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# MINUSTAH's Specialized Police Team to Combat Sexual Violence in Haiti

Marina Caparini and  
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## Summary<sup>1</sup>

This paper examines the Norwegian specialized police team (SPT) that has been deployed to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) since late 2010. The objective of the team is to build the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP) to conduct investigations into sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).

The SPT represents an innovative approach to deploying police personnel in UN peacekeeping operations. By providing a coordinated team of police experts who work closely with host-state police in defining, developing and implementing a specific project, this new deployment mechanism offers a more effective means of building police capacity than the traditional peacekeeping approach of using individual police officers (IPOs).

However, the SPT on SGBV in Haiti has encountered obstacles which have at times come close to derailing the work of the team. These challenges derive from dynamics within the UN itself and reflect systemic problems – rigid bureaucratic procedures, the persistence of institutional silos, failure to collaborate within the police component and among the various actors engaged with strengthening the rule of law, combined with the limitations imposed by a risk-averse organizational culture.

Despite the achievements of the Norwegian-led SPT, and the benefits offered by the specialized team model as a new means of bringing expertise and funding to countries hosting peace operations, the UN is currently ill-prepared for facilitating this new deployment model. Administrative improvements are required, particularly for supporting the team's work through financial and procurement procedures. There is a need to bolster sustainability by changing police mind-sets concerning SGBV, and a need for a more integrated approach to combating SGBV effectively through the various links comprising the

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<sup>1</sup> This working paper is part of the project *Learning from Experience – International Policing*, funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The authors are very grateful to all those we have interviewed in order to write this paper, in particular the members of the SPT, but also local and international UN staff in Haiti as well as representatives from the UN Police Division in New York and from the Norwegian UN Delegation to the UN.

chain of justice in Haiti. This will require improved communication and coordination between the SPT and the relevant agencies involved with the UN Country Team in Haiti.



# Introduction

There is a mismatch between on-the-ground needs in post-conflict environments and the instruments available to the United Nations Police (UNPOL). This is spelled out explicitly in the 2016 ‘External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division’.<sup>2</sup> According to this review, a paradigm shift is needed in UNPOL’s operating model, in order to tailor support to the needs of the specific country and deliver on the mandate given. One recommendation is to increase the use of specialized police officers.

As yet there has been little formal guidance on specialized police teams in police development and capacity-building. That makes it instructive to examine the experience of the first project-based specialized police team, deployed in 2010 by Norway to work as part of the MINUSTAH police component in building Haitian police capacity for investigating SGBV crimes.

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<sup>2</sup> ‘External Review of the Functions, Structure and Capacity of the UN Police Division’, 31 May 2016. See <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/policerreview2016.pdf>

## MINUSTAH and the Development of the Haiti National Police

The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, was established in 2004.<sup>3</sup> A core element of its mandate has been to support the rebuilding of the rule of law through the development and professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). However, police reform efforts gained momentum only from 2006, when Haitian attitudes towards the mission began to change, especially following MINUSTAH's anti-gang efforts in the large shantytown of Cité-Soleil in the capital city, Port-au-Prince.<sup>4</sup>

Unlike other places where UN peacekeeping missions have been established, Haiti is not a country emerging from armed conflict. It has experienced continuing political instability, social unrest and sporadic violence throughout its recent tumultuous history – from the fall of dictator 'Baby Doc' Duvalier in 1986, to the military coup that removed the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in September 1991, through to the reinstatement of Aristide as president from 1994–96 and 2001–04. Aristide's ouster and exile in 2004 and the ensuing instability prompted the authorization of MINUSTAH. Haiti's subsequent leaders have not managed to deal with the extreme poverty, deep social divisions and cycles of electoral strife that have continued to afflict the country.

Although MINUSTAH gradually made some progress in supporting Haitian police reform, this process was cut short by a series of natural and man-made disasters that devastated the country. Hurricanes and tropical storms in 2008, combined with vast deforestation, resulted in massive flooding. This was but a prelude to the utter destruction wreaked by the magnitude 7 earthquake on 12 January 2010, which caused up to 220,000 deaths, displaced an estimated 1.5 million people, and destroyed residences and infrastructure throughout the

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<sup>3</sup> The acronym MINUSTAH comes from the French, *Mission des Nations-Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haïti*.

<sup>4</sup> Timothy Donais, 'Reforming the Haitian National Police: From stabilization to consolidation', in Jorge Heine and Andrew S. Thompson, eds, *Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond* (Tokyo and New York: UN University Press, 2011), pp. 99–100. See <https://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:2516/ebrary9789280811971.pdf>

capital, including government buildings.<sup>5</sup> Further, a cholera epidemic linked to faulty sanitation systems at certain MINUSTAH bases<sup>6</sup> has caused the deaths of at least 9,200 persons (probably many more, according to recent studies)<sup>7</sup> and the illness of over 770,000, or 7% of the Haitian population.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> J.E. Daniell, B. Khazai and F. Wenzel, 'Uncovering the 2010 Haiti earthquake death toll' in *Natural Hazards and Earth System Sciences Discussions*, Vol. 1: 1913–1942 (2013), <http://www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci-discuss.net/1/1913/2013/nhessd-1-1913-2013.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Joe Sandler Clarke and Ed Pilkington, 'Leaked UN report faults sanitation at Haiti bases at time of cholera outbreak', *Guardian*, 5 April 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/05/leaked-un-report-sanitation-haiti-bases-cholera-outbreak>

<sup>7</sup> Rick Gladstone, 'Cholera deaths in Haiti could far exceed official count', *New York Times*, 18 March 2016.

<sup>8</sup> David McFadden, 'Cholera quietly still kills dozens a month in Haiti', Associated Press, 3 March 2016, [http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/2016/03/cholera\\_quietly\\_still\\_kills\\_dozens\\_a\\_month\\_in\\_haiti](http://www.bostonherald.com/news/international/2016/03/cholera_quietly_still_kills_dozens_a_month_in_haiti)

## The SPT in UN policy

Until recently, most police deployed to UN peacekeeping missions have fallen into one of two categories: 'individual police officers' (IPOs), or members of 'formed police units' (FPUs).<sup>9</sup> IPOs are seconded police or law enforcement personnel who are deployed on an individual basis and conduct a range of mandated tasks related to policing. These tasks may include direct law enforcement where missions have partial or full executive policing mandates – or, more commonly, operational support to host-state police in conducting investigations, special operations and ensuring public safety.<sup>10</sup> Further, IPOs may support the capacity-building and development of the host-state police and law enforcement agencies through activities that include monitoring, mentoring and training. In contrast, FPUs are cohesive mobile police units that have three core tasks: providing support to UN operations that involve higher risk above the general capacities of an IPO; helping to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel and facilities; and providing public order management.<sup>11</sup> FPUs are composed of at least 120 police officers; these units are armed, robust and self-sustaining.

