globalchange  > 气候变化事实与影响
DOI: doi:10.1038/nclimate2335
论文题名:
Impact of the Keystone XL pipeline on global oil markets and greenhouse gas emissions
作者: Peter Erickson
刊名: Nature Climate Change
ISSN: 1758-1205X
EISSN: 1758-7325
出版年: 2014-08-10
卷: Volume:4, 页码:Pages:778;781 (2014)
语种: 英语
英文关键词: Climate-change mitigation
英文摘要:

Climate policy and analysis often focus on energy production and consumption1, 2, but seldom consider how energy transportation infrastructure shapes energy systems3. US President Obama has recently brought these issues to the fore, stating that he would only approve the Keystone XL pipeline, connecting Canadian oil sands with US refineries and ports, if it ‘does not significantly exacerbate the problem of carbon pollution’4. Here, we apply a simple model to understand the implications of the pipeline for greenhouse gas emissions as a function of any resulting increase in oil sands production. We find that for every barrel of increased production, global oil consumption would increase 0.6 barrels owing to the incremental decrease in global oil prices. As a result, and depending on the extent to which the pipeline leads to greater oil sands production, the net annual impact of Keystone XL could range from virtually none to 110 million tons CO2 equivalent annually. This spread is four times wider than found by the US State Department (1–27 million tons CO2e), who did not account for global oil market effects5. The approach used here, common in lifecycle analysis6, could also be applied to other pending fossil fuel extraction and supply infrastructure.

Globally, the International Energy Agency projects that nearly $700 billion per year will be invested in the upstream oil and gas sector over the next two decades7. The resulting infrastructure could contribute to carbon lock-in and further the problem of ‘carbon entanglement’8. Accordingly, it is crucial to understand the implications of fuel supply infrastructure for future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions9. Innovations such as extraction-based carbon accounting10 have helped quantify the emissions associated with fossil fuel supply, not just consumption, as has traditionally been the focus. However, few analyses have quantified the incremental GHG emissions impact of new fossil fuel supply infrastructure.

Broadly speaking, construction of fuel supply infrastructure could result in several categories of GHG impacts, including emissions associated with project construction and operation5; ‘lifecycle’ emissions associated with fuel extraction, processing and transportation5; and emissions associated with increased fuel use and combustion, due to price effects6, if the infrastructure increases global fuel supply. Furthermore, high-profile decisions such as the US government approval of Keystone XL could have indirect, political or structural effects, if they lead other decision-makers to reject new fossil fuel infrastructure on GHG grounds or, conversely, lead to a political backlash that inhibits other efforts to reduce emissions11. Although this last category may be the most significant, quantification is difficult and inherently speculative, so we do not further analyse it here.

The three categories of emissions impact can be reflected, sequentially, as:

where: Emissionsconst = Emissions associated with infrastructure construction and operation, in tonnes CO2 equivalent (CO2e); ΔProduction = Increase in production of fuel handled by infrastructure project; EFproj = Emissions factor, per unit of fuel handled, lifecycle basis; EFref = Emissions factor, per unit of displaced, reference fuel, lifecycle basis; ΔConsumption = Increase in fuel consumption resulting from increased production.

Factoring out the increase in production from the second two terms of equation (1) yields:

For the Keystone XL pipeline, the State Department has estimated all terms in equation (2) except the final one, a ratio that expresses the extent to which expanding oil sands production may increase global oil consumption. This term, and the effect it embodies, has not received significant attention in discussions of Keystone XL (ref. 12), and is therefore the subject of this Letter.

Microeconomic theory provides the tools to examine the price effect of adding new production capacity to an existing market13. Our simple model simulates the interaction between global oil demand14 and supply15 for the year 2020, as depicted in Fig. 1.

Figure 1: Simple model of global supply and demand for oil: how increasing global oil supply via Keystone XL would decrease prices and increase consumption.
Simple model of global supply and demand for oil: how increasing global oil supply via Keystone XL would decrease prices and increase consumption.

We fix the demand curve, and adjust the supply curve to reflect the extent to which Keystone XL might affect Canadian oil sands production, from no effect to the full 830,000 bpd pipeline capacity.

Our model of global oil supply and demand is based on the standard approach for supply and demand analysis, for example as outlined by Perloff13.

We draw our global oil supply curve for 2020 from the work of Rystad Energy15. Similar to other oil supply curves30, 31, Rystad’s curve starts with significant conventional oil production in lower-cost regions (such as the Middle East), followed by a more steeply rising segment of higher-cost, less conventional resources (such as deepwater, enhanced recovery, oil sands) that represent the marginal resource. For example, Rystad’s curve shows the cost of oil supply in 2020 rising sharply after 90 million barrels per day (mbpd). At the assumed equilibrium consumption level of 96.62 mbpd in 2020, per the US EIA (ref. 22), the real oil price is $101 US$/barrel and the elasticity of supply is 0.13. (See Appendix 1 in the Supplementary Information for the full cost curve.) For simplicity, we assume that Rystad’s cost curve does not already include the oil to be carried by Keystone XL. If it did already include it, we estimate that the elasticity of supply at the equilibrium consumption level would instead be 0.11.

To model a demand response, we use the results of a literature review that estimates a long-run demand elasticity of −0.2 (ref. 14) which we use to approximate a demand curve that intersects the supply curve at the equilibrium consumption level noted above.

Assuming small changes in supply, a change in consumption can be estimated as the shift in the supply curve (change in production) multiplied by the elasticity of demand divided by the difference between the elasticities of demand and supply, Ed/(EdEs) (ref. 13).

