has fostered targeted capacity development, intraregional sharing of knowledge, expertise and best practices, adoption of joint negotiation positions, regional peacekeeping and the pooling of financial and other resources. With effective support and collaboration, regional organizations have increasingly served as first-line responders in national and regional preventive and peacemaking initiatives, promoting innovative regional approaches such as the African Peer Review Mechanism for promoting good governance in the region, and helping to dispel the notion that collaboration in peace and security matters necessarily undermines sovereignty or principles of non-intervention. Regional organizations have also spurred interregional South–South and triangular cooperation, including through mutual exchanges – as in the case of cooperation between the African Union and the Organization of American States in the context of adaptation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter to the African context and realities, in the form of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.<sup>110</sup>

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UNDP and IGAD in implementing a capacity-building initiative with expertise specifically from the region. Author interview with senior UNDP senior management in the field.

<sup>108</sup> See for example, an ACCORD report entitled, *The African Union Panel of Wise: Strengthening Relations with Similar Regional Mechanisms*, June 2012.

<sup>109</sup> A/61/630.

<sup>110</sup> Author interview with senior DPA staff. See also <http://au.int/en/partnerships>.

53. Indicative of its operational shift and recent efforts to ensure that UN good offices, mediation, crisis response and capacity-building services were strengthened and rapidly deployable – including from the Global South<sup>111</sup> – in 2012 the DPA 53 times deployed its diverse and specialized Standby Team of Mediation Experts,<sup>112</sup> on 72-hour notice, to assist UN and non-UN mediators in facilitating tailored regional, national and community-level political dialogues, mediation processes and other good offices efforts (e.g. Central African Republic, Georgia, Libya, Somalia, the Sudan and Yemen), as well as responding to 33 requests for experts from its Mediation Roster. In the creation of the Mediation Roster of some 200 experts, the DPA placed special emphasis ‘on the identification and promotion of expertise coming from the Global South’.<sup>113</sup> It has increasingly served as a knowledge broker, also of Southern good practices and approaches, by linking expertise, experiences and technology and making available practical tools for prevention and peacemaking. These include the Guidance for Effective Mediation<sup>114</sup> and the UN Peacemaker, an online repository of knowledge on peace agreements and mediation.<sup>115</sup> Notwithstanding these efforts to meet current demands and strengthen crisis response and capacity-building support to the UN and other partners, a 2012 report of the Secretary-General further recommended that the partnership development mechanism being contemplated should also focus on harnessing mediation and peacemaking capacity from, in particular the Global South and women in the South.<sup>116</sup> The interoperability between DPA-wide rosters composed of experts with varied backgrounds and expertise<sup>117</sup> and use of CAPMATCH could offer one of many possible options for addressing resource gaps and

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<sup>111</sup> The Secretary-General’s Five-Year Action Agenda, 2012.

<sup>112</sup> In 2010, the Standby Team was deployed 22 times. In 2012–2013, this number increased to 70 times. When not deployed to the field, the experts provide advice or analysis remotely, and work on the development of UN best practices and training materials in the areas of their expertise.

<sup>113</sup> DPA Factsheet, *Mediation Roster*, September 2011.

<sup>114</sup> A/66/811.

<sup>115</sup> Similarly, the DPA is in the process of developing and making available the ‘UN Constitutionmaker’.

<sup>116</sup> A/66/811, p. 62.

<sup>117</sup> UNDP’s Office for South–South cooperation has provided technical support in the design, development and maintenance of two rosters in the DPA (Mediation Roster in the Policy and Mediation Division and Roster of Experts in the Security Council Affairs Division), creating possibilities for interoperability between these two and other rosters in the DPA and possibly with the UNDP, the DPA’s close partner in the area of conflict prevention and capacity building.

allowing greater utilization of experts and approaches from the Global South.

### Credible political analysis

54. Since most of the DPA's work takes place in or for the benefit of developing countries and is related to ongoing political processes to promote critical stability for economic development and other processes in conflict-affected countries,<sup>118</sup> by sufficiently incorporating perspectives of the Global South as well as Southern/regional solutions and approaches, the DPA could serve an important role in providing the rest of the UN system with sound information, analysis and recommendations essential for developing effective policy responses, fostering trust with national governments and consensus among actors, and developing hybrid forms of international engagements for each priority case. However, this has been recognized as somewhat of a challenge by already-overburdened desk officers in regional DPA divisions who, often busy responding to one crisis after another and lacking guidance or support for pursuing innovative approaches that could draw on relevant models and recent experiences of democratic transitions in the Global South, have found themselves relying on widely accepted traditional approaches.<sup>119</sup> Recently some efforts have been made to address this shortcoming. For a brief period, the Americas Division designated a *focal point* to collect and include information in the talking points for use by the Secretary-General and others on activities of countries in the region related to facilitation of South–South cooperation. This arrangement was discontinued, but there seems a clear need for it to be reinstated at the divisional<sup>120</sup> or departmental level. Furthermore, joint assessments with regional organizations and regional offices, as well as recent initiatives to channel input from the pool of special envoys, UNDP country teams, including peace and development advisors, the specialized Standby Team of Mediators and the newly established Academic Advisory Council

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<sup>118</sup> In recognition of this, the DPA Trust Fund has been registered recently on the OECD List of ODA-eligible Organizations. DPA, Multi-year Appeal, 2013 update, p. 11.