The 'Specialized Police Team' (SPT) has recently emerged as a new category of police deployment for UN peacekeeping missions. The 2014 'Policy on UN Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions' describes an SPT as 'a group of experts in a particular police specialism assigned to serve with the United Nations on secondment by an individual country or a group of Member States at the request of the Secretary-General.'<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> There is also an additional category, the Standing Police Capacity (SPC), which involves the rapid deployment unit of the UN, with an approved operational capacity of 40 staff members (UN Police Division, at: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/division.shtml>).

<sup>10</sup> DPKO and DFS, 'Guidelines on Police Operations in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions', Ref 2015.15, 01 January 2016, para 8, [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/Guidelines\\_Operations.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/Guidelines_Operations.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> DPKO and DFS, 'Policy on UN Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions', 01 February 2014, p. 26, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/Policy.pdf>

<sup>12</sup> 'Policy on UN Police', 2014, p. 27.

The Norwegian-led SGBV team marked the emergence of the SPT as a new mechanism to assist in developing host-state police and law enforcement capacity. The SPT concept is generally envisioned as providing additional options to overcome obstacles commonly encountered by IPOs. As described in the 2016 UN guidelines on police command, UN police commanders face challenges in the mission environment, due to the many different policing cultures and approaches to training by personnel within the police component, compounded by frequent staff rotations:

National capacity gaps in the host State should inform the composition of police components and requests for police contributions from police-contributing countries (PCCs). For example, commanders shall consider piloting specialised teams to address areas such as serious and organized crime, sexual- and gender-based violence or crime analysis, as well as drawing on the expertise available in the SPC [Standing Police Capacity].<sup>13</sup>

Aside from these brief mentions in the SGF overall doctrine and 2016 guidance on command of the police component, however, there has been little formal guidance on specialized police teams in police development and capacity-building.<sup>14</sup>

Although the idea of a ‘specialized capacity’ within the police component was initially seen as an optional addition to formed police units (FPUs), it should be noted that the SPT is distinct from the FPU specialized capacity. The UN policy on FPUs (2009, revised 2010) mentions the possibility of including ‘dedicated specialized units’ or ‘specialized capacities’ to FPUs. These may include special weapons and tactics (SWAT) teams, canine units, close protection teams, investigations and forensics teams.<sup>15</sup> These specialized teams were

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<sup>13</sup> DPKO and DFS, ‘Guidelines on Police Command in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions’, 01 January 2016, para 68, [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/Guidelines\\_Command.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/Guidelines_Command.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> This is the case for police-contributing countries (PCCs), member states who are considering deploying them, for police component senior leadership in peacekeeping missions who may be asked to incorporate such teams and their projects into the work and management of the police component, and for the various administrative support elements on which specialized teams will rely, both in the field and at the Secretariat in New York.

<sup>15</sup> DPKO and DFS, ‘Policy (revised) on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations’, 1 March 2010, para. 24,

foreseen to be deployed as part of, or attached to, a national FPU; or, if provided by another country, they could be deployed to hotspots or stationed in a central location for dispatch as needed.<sup>16</sup> Specialized teams attached to FPUs have a clearly operational role in providing support to host-state law enforcement activities and are subject to specific command and control arrangements.<sup>17</sup> However, FPUs normally do not play a prominent role in capacity-building of host-state police, a task traditionally undertaken by IPOs in UN peacekeeping missions, and henceforth additionally through the SPT

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[http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed\\_police\\_unit\\_policy\\_032010.pdf](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> Policy on FPUs, para 48.

<sup>17</sup> The head of the police component (HOPC) or his delegates – the Chief of Operations, and Deputy Chief of Ops (FPU) and Regional Commanders – exercise command and operational control of specialized teams attached to FPUs. ‘In the execution of a specific task, specialised units are under the tactical control of whoever leads the operation or specific action, but remain under the tactical command of their commander. Where specialised units are dispatched to execute a task on their own, without involvement of other FPUs or individual UNPOL, tactical control is exercised by the commander of the specialised unit.’ See Policy on FPUs, para 49.

## Establishment of the Norwegian SPT on SGBV

The Norway-led SPT has focused on building the capacities of the Haitian National Police (HNP) in investigating cases of SGBV through two successive projects – SGBV I (2010–2015) and SGBV II (2015–2016, with the possibility of extending to 2017). This section traces the development and implementation of these projects through the perspective of team members, drawing on key informant interviews, reports and team documentation.<sup>18</sup>

In response to the earthquake of 12 January 2010, Norway spearheaded the deployment of a specialized police team to Haiti. The earthquake resulted in mass internal displacement of some 1.5 million people. In the immediate aftermath of the quake, many of the displaced lived in makeshift shelters made of bedsheets and tarps or, for a minority, in tents in crowded encampments with little or no lighting or sanitation facilities. The collapse of social and family networks and means of support made women especially vulnerable. Even before the earthquake, levels of sexual- and gender-based violence had been high in Haiti.<sup>19</sup> After the earthquake, international and national human rights and women's groups reported extremely high rates of sexual violence in IDP settlements and camps.<sup>20</sup> In one study, for example, 14% of displaced respondents said they or a member of their household had experienced rape or sexual violence since the

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<sup>18</sup> Between December 2015 and May 2016, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews with current and former SPT team members in Port-au-Prince and in Oslo, as well as with HNP officers, MINUSTAH personnel and UN country team representatives, DPKO Police Division, and several police advisers to permanent missions to the UN.

