Resource systems with enforced rules and strong monitoring systems typically have more predictable resource abundance, which can confer economic and social benefits to local communities. Co-management regimes demonstrate better social and ecological outcomes, but require an active role by community members in management activities, such as monitoring and enforcement. Previous work has emphasized understanding what makes fishermen comply with rules. This research takes a different approach to understand what influences an individual to enforce rules, particularly sea tenure. We conducted interviews and used multiple regression and Akaike’s Information Criteria model selection to evaluate the effect of social networks, food security, recent catch success, fisherman’s age and personal gear investment on individual’s enforcement of sea tenure. We found that fishermen’s enforcement of sea tenure declined between the two time periods measured and that social networks, age, food security, and changes in gear investment explained enforcement behavior across three different communities on Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast, an area undergoing rapid globalization.
Michigan State University, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, East Lansing, Michigan, United States of America;Michigan State University, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, East Lansing, Michigan, United States of America;Michigan State University, Department of Counseling, Educational Psychology and Special Education, East Lansing, Michigan, United States of America;Michigan State University, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, East Lansing, Michigan, United States of America;Michigan State University, James Madison College, East Lansing, Michigan, United States of America
Recommended Citation:
Kara Stevens,Kenneth A. Frank,Daniel B. Kramer. Do Social Networks Influence Small-Scale Fishermen’s Enforcement of Sea Tenure?[J]. PLOS ONE,2015-01-01,10(3)