<sup>119</sup> Author interviews with DPA desk officers.

<sup>120</sup> A 2011 audit report of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU/REP/2011/3, pp. 35 and 47–58) noted that out of 17 countries that had included a reference to South–South cooperation in their UNDAFs, seven were from Latin America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, and Venezuela, underscoring the relevance of the framework to countries in the region.



on Mediation composed of individuals with a wide range of backgrounds, experiences and language skills, offer the potential to integrate various perspectives, better connect academic analysis with practice and promote the development of best practices, communities of practice and innovative pathways – including those specifically relating to facilitation of South–South cooperation as a cross-cutting thematic issue. In the context of expanding its range of information and options, the DPA’s strategic plan for 2014–2015 includes a recommendation for greater cooperation with intellectual leaders and civil society in the South.

### **Outreach and advocacy**

55. As ‘non-intervention’ has gradually given way to ‘non-indifference’ and the demand has risen for the DPA’s impartial and timely political analysis and interventions, without a commensurate increase in resources, the DPA has sought enhanced partnerships with traditional and non-traditional actors, extra-budgetary resources, effective solutions with a multiplier effect and a coherent policy framework to harmonize fragmented international responses. As part of these efforts, solidifying support for its activities in the Global South, the DPA’s largest constituency, including financial support from the emerging powers at this time of global austerity and going forward, is recognized as critical to bolstering the DPA’s resources, capacities and credibility.<sup>121</sup> Financial contributions from emerging powers to the Peacebuilding Fund have amounted to over 3.9 per cent of the balance. In 2012, India joined the ranks of non-traditional donors to the DPA’s Trust Funds, together with Morocco and Turkey. However, for the support to continue and grow, the DPA would have to conduct more regular policy dialogues with the emerging powers,<sup>122</sup> taking into consideration their priorities and perspectives as well as the commitment to triangular and South–South cooperation. Together with PBSO, the DPA would need to adopt a bold public diplomacy and outreach strategy that could

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<sup>121</sup> In 2009, when DPA was attempting a second time to galvanize the support of developing countries that had serious reservations about strengthening DPA’s conflict prevention mandate and viewed it as a challenge to the principles of national sovereignty and non-intervention, South Africa seems to have played an instrumental role in reassuring the developing countries and winning their support for 49 new posts in DPA for its conflict-prevention activities.

<sup>122</sup> DPA strategic plan, 2014-2015, recommendation 2.6.

generate awareness about the specific programmes it has implemented to facilitate and support triangular and South–South cooperation. Then, after mapping and documenting all such ‘islands of success’ and accompanying challenges, the DPA would be in a better position not only to demonstrate the proven relevance of triangular and South–South cooperation to its own work, but also to take up the role of an advocate and convenor of system-wide efforts to mainstream South–South cooperation in areas of peace and security that UN membership at large and the emerging powers particularly favour: and this could stimulate serious policy dialogue aimed at furthering the impact of the DPA and the UN in key national capitals on issues of importance.

### **Summary observations & recommendations**

- Some divisions within the DPA have, albeit on an *ad hoc* basis, deepened partnership with the emerging powers in the Global South and facilitated triangular and South–South cooperation through stand-alone projects.
- In response to increasing demands from member states (including conflict-affected countries), and given the proven relevance to its own work, the DPA should give priority to mainstreaming triangular and South–South cooperation as a thematic and cross-cutting issue across all aspects of its work.
- To build departmental consensus and support, DPA-wide awareness and shared understanding of the value added by triangular and South–South cooperation needs to be generated through mapping and sharing of relevant experiences and projects implemented by various parts of the DPA.
- To avoid reinventing the wheel and to leverage the existing architecture and normative consensus in support of South–South cooperation for its work, the DPA should advance its understanding of related system-wide and international processes and best practices, and participate in ongoing policy dialogues.
- The DPA needs to identify a focal point to coordinate systematic development of department-specific guidance which can link policy with its evolving practice in facilitating triangular and South–South cooperation, and synchronize it with complementary system-wide guidance, tools and mechanisms.
- The DPA, together with the PBSO, should take the lead in coordinating with other principal stakeholders in the system development of a common integrated and enabling policy framework to establish and promote the role of the UN and the DPA as advocate, convenor, knowledge broker and supporter of South–South cooperation across the peace and security pillar.
- To harness the full potential of South–South cooperation, the DPA should deepen strategic and operational collaboration with the Global South, including the emerging powers and regional organizations as well as civil society and think-tanks.
- The DPA should undertake a massive outreach to generate recognition and support for its efforts in facilitating triangular and South–South cooperation among non-traditional and traditional donors alike..