<sup>19</sup> Helen Spraos, 'Strengthening state and civil society action to overcome violence against women in Haiti: A baseline study', UNIFEM, 2008, p. 13, [http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/security\\_baseline\\_study\\_haiti\\_spraos\\_unifem2008.pdf](http://www.endvawnow.org/uploads/browser/files/security_baseline_study_haiti_spraos_unifem2008.pdf)

<sup>20</sup> MADRE, International Women's Human Rights Clinic at CUNY School of Law, and Institute for Justice & Democracy in Haiti, 'Our bodies are still trembling: Haitian women continue to fight against rape', January 2011, especially pp. 6–7, <http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/1-Year-GBV-2011.pdf>

earthquake.<sup>21</sup> Another survey conducted in 2011/2012 found that Haitians living in high-density, low-income urban areas were 27 times more likely to experience sexual assault than those in better-off, less densely populated areas.<sup>22</sup>

However, victims of domestic violence or sexual assault have tended not to report this to the police or other authorities, for various reasons that include shame, community stigmatization, fear of reprisals by perpetrators, economic dependence on the perpetrator, and lack of trust in Haitian justice and police sector. State police have not been present in the Port-au-Prince shantytown of Cité-Soleil, where rape is commonly used by the gangs who control the area, and victims who report such crimes to the police face certain reprisal. Women who report having been sexually assaulted, especially if they are of low socio-economic status, have also frequently been blamed by police officers, who ask, for example, what they did or wore to provoke the attack.<sup>23</sup> This social norm of blaming the victim, police failure to act, and corruption in the police and judiciary, combined with heavy under-reporting of SGBV crimes by victims, high dismissal rates for the few cases taken through the justice system, and the readiness to accept out-of-court settlements, have perpetuated *de facto* impunity for most perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence in Haiti.<sup>24</sup>

According to interviews with Norwegian police, the alarming SGBV rates in Haiti's IDP camps was a key initial factor behind the desire to assist by deploying Norwegian police peacekeepers. Two Norwegian senior police officers with international experience travelled to Haiti on a fact-finding trip, to meet with MINUSTAH mission leadership and key HNP officials and consider whether the proposed focus on SGBV was

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<sup>21</sup> Brooke Steadman, 'Security after the quake? Addressing violence and rape in Haiti', USIP Peace Brief 73, 7 January 2011, [http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB73-Security\\_After\\_the\\_Quake.pdf](http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB73-Security_After_the_Quake.pdf). See also Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 'Sexual violence in Haiti's IDP camps: results of a household survey', New York University, March 2011, <http://chrgi.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/HaitiSexualViolenceMarch2011.pdf>

<sup>22</sup> ANAPFEH et al., 'Fighting for our lives – violence and discrimination against women and LGBT persons in Haiti', Submission to the Human Rights Committee, Response to the Second Periodic Report on the Republic of Haiti, October 2014, p. 11, <https://www.madre.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/Haiti%20ICCPR%20Report%20ENG%202014%20final.pdf>

<sup>23</sup> ANPFEH, p. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Spraos, p. 20. See also Athena Kolbe and Robert Muggah, 'Haiti's Silenced Victims', *New York Times*, 8 December 2012 for an account, documented by two Western researchers, of a Haitian colleague's sexual assault and her efforts (finally abandoned) to get the crime registered and pursued through the justice system.



needed – and if it would be welcome. Once these points were confirmed, the Norwegian Police Directorate liaised with the Gender Adviser in the Police Division at UN DPKO in New York, for help in developing the concept of deploying a specialized team to MINUSTAH to work on SGBV. Initially there was discussion of deploying a team of Norwegian police and justice sector experts to focus on the Haitian chain of justice, but this was rejected as too ambitious an undertaking. A more modest concept emerged, one that concentrated specifically on strengthening the HNP's capacities to prevent, investigate and prosecute sexual and gender-based violence. This concept was then approved by DPKO's Police Division.

The Norwegian Police Directorate then identified five suitable police officers to work as the Specialized Police Team. They underwent the usual pre-deployment training course as required by the United Nations, and were deployed collectively. However, when they arrived in Haiti in October 2010, it became apparent that the mission was not prepared to receive the five as a team, and individual team members were interviewed for separate placements within the mission. Whereas IPOs undergo such interviews and individual placements, the members of the SPT had been deployed with the intent of working together as a team on an SGBV project. Personnel within the MINUSTAH police component had apparently been unaware of this. The absence of appropriate intake procedures and preparations created challenges: the group had to struggle to establish its place within the UNPOL component, while lacking critical resources from MINUSTAH such as an allocated office, equipment and vehicles. The process of gaining acceptance and the required resources from the mission delayed the start-up phase of the SPT.

Once the team was established and equipped with an office and vehicles, the mission requested it to create a project proposal for activities proposed. Team members spent months collecting relevant information for a comprehensive assessment on which such a proposal could be based. Information was sought concerning such matters as how the Haitian judicial system worked; the structure, organization and tasking of the HNP; how HNP officers dealt with SGBV cases; the role of investigating judges; Haitian law and the penal code governing SGBV crime; the extent and nature of corruption; and services available for victims of SGBV, at local hospitals and from NGOs. Although other sections in MINUSTAH had in fact conducted similar research on SGBV and the justice system, team members were not directed to these sections, and learned of this only after their own assessment had been completed. In the view of one team member, this failure to convey and bridge the overlapping areas of interest in supporting reform and

development in the rule-of-law sector in Haiti reflected the poor communications between police and civilian components within the mission.

During the extended research and scoping period of defining the project, team members consulted extensively with local HNP. Local knowledge, advice and buy-in were seen as essential for project efficacy and legitimacy, including the support of senior management at HNP headquarters for the SGBV project.

### **SGBV I Project**

The project proposal completed in 2012 identified two strategic objectives: first, to contribute to the professionalization of the HNP, and second, to the strengthening of HNP operational capacities. Professionalization would be pursued by organizing and facilitating basic investigation courses on SGBV in all ten of Haiti's regional departments. To that end, the project also supported the training of trainers. This focus was chosen after consultations with local police. Because of the sensitivity of SGBV relative to many other types of crime, modern policing practice has developed specific approaches for interviewing victims and witnesses, evidence collection and other procedural approaches. A one-week course was developed in close cooperation with the HNP, using local instructors from the Haitian Police School. Topics addressed in the SGBV project's training of HNP included sexual crimes, domestic violence, cultural attitudes, crime scene investigation and interview techniques, including those for child victims. Because the SGBV project undertook not only to transfer technical skills, but more ambitiously to effect a change in mentality among HNP personnel regarding crimes of sexual violence, it sought to reach as many officers as possible, at all levels of the organization. The course was aimed not only at police investigators, but at all HNP, including traffic and patrol officers as well as directors and senior management. The training-of-trainers course was developed with the aim of extending the reach of training beyond the capital city and into the outlying regions.

