Ambiguous causal evidence in which the covariance of the cause and effect is partially known is pervasive in real life situations. Little is known about how people reason about causal associations with ambiguous information and the underlying cognitive mechanisms. This paper presents three experiments exploring the cognitive mechanisms of causal reasoning with ambiguous observations. Results revealed that the influence of ambiguous observations manifested by missing information on causal reasoning depended on the availability of cognitive resources, suggesting that processing ambiguous information may involve deliberative cognitive processes. Experiment 1 demonstrated that subjects did not ignore the ambiguous observations in causal reasoning. They also had a general tendency to treat the ambiguous observations as negative evidence against the causal association. Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 included a causal learning task requiring a high cognitive demand in which paired stimuli were presented to subjects sequentially. Both experiments revealed that processing ambiguous or missing observations can depend on the availability of cognitive resources. Experiment 2 suggested that the contribution of working memory capacity to the comprehensiveness of evidence retention was reduced when there were ambiguous or missing observations. Experiment 3 demonstrated that an increase in cognitive demand due to a change in the task format reduced subjects’ tendency to treat ambiguous-missing observations as negative cues.
Research School of Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia;Research School of Psychology, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory, Australia
Recommended Citation:
Yiyun Shou,Michael Smithson. Adapting to an Uncertain World: Cognitive Capacity and Causal Reasoning with Ambiguous Observations[J]. PLOS ONE,2015-01-01,10(10)