# Annex: Compilation of Summary Observations & Recommendations

## **I. Resurgence of South–South cooperation: the game-changer?**

- South–South cooperation, involving exchanges of affordable and appropriate knowledge, skills and solutions among developing countries, has been mandated as a priority by intergovernmental bodies, requiring the entire UN system to take steps towards integrating and institutionalizing it in their programmes and approaches.
- The emergence of major economies in the Global South and their eagerness to assist other developing countries, including conflict-affected countries, has resulted in the mainstreaming of triangular and South–South cooperation in peacebuilding activities, particularly in the complex task of building state capacity.
- The nexus between security and development, fostered also in the post-2015 framework, has further underscored the need for wider application of developmentally-focused South–South cooperation across the peace and security pillar of the UN's work.
- UN system-wide efforts in 2012 towards developing a more systematic approach and operational guidelines for implementation of South–South cooperation have made it opportune for the DPA and concerned departments across the peace and security pillar to advance their understanding of processes and mechanisms facilitating South–South cooperation and assess the added value of triangular and South–South cooperation to areas of their work.

## **II. The new normal: exercise of soft power by Southern powers**

- Emerging powers have become major players in the provision of tailored and long-term assistance to conflict-affected countries within the framework of South–South cooperation, as well as their broader development cooperation programmes, growing commercial interests and foreign-policy aspirations for regional stability, dominance and a bigger role in global governance.
- Emerging powers have promoted alternate models and approaches that prioritize national ownership and capacity-building, an intrinsic link between security and development, the ‘human approach’ with its emphasis on poverty elimination and food security as root causes of conflict, and the nexus between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.
- To take their engagement to the next level, emerging powers have explored novel modalities and partnerships to deepen policy coordination and pool resources in efforts to help each other and other developing countries as well as increase their collective bargaining power in multilateral forums.
- Emerging powers have favoured consent-based regional, triangular and multilateral interventions and institutional support over bilateral arrangements to scale up their engagement in politically sensitive areas, including promotion of democratic values and inclusive political processes, while balancing commitment to South–South cooperation principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and national ownership.
- Wary of attempts to co-opt them into OECD-led international aid structures, emerging powers have looked to the UN to play a meaningful role in the development of an integrated and coherent policy framework that can reflect and harmonize their priorities, perspectives and approaches (including the South–South cooperation framework) with that of OECD countries and other key stakeholders.
- Given the growing centrality and political influence of the emerging powers, the UN system has an important role in harnessing their full potential and facilitating the development of a common policy

framework that can sufficiently reflect their perspectives and priorities.

### **III. Peacebuilding: a paradigm shift**

- Evolving approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding have given salience to national ownership and development of self-sustaining institutions, capacities and inclusive processes that can provide basic security, social cohesion, governance, justice and a sufficient foundation for democratic and equitable development in the long term.
- South–South cooperation, with its emphasis on demand-driven, context-specific, long-term partnerships among equals, and involving sharing of relevant expertise and experiences between developing countries, has shown the potential to become a catalyst for successful peacebuilding efforts, also as regards inclusive political processes.
- In the absence of sufficient national support structures, triangular cooperation has become indispensable to the expansion of developmentally-focused South–South cooperation to the peace and security pillar.

### **IV. South–South cooperation in peacebuilding mandates**

- Mandates of key intergovernmental bodies have stressed the need to broaden and deepen the pool of rapidly deployable civilian expertise and experiences from countries which have undergone post-conflict situations or democratic transitions, in particular from developing countries; and to strengthen cooperation and coordination in building such civilian capacities, minimizing possible duplication of efforts and ensuring consistency and complementarity.
- These mandates have emphasized the importance of regional, triangular and South–South cooperation for effective international assistance to conflict-affected countries, and have encouraged the UN and its partners to play a catalytic role in facilitating development of a coherent policy framework and relevant structures and processes.

## **V. Mapping and matching Southern capacities**

- Member states, multilateral institutions and non-governmental organizations have made significant progress in developing instruments and tools for mapping and matching relevant expertise and experiences from the Global South in the areas of peace and security, and widening and deepening the pool of deployable civilian capacities and models of transition in support of fragile societies.
- Instead of reinventing the wheel and duplicating efforts, the UN and the DPA should take stock of and attempt to connect the various instruments – including rosters of experts and knowledge-sharing networks existing within (e.g. CAPMATCH) and outside – with a view to mainstreaming triangular and South–South cooperation in their work, and forming effective partnerships to facilitate South-to-South exchanges.

## **VI. The DPA, emerging powers and South–South cooperation**

- Some divisions within the DPA have, albeit on an *ad hoc* basis, deepened partnership with the emerging powers in the Global South and facilitated triangular and South–South cooperation through stand-alone projects.
- In response to increasing demands from member states (including conflict-affected countries), and given the proven relevance to its own work, the DPA should give priority to mainstreaming triangular and South–South cooperation as a thematic and cross-cutting issue across all aspects of its work.
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understanding of related system-wide and international processes and best practices, and participate in ongoing policy dialogues.

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