Training of Haitian police trainers and having the police school run the course itself was seen as critically important for gaining credibility for the SGBV training program. For many years, also prior to the current MINUSTAH mission, the HNP had been trained by an ever-shifting array of foreign police, often through interpreters. The internationals providing police assistance would often introduce competing models of

policing, driven by competing foreign interests and priorities.<sup>25</sup> However, a guiding principle of UN police peacekeeping doctrine is to ensure that capacity-building is not supply-driven, but is demand-driven – responding to needs identified by the intended beneficiaries in the host state.<sup>26</sup> The Norwegian SPT sought to ensure that the assistance they would provide was recognized as a need by the HNP and Haitian state. Priorities identified in the HNP development plan for 2012–16 included HNP capacity-building for dealing with SGBV and the establishment of SGBV offices, and this was confirmed in discussions with HNP officials, including local chiefs of police in the regional departments. Further, for the sustainability of capacity building, the Norwegian SPT sought to ensure that training was developed with the HNP and implemented by HNP trainers. Over the course of the initial four-year SGBV I project, the course was attended by 1191 Haitian police personnel, constituting about 9% of the entire HNP. The course was also included in basic training at the police school. From 2014, all police recruits have received one week of SGBV training during the basic training that runs for seven to nine months.

The second strategic objective of the project – strengthening the HNP’s operational capacities – would be served through infrastructure development, specifically by providing one or two offices per regional department that would serve as police reception facilities for victims of SGBV, and suitable equipment for SGBV investigations for the HNP in nine of Haiti’s ten regional departments (the exception being the West department including Port-au-Prince, for which MINUSTAH’s Gender Unit was responsible). These facilities are intended to offer greater privacy to victims of SGBV when they report the crimes and when police officers interview them. Having a quiet, less public environment for the reception of victims is especially important in a country like Haiti, where the social stigma attached to victims of sexual violence often inhibits them from reporting the crimes to the police. Police stations in Haiti, as in many other developing countries, often offer little privacy to victims, who may be crowded into the same room with the accused and other alleged perpetrators, as well as often being accompanied by a cortege of NGO workers, witnesses and family members.

In order to build the offices for the reception of SGBV victims, the SGBV team met with the HNP director in each of the nine departments

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<sup>25</sup> Charles T. Call, ‘Competing donor approaches in police reform’, *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2002).

<sup>26</sup> DPKO/DFS, *Police Policy* (2014), paras 30–46.

in order to identify what was needed and where to place each office. Some of these offices were built completely from the ground up, while others involved the refurbishment of existing office premises. The project completed 15 offices during the first phase, including an office for the HNP national coordinator for gender in Port-au-Prince.

The initial SGBV project had been expected to run from October 2010 until the end of 2013. However, due to the unforeseen difficulties in getting the team settled within the mission, the time needed to develop the project proposal, and repeated delays in the financial and procurement processes (see 'Challenges' section below), the project deadline had to be extended to the end of 2015. By the end of first project, the specialized team had met its professionalization objective by training 35 HNP trainers in SGBV, and those HNP trainers had in turn trained a total 1191 HNP officers from across Haiti. The SGBV training programme was integrated into the 7-month basic training for new HNP officers at the police school. It also met its objective of strengthening HNP operational capacities by building or renovating 15 SGBV offices, the office for the HNP's gender coordinator, and one classroom for the SGBV course in the HNP School, and providing equipment, furniture and computers for the offices and classroom.

The specialized police team benefitted from having an independent budget for the implementation of their project on SGBV. Initially, USD 475,000 in independent project funding was allocated by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support the SPT's activities in Haiti, later increased by an additional 900,000. By the end of December 2015, USD 1.2 million had been spent on the project.

This independent project funding was in itself an unusual feature, but one that was critical to the success of the team in fulfilling the project objectives. In UN peacekeeping missions, the presence of civilian and police personnel is typically the primary resource for implementing the various civilian tasks relating to the mission mandate, such as police capacity-building. Financial support for programming is very limited. And while funds are available for quick impact projects (QIPs), these tend to be relatively modest, small-scale projects aimed at creating an immediate and tangible impact by providing tangible benefits to the population. QIPs are seen as a means to foster greater public confidence in the host state as well as in the peacekeeping mission's presence in the country. As project funding is limited across the entire mission, competition is stiff. In fact, the dearth of funding to support programming in peacekeeping missions has been identified as a key factor that limits the impact on intended beneficiaries. As noted by the High-Level Panel on Peacekeeping

Operations (HIPPO), ‘modest amounts of programmatic support could help develop capacity and yield better results in mandate implementation.’<sup>27</sup> The arrival of a team of police experts with their own guaranteed funding was fortunate, in view of the normally scarce financial resources available for project implementation.

The SPT also sought to bring on French-speaking UNPOL officers as part of the team. This was considered necessary, as there are few Norwegian police personnel who speak French. The team took on several UNPOL members from different countries, but ultimately developed a partnership with Canada. The Canadians became valued not only for their language skills, but also as like-minded partners who brought specific policing experiences and approaches considered directly relevant to the aims of the project, and whose policing culture was similar to that of Norway.

### **SGBV II Project**

Based on the success of the SGBV I project, a follow-on project was developed, to run from 2015 to 2017, with the possibility of extending up to three years, contingent on a prolongation of MINUSTAH’s mandate. Whereas the first project focused on HNP professional development through educating and training police on SGBV at a general level, SGBV II has focused on training investigators at the specialist level of the *Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire* (DCPJ), or Central Directorate of Judicial Police, located between the director and operational levels in the HNP. The specialist level is responsible for development of strategic plans, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and investigation of serious cases where regular divisions lack the necessary expertise. SGBV II has aimed at the creation of a centralized SGBV office in the DCPJ, the *Unité de lutte contre les crimes sexuelles* (ULCS) – the Unit to Combat Sexual Violence. The ULCS, currently staffed by four investigators who were trained through SGBV I project, has been provided with an office, equipment and vehicle. The SGBV II project also includes plans to build an SGBV reception office in West department, which more or less covers the Port-au-Prince area, since this office was not built as originally planned by the mission’s Gender Unit. In close cooperation with the ULCS, the specialized police team supports the development of a strategic plan for the HNP for improving

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<sup>27</sup> *Uniting Our Strengths for Peace – Politics, Partnerships and People. Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, 16 June 2015, para 147. Also known as the HIPPO Report, [http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO\\_Report\\_1\\_June\\_2015.pdf](http://www.un.org/sg/pdf/HIPPO_Report_1_June_2015.pdf)

police response to SGBV cases, as well as the development of related curriculum and SOPs for police investigation of SGBV cases. In addition, the team has supported the holding of special investigation courses for HNP investigators in the regions, so as to encompass all departments in Haiti. Seminars have been organized on international standards and practices in SGBV issues, and a course in interviewing children is being developed based on international standards.

