Alternative stable states
; asymmetric game
; coevolution
; evolution of cooperation
; game theory
; Mutualistic networks
; network stability
; pollination
; prisoner's dilemma
; time scale
Institute for Evolution and Biodiversity, Westphalian Wilhelms-University Münster, Münster, 48149, Germany; Institute of Infection and Global Health, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L7 3EA, United Kingdom; Center for Ecological Research, Kyoto University, Otsu, 520-2113, Japan; Graduate School of Life Science, Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan; Institute for Environmental Systems Science, University of Osnabrück, Osnabrück, 49076, Germany
Recommended Citation:
Metelmann S.,Sakai S.,Kondoh M.,et al. Evolutionary stability of plant–pollinator networks: efficient communities and a pollination dilemma[J]. Ecology Letters,2020-01-01,23(12)