This paper explores the kind of knowledge that partisans profess in order to contribute to our studies of what has usually been thought of as the denial of science. Building on the research of Robert Proctor, Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, I show that the tobacco interests and climate science skeptics usually described as doubt mongers also purveyed forms of certainty and rested their arguments on three different registers of truth: that of narrowly defined facts that could sustain a controversy, ideological commitments to free enterprise, and the truths of self-conscious partisans engaged in battle. Thus, in many respects they have used elements of general knowledge, as well as social, economic and political commitments, to argue against specific scientific findings. Further, at least in the case of climate skeptics, this denial has been in the service of an image of the nature of science and its proper relation to politics. Analyzing significant dichotomies in debates that cross the terrains of science and politics, and knowledge and science, I will argue that a clear articulation of the relations amongst them will be critical to our work to understand the character of climate science denial, but also of the climate sciences themselves.