## **Challenges encountered by the SPT**

### **Administrative support and efficiency**

The Norway-led specialized police team has encountered various challenges throughout the implementation of its two consecutive projects. From the team's perspective, the most serious problem has involved the repeated delays and obstacles in getting its dedicated project funds transferred through UN procedures. We argue that this challenge reflects systemic problems that afflict the large and rigid UN bureaucracy as it struggles to adapt in a context of changed expectations and conditions.

According to feedback from former team members, certain senior managers in MINUSTAH's police component did not fully accept the SPT or support their work. These problems were attributed to the unprecedented nature of the SPT and the adjustments that it required in established bureaucratic procedures, which some managers were not able or willing to accommodate.

The lack of support became evident with the team's arrival in Haiti in October 2010, and has been perceived by the team as a continuing problem. One major challenge relates to the handling of the team's independent and dedicated project funding, which was in its entirety provided by the Norwegian MFA. For the first two years, project funds were transferred from Norway to the Police Division, DPKO at UN Headquarters, and from there were released through financial authorizations to the Norwegian team's accounts in MINUSTAH. This was an unusual arrangement, as UN peacekeeping missions normally control project money within their own budgets. According to the team, this arrangement worked smoothly, although there was little need for the project money during the first year, when the team was busy settling in, arranging for offices, equipment and vehicles, gathering the necessary information for the project proposal, and setting up the SGBV project.

From the mission perspective, the financial arrangements concerning the SPT's project budget were normalized after the first two years of extraordinary financial authorizations. From 2013, the mission received project funds in the form of a dedicated trust fund, to be administered by the mission and from which it would disburse funds to the SPT, as needed and in accordance with established procedures. However, according to the team, this is when the problems began, and financial procedures became the cause of considerable frustration and delays. Project funding came under the purview of the Project Review Committee (PRC), which has responsibility for overseeing funding of all projects in MINUSTAH. That meant that the SPT required PRC authorization in order to get the funding to carry out their planned activities, even though the team's mandate had already been agreed between the Norwegian government and the DPKO. The PRC has been described as a very slow and bureaucratic entity. Once disbursements became subject to the authority of the PRC, receiving the money required to pay a bill relating to the SGBV project could take three or four months. The team also experienced repeated bureaucratic delays in the transfer of funding from UN headquarters to the mission, at times threatening the arrangements for scheduled events and projects. Dynamics between the SPT and UNPOL senior management became strained as a result of the repeated delays in getting approval and disbursement of funds.

Failure to secure the timely transfer of funding led to overdue payment of bills to suppliers, the cancellation of one training, and the threat of derailing several of the team's other planned events. The paperwork and efforts required to process infrastructure projects and disburse funding through the UN administration system was described as having required almost full-time attention from one team member. According to the team, the problems in getting the funds transferred from New York and disbursed to the specialized police team were rooted in rigid internal UN procedures, lack of appropriate arrangements to support the SPT, which as a new mechanism emplaced new demands on the administrative system, and a risk-averse organizational culture that tended towards inflexibility when confronted by new challenges. The team found members of the UN bureaucracy in the mission and at UN headquarters unable or unwilling to devise solutions to the delays and blockages until the crisis had escalated to the highest level.

From the perspective of some administration personnel in the mission, the main problem was that the team members did not understand the steps involved in the procurement process or in getting funds disbursed. There was also a learning process involved for

administration personnel, as the team presented specific needs, often working under tight deadlines. Some problems were also acknowledged to be linked to the introduction of the new Umoja central administrative online platform throughout the UN to replace its multiple, fragmented information technology and administrative systems.<sup>28</sup> Convening team briefings on finance, procurement and administration, or even better, preparing an SOP for the team's procurement and financial disbursements, were mentioned as possible solutions that could inform the team members and ensure that they were aware of the UN procedures on which they depended to implement their project.

In the current context of multiple reviews of UN activities and the leadership race for the post of the next Secretary-General, there has been discussion of reform of dysfunctional or under-performing UN structures. Several former high-ranking insiders have criticized the UN as a 'maddeningly complex'<sup>29</sup> and 'under-funded bureaucratic labyrinth'<sup>30</sup>, an 'over-administered and undermanaged institution'<sup>31</sup> prone to 'risk aversion'.<sup>32</sup>

According to the report of the High Level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO Report), the UN's internal policies and procedures undermine effectiveness and efficiency in field operations:

...UN administrative procedures are failing missions and their mandates. Force commanders and troop contributors are exasperated by bureaucratic constraints that fail to meet reasonable demands in difficult settings. Senior managers complain of deep dysfunction and are frustrated by the inability to recruit rapidly on one hand and the obstacles to removing poor performers on the other. Staff members are discouraged and frustrated by administrative red tape, and a lack of mobility and career development. Administrative risk controls poorly suited to the field leave mission leaders and administrators feeling constrained from taking common sense decisions in pursuit of the mandate. Too often, the choice is between what makes sense for the

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<sup>28</sup> For more on UMOJA's teething problems, see Colum Lynch, 'At the United Nations, Umoja translates as bureaucratic chaos', *Foreign Policy* (online), 6 May 2016, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/06/at-the-united-nations-umoja-translates-as-bureaucratic-chaos/>

<sup>29</sup> David Banbury, 'I love the U.N., but it is failing', *New York Times*, 18 March 2016

<sup>30</sup> Mark Malloch-Brown, 'The UN is an under-funded bureaucratic labyrinth – and a force for good in the world', *Telegraph* (London), 26 June 2015.

<sup>31</sup> Franz Baumann, 'UN bureaucracy? No thanks', *Pass Blue: Covering the UN* (online), 14 May 2016, <http://passblue.com/2016/05/14/un-bureaucracy-no-thanks/>

<sup>32</sup> Malloch-Brown (fn 29 above).



mission or what is compliant with unwieldy procedures, and usually the choice is to do what is compliant. The price of these risk controls is extremely high in terms of operational and reputational risk through underperformance against mandates.<sup>33</sup>

Further, as noted by Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations from 2000 to 2008, the UN is a very risk-averse organization; risk-taking is likely to harm one's career there.<sup>34</sup> Staff members are overly concerned about taking a decision or action that lies outside established procedures and risks incurring disapproval.

Various problems with UN bureaucratic procedures and institutional culture have been acknowledged. However, internal reform, if undertaken, will take time. From the many difficulties experienced by the SPT in MINUSTAH in navigating the UN's internal bureaucratic structures and processes, several stakeholders have recommended that, if Norway decides to field further SPTs to UN missions in the future, it should seek to keep the funding provided for the team outside of the UN, in order to avoid problems like those that undermined the efficiency and effectiveness of the SPT in Haiti.

### **Sustainability**

MINUSTAH is a mature peacekeeping mission, initially established in 2004, and currently in the process of drawdown. As a result of Security Council Resolution 2180 of October 2014, it has been undergoing a shift in configuration, with the reduction of its military component and a commensurate strengthening of the police component, because of greater stability in Haiti and the identified need to strengthen the capacities of the Haitian National Police. Uncertainties relating to the electoral cycle have temporarily delayed termination of the mission, but several respondents mentioned the eventual end of the mission and their concerns for the sustainability of current projects and activities undertaken by MINUSTAH personnel to build Haitian state capacity for maintaining security and stability.

Various measures have aimed at ensuring the sustainability of the SPT's police capacity-building efforts. These include the establishment of the Unité de lutte contre les crimes sexuelles (ULCS), the

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<sup>33</sup> HIPPO Report, para 289.

<sup>34</sup> Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Lecture at the International Peace Institute, 14 July 2015. See 'Guéhenno: "Much Better for the UN to Take Risks"', IPI, available at: <https://www.ipinst.org/2015/07/a-peacekeeping-discussion-with-jean-marie-guehenno#2>

institutionalization of SGBV standards by establishing SOPs and incorporating the training module into the regular seven-month basic training for Haitian police and into trainings at the specialist level.

However, sustainability of the project's achievements may be at risk, due to at least two factors. First is the challenge of retaining officers specifically trained in investigating SGBV. As in many other police organizations throughout the world, SGBV is not a high-status area for the Haitian National Police. According to SPT members, investigation of homicides, narcotics and organized crime cases are more attractive fields of work for many police officers, more highly valued by peers and receiving the most attention and resources. Moreover, investigating SGBV is complex and challenging: evidence to corroborate a victim's statement is often lacking, and the impact on victims is often deeply traumatic. Personnel retention can be a problem when officers ask to be reassigned to other duties. One means of raising the status of SGBV investigations within the police is to ensure that the necessary office space, equipment, and vehicles are available. Accordingly, the SPT has equipped the ULCS, and seeks to strengthen its material resourcing in the future. Further, it is important to ensure a higher status for SGBV investigators, as reflected in rank and salary. Enhancing the status and ascribed value of SGBV investigations will require attitudinal change within the HNP. While changing organizational attitudes about SGBV crimes and investigations is partly dealt with by the team's effort to involve senior HNP managers in SGBV training, it will more fundamentally require coordinated efforts within the police component and with other actors, as discussed below.

### **Importance of coordination**

One reason why the SGBV team has been effective is that it functions as a cohesive, tightly coordinated unit with a clear division of labour among its members, all working towards a common goal. The team chose to focus on a narrowly defined objective: building professional and operational HNP capacity to investigate SGBV crimes. This was pursued initially at the general level and institutionalized in the basic training course at the police school, and subsequently at a more advanced specialist level within the HNP.

However, the problem of SGBV in Haiti, as elsewhere, involves more than simply training police investigators. The Haitian police are responsible for investigating crimes, providing a preliminary report to justices of the peace (*juges de paix*) on the facts of the crime and any evidence gathered, and bringing any individual caught in the act (*in flagrante delicto*) before justices of the peace. The police officers and justices of the peace are members of the Judicial Police who receive the

complaint from the victim and, in the case of an *in flagrante* offence, conduct the initial interview. The police are thus an important step in the process of responding to cases of SGBV, but are only one link in the chain of justice. Other essential actors include women's and victim support groups, who may provide shelter and moral support, and advise the victim about where to seek medical assistance; the clinics or hospitals that assess and treat the victim and issue the essential medical certificate (without which a rape case will not proceed); and the investigating judge (*juge d'instruction*) and Office of the Prosecutor (*parquet*) who take over the case from the police in the Haitian justice system. While in theory the Office of the Prosecutor should then develop the case further to the point where it is brought before a magistrate, in reality the prosecutor's office has posed several obstacles, from requiring resources from the complainant to discriminatory attitudes and corruption.<sup>35</sup> Interviews with Haitian and international actors revealed that the Haitian chain of justice is dysfunctional to the point of being 'broken', particularly with respect to SGBV cases. There is no harmonized case file concerning an alleged sexual assault. The police investigation and documentation of the case are limited and separate from the work of the justice personnel; the frequent failure of the prosecutor's office to pursue SGBV cases – especially those involving women and girls with few financial resources – undermines access to justice for victims of SGBV.

Sexual- and gender-based violence has remained severely under-reported in Haiti due to stigma, shame, fear of retaliation by the perpetrator, or the (historically well-founded) perception that the police and justice system will not act on the complaint. The situation is particularly grave for victims living in the large shantytown of Cité-Soleil, where rape is often perpetrated by armed gangs who fight among themselves for control of the area. There is in Cité-Soleil no police presence or station where victims can have crimes registered, and any victim who nevertheless decided to report an attack to the police would be unable to return home because of the high risk of reprisals.

SGBV is a problem that requires coordinated efforts involving police, justice, public health and civil society actors. From a donor perspective, it is more feasible and attractive to focus in on one specific component of the 'chain of justice' and concentrate efforts in that

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<sup>35</sup> See Meena Jagannath, 'Barriers to women's access to justice in Haiti', *CUNY Law Review*, Vol. 15, No. 27 (2011), [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2533519](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533519)

particular domain. However, improving the response of the Haitian police to reports of SGBV must be placed in the broader context of work to improve and coordinate SGBV responses across the Haitian public and private sphere, and must be linked up with efforts to reform the judicial system more generally. By extension, assisting the HNP and judicial authorities to address SGBV will require coordinated efforts from the various components and relevant offices in MINUSTAH and the UN Country Team – such efforts are not yet evident in Haiti.

### **Lessons from the SPT on SGBV**

Rapid deployment of an SPT by a police-contributing country is possible, as seen in the SGBV team experience. However, for the SPT to be able to start working efficiently and effectively implement its project, the mission must accept and facilitate the work of the team. Once present on the ground, the SGBV I team lost valuable time in struggling to gain acceptance and secure the office space, equipment and transportation resources already agreed in principle. Further, the team found itself undertaking research on the police and justice system with regard to SGBV that replicated work already conducted by other parts of the UN mission and country team; better initial information and coordination could have reduced the time required to define the specific project on which they were to work. This underscores that flexibility and a rapid response is indeed possible but may be undermined by the absence of enabling procedures within the mission.

Preparation for deploying an SPT should include a comprehensive pre-mission assessment of the mission and the local context, involving consultations with host-state police, senior mission leadership and heads of the relevant mission components. Depending on the focus of the SPT, other actors relevant to the achievement of their objective should be consulted, such as the justice sector and UN country team. Conducting a thorough pre-mission assessment will enable team members to be better prepared to commence substantive work on the ground sooner. The pre-mission assessment should pay adequate attention to the many factors and actors that are likely to affect the team's work.

It is critical that both mission leadership as well as UNPOL management at UN headquarters in New York are consulted while the specialized team project is developed by the police-contributing country/ies. The experience of the SGBV team in Haiti has shown that effective implementation of the project on a day-to-day basis hinges on adequate support from senior mission management.

Before the team is deployed, a detailed MoU should be agreed with senior mission leadership, including the head of the police component. The MoU should specify the role of the SPT, the terms of its deployment, and the resources that the mission will provide in support of its work. This is crucial for ensuring efficient start-up of the work of the SPT.

Working closely with host-state authorities and police and ensuring local ownership are essential for an SPT's engagement in capacity building of the host state police. Consultation with appropriate local authorities in the development of the project is necessary to secure local ownership, sustainability and effectiveness. Local ownership is widely acknowledged as an imperative in peacebuilding assistance,<sup>36</sup> yet continues to be lacking in many international interventions in fragile and post-conflict states. In Haiti, where there are deep, historically-based cultural sensitivities to compromised sovereignty, the international community has been particularly remiss in actively involving the authorities and society in the development and implementation of national reconstruction and state-building processes. In this respect the SPT on SGBV has implemented good practice by consulting closely with HNP police at headquarters and in the regional departments, and by undertaking activities that strengthen the sustainability of SGBV capacity-building, with institutionalization of the ULCS in the HNP and SGBV training for police recruits, development of SOPs and training curricula, training of trainers, and resources for strengthening SGBV investigations as a specialization within the HNP.

Another good practice applied by the team is having a handover period between outgoing and incoming team leaders, and staggering personnel rotations so all personnel are not replaced at the same time. Staggered rotations enable the team's institutional memory to be retained, and relevant information concerning UN protocols and project implementation can be passed on to incoming members.

The SGBV SPT in Haiti has shown the potential for developing peacekeeping partnerships among police-contributing countries in the police component. The inclusion of two Canadian police officers facilitated communication between the team and francophone

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<sup>36</sup> For example, United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881--S/2009/304, 11 June 2009, paras 7–14, <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/s2009304.pdf>

stakeholders in the mission and the HNP; moreover, these officers brought to the SPT their own distinct areas of expertise, such as interviewing techniques for children. The successful blending of Norwegian and Canadian police experts in the specialized team on SGBV indicates that such teams need not necessarily have be purely national in composition, but may also be blended, involving police from two different countries. However, SGBV team leaders emphasized that, for a blended team to be effective, the partnering countries should share a common approach to policing generally and in the specific functional area of expertise: thus, potential country partners should be limited to those with like-minded policing cultures.

Specialized police teams are also seen by some observers as a potential means for PCCs from other regions to increase their participation in peacekeeping. For example, combating organized crime – an area of growing concern in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding – is a particular competence of Latin American police. Foreign deployments can offer benefits in terms of intelligence-sharing and area knowledge acquisition, expanding the capacity of the domestic police to combat organized crime. While the continuing problem of violent crime in some Latin American countries has created political incentives for keeping most police at home,<sup>37</sup> discussions with police advisers from other regions such as Europe and North America have indicated interest in deploying SPTs with an organized crime focus.

The lack of specific guidance on procedures concerning SPTs is one likely factor in explaining why the SPT on SGBV encountered challenges in implementing its project in Haiti. The concept of specialized police teams has been endorsed by the UN Secretary-General and in DPKO police policy. It has further been flagged in external reviews of UN peacekeeping (HIPPO Report) as a new modality for improving the effectiveness of UN capacity-development efforts in host countries. What is now needed is the development of appropriate doctrine and guidance to guide changes in field mission administrative and financial procedures to facilitate the establishment of specialized teams, provide institutional support from the mission's leadership and administrative pillar, and, it is to be hoped, to deal with some of the obstacles encountered by the SGBV team in MINUSTAH.

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<sup>37</sup> IPI, 'Beyond Haiti: Enhancing Latin American Military and Police Contributions to UN Peacekeeping', April 2014, p. 5, [https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi\\_e\\_pub\\_beyond\\_haiti.pdf](https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_e_pub_beyond_haiti.pdf)

## Conclusions and recommendations

The experience of the Norwegian SGBV group since 2010 has shown that the use of a specialized police team approach offers several important advantages to the host state police. Close consultation by the team with the heads of relevant HNP departments in the first phase, and with the Police School in the second phase, aimed at ensuring local ownership of the SGBV project. That stands in contrast to otherwise widely-used approaches to capacity-building in which external actors tend to deliver externally conceived projects to host populations.

The SGBV group concentrated its efforts on sustainable capacity-building activities that could be continued after the project was completed. These activities included the development of training courses and the incorporation of SGBV into basic training, the training of HNP trainers, and the elaboration of standard operating procedures (SOPs) for SGBV investigations.

The SGBV group pursued a coordinated approach in implementing of a defined project addressing SGBV investigations. The SPT's approach enabled a division of labour among the individual team members, working together to achieve a shared goal. Under the overall direction of the team leader, the SPT approach promoted unity of effort and accountability of group members toward the realization of project objectives.

Linked to the above, the SPT also enabled a common and coherent approach to capacity-building on SGBV investigations. Team members shared a common culture of policing, especially since most of them came from Norway – but this was also reflected in the non-Norwegian members of the team. In inviting other UNPOL to become part of the team, it was recognized that those individuals should come from a police culture similar to that of the other group members. Canadian police were seen by the Norwegian team members as holding a similar approach to police as themselves, in addition to the Canadians' fluency in French. As a result, the team was able to advance a coherent policing message to their Haitian counterparts. This stands in contrast to the prevailing UN approach to capacity-building in which host-state police are subject to a plethora of varying national approaches from the succession of individual police officers tasked with capacity-development.

The SPT on SGBV further provided greater continuity in capacity-building assistance to the host-state police. The project cycles of three to five years are longer than those for independent police officers, even those who have their terms extended. Through the SPT, greater continuity of assistance in a targeted area, combined with greater coherence in approach, appears to be producing a greater impact.

The SPT also offers potential benefits to the Head of the Police Component (HOPC) and senior police leadership team of the mission into which the team deploys. The lead police-contributing country of the SPT takes on a greater responsibility both in defining the project to be implemented by the SPT will implement, and in recruiting skilled personnel with the competences needed to implement the SPT project. Recent efforts have aimed at improving recruitment of police as IPOs for UNPOL, but it is apparent from feedback from recently returned IPOs that there is still some way to go before HOPCs get the personnel with skillsets needed. Preparations undertaken by the PCC authorities for the SPT also present the opportunity for team members to prepare better before deployment, to learn about the project and begin planning.

With its defined project, independent budget, and specially selected team of personnel, an SPT is likely to be more successful in achieving its objectives than many independently deployed IPOs. This can be a powerful incentive for the HOPC and the rest of the mission's senior leadership team, as success of the SPT will benefit the component more generally. However, it is imperative that the mission's police component leadership be consulted and involved in the planning for the SPT, from the beginning. SPTs must take care not to become inadvertently caught up in the HQ-field tensions frequently found in UN peace operations.

Buy-in and support of the senior police leadership team is vital for future specialized police teams. This includes coordination within the police component itself (for example, between the development and operational pillars, but also, as in Haiti, between the development and administration pillars in order to get funds transferred and facilitate day-to-day activities of the team) as well as between the police component and civilian component (rule of law, gender, the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women, human rights, child protection).

The specialized team approach presents potential advantages for police-contributing countries. The deployment of expert police personnel to a peacekeeping mission is costly, both financially and in



terms of the gaps created in domestic policing capacity. Nevertheless, a specialized team offers the prospect of greater impact and effectiveness of deployed personnel because of the collective, coordinated effort undertaken by team members to implement a defined project.<sup>38</sup> Specialized teams present an opportunity for Western/Northern PCCs to re-engage with peacekeeping, as a modality that arguably represents more effective use of their personnel and resources.

One team member noted that, when deployed as part of a small team, members tend to have a greater sense of accountability for their work than might be the case with deployment independently as an IPO. Deployment abroad by other PCCs has also been shown to promote feelings of solidarity among members of the contingent.<sup>39</sup> Dynamics within the specialized team can be intense, because of the necessity of working closely with colleagues over an extended period of time and the greater isolation of the team and mission environment from normal daily life than in the home country. However, the Norwegian SPT experience in Haiti has indicated the team setting fosters a greater sense of solidarity and accountability to team mates.

That said, the close teamwork required of members and their sustained interaction over the course of deployment makes it essential to select team members who can work well together. While it is always difficult to predict whether two personalities will prove incompatible, careful screening should be applied to minimize this possibility.

The SGBV specialized team encountered various forms of resistance and bureaucratic obstacles within MINUSTAH. These appeared due in part to structural factors in mission management, with reliance on a strict hierarchy and rigid procedures, the heavy emphasis on reporting, and inadequate communication between pillars of the police component. Together these acted to reinforce institutional silos, top-down decision-making, and a focus on outputs rather than outcomes.

Monitoring and evaluation appears to remain a problematic area for UNPOL and the UN more broadly. Effective M&E will require moving beyond the simple 'bean counting' of meetings held, police officers

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<sup>38</sup> See the Secretary-General's report on peacebuilding in post-conflict environments (2009), which emphasised the responsibility of troop- and police-contributing countries to enhance the impact of their participation in peace operations (fn 35 above).

<sup>39</sup> Samuel Tanner and Benoit Dupont, 'Police Work in International Peace Operation Environments: a perspective from Canadian police officers in MINUSTAH', *Policing and Society*, Vol. 25, Issue 6 (2015).

trained, or patrols conducted. More meaningful ways of measuring the impact of this and other UNPOL activities for building host-state capacity will need to be developed and implemented throughout the police component, and conveyed to host state populations and the wider public, including through the periodic reports of the UN Secretary-General.

### **Specific recommendations**

PCCs deploying an SPT into a peacekeeping mission should consider *including an administrative focal point within the SPT*, an individual with professional experience in finance, procurement and administration in general, who could be trained in Umoja, the UN's new administrative information technology platform, and would be responsible for technically initiating the team's requests into the mission's administrative system and tracking the requests through the administrative process as necessary. The administrative focal point need not be a police officer, but could be a civilian or someone assigned from the mission's civilian staff and funded by the SPT project. Having a dedicated administrative expert on the team would most obviously help the team in navigating the necessary UN bureaucratic procedures. This would enable the other team members to focus on their specialized policing expertise, as was the original intent of the SPT mechanism, instead of spending each day filling out forms.

PCCs deploying an SPT should also consider *equipping the SPT with independent project funding*. Having a dedicated project budget will facilitate planning and ensure that the SPT does not have to compete for scarce project funding with other parts of the police component or mission. The UN should develop SOPs concerning the specific administrative procedures required for financial disbursements from the dedicated project budgets of SPTs, and clearly set out procedures for procurement. These SOPs should be standardized so as to be applicable in other mission settings as well.

Finally, SPTs should ensure that they are *properly informed* about the roles and work of other relevant components and divisions in MINUSTAH (such as justice, human rights, rule of law, gender) that may overlap or intersect with their project. Particularly in mature missions where components are drawing down and mission termination is being planned, it is essential to communicate the work of the SPT to the agencies and programmes that form part of the UN country team, and to communicate relevant work by the agencies back to the SPT. When the peacekeeping mission departs, these agencies will continue to be present over the long term. As existing UN

arrangements for coordination have not produced information exchange at the working level, SPTs should consider designating *liaison duties* or part-time co-location of a team member with other UN rule of law actors and agencies in the mission area. Rather than merely scheduling the occasional meeting where information is exchanged on a one-off basis with little chance of follow-up, consideration should be given to *creating relationships, building confidence and trust* between the SPT and rule-of-law actors as a basis for cooperation when working on a cross-cutting issue such as SGBV.



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