Demand elasticities tend to be greater in the longer term than in the shorter term14, as there is more time to invest capital in alternatives such as biofuels or high-efficiency or electric vehicles. Uncertainties also exist on the supply side. Technological progress in oil extraction and processing could flatten the curve, increasing the price elasticity of supply. (The elasticity of supply could also be lower if overall demand was less, and hence the equilibrium price was lower). Alternatively, if depletion effects (whether in conventional or unconventional sources) are stronger than assumed by industry analysts, the curve could steepen, decreasing the elasticity of supply. To characterize these uncertainties, we also consider a range of supply and demand elasticities. For demand elasticities we use a range from one of the studies cited by the literature review we use for our central estimate17. For supply elasticities, we use a range reported by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development18.

We do not consider substitution or market effects with other fuels because most oil is consumed in the transport sector, where few alternatives are currently available and where the literature on elasticities of substitution for the key alternative—biofuel—is sparse32. If this method were applied to other fossil fuels, however—for example, the expanded supply of coal, which in most sectors, such as power, competes directly with other fuels and energy sources such as natural gas or renewable energy—such substitution effects would need to be considered.

Last, this simple model may miss more complicated effects, such as cartel behaviour, in which a small number of producers may manipulate the oil supply and prices. However, our literature review and analysis of global oil price behaviour found little compelling evidence of effective cartel influence; in the case of recent price increases, we found that low demand price elasticity, low supply elasticity (or the ‘failure of global production to increase’), and growing demand from emerging economies are the main determinants of price14. Just as underinvestment has tended to lead to price increases33, investment in supply infrastructure will tend to lead to price decreases. Our simple model also misses any market, and consequent emissions, impact should increased oil sands production increase the supply and depress the prices of refining co-products such as petroleum coke, LPG, or electricity, increasing their consumption and substituting for lower or higher carbon fuels.

  1. Metz, B., Davidson, O., Bosch, P., Dave, R. & Meyer, L. Climate Change 2007: Mitigation (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).
  2. Sathaye, J. & Meyers, S. Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Assessment: A Guidebook Vol. 190 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995).
  3. Jones, C. F. Building more just energy infrastructure: Lessons from the past. Sci. Cult. 22, 157163 (2013).
  4. The White House Remarks by the President on Climate Change (Georgetown Univ., 2013); http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change
  5. US Department of State Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the Keystone XL Project (US Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 2014); http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/finalseis/index.htm
  6. Rajagopal, D. & Plevin, R. J. Implications of market-mediated emissions and uncertainty for biofuel policies. Energy Policy 56, 7582 (2013).
  7. IEA World Energy Outlook 2013 (International Energy Agency, 2013); http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/publications/weo-2013/
  8. Gurría, A. The Climate Challenge: Achieving Zero Emissions (OECD, 2013); http://www.oecd.org/about/secretary-general/the-climate-challenge-achieving-zero-emissions.htm
  9. Meindertsma, W. & Blok, K. Effects of New Fossil Fuel Developments on the Possibilities of Meeting 2 °C Scenarios (Ecofys, 2012); http://www.ecofys.com/en/publication/climate-impact-of-new-fossil-fuel-developments/
  10. Davis, S. J., Peters, G. P. & Caldeira, K. The supply chain of CO2 emissions. Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 108, 1855418559 (2011).
  11. DeCanio, S. J. & Fremstad, A. Game theory and climate diplomacy. Ecol. Econ. 85, 177187 (2013).
  12. Giles, C. Letter to Jose Fernandez and Kerri-Ann Jones (US Department of State) : EPA Review of Department of State’s DSEIS for the Keystone XL Project (2013).
  13. Perloff, J. M. Microeconomics (Pearson Higher Education, 2007).
  14. Hamilton, J. D. Understanding crude oil prices. Energy J. 30, 179206 (2009).
  15. Nysveen, P. M. & Rystad Energy Shale oil impacting global markets. Oil Gas Financ. J. 10 (2013); http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-10/issue-10/features/shale-oil-impacting-global-markets.html
  16. Power, T. M. & Power, D. S. The Impact of Powder River Basin Coal Exports on Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions (The Energy Foundation, 2013); http://www.powereconconsulting.com/WP/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/GHG-Impact-PRB-Coal-Export-Power-Consulting-May-2013_Final.pdf
  17. Cooper, J. C. B. Price elasticity of demand for crude oil: Estimates for 23 countries. OPEC Rev. 27, 18 (2003).
  18. Brook, A-M., Price, R. W., Sutherland, D., Westerlund, N. & André, C. Oil Price Developments (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004); http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/workingpaper/303505385758
  19. NETL Development of Baseline Data and Analysis of Life Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions of Petroleum-Based Fuels (US Department of Energy National Energy Technology Laboratory, 2008).
  20. Goldman Sachs Getting Oil Out of Canada: Heavy Oil Diffs Expected to Stay Wide and Volatile 41 (Goldman Sachs Group Inc., 2013).
  21. Leaton, J., Capalino, R. & Sussams, L. Keystone XL Pipeline (KXL) : A Potential Mirage for Oil Sands Investors (Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2013); http://www.carbontracker.org
  22. US EIA International Energy Outlook 2013 (US Energy Information Administration, 2013); http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/
  23. Bauer, N.
URL: http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/v4/n9/full/nclimate2335.html
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资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/5030
Appears in Collections:气候变化事实与影响
科学计划与规划
气候变化与战略

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Peter Erickson. Impact of the Keystone XL pipeline on global oil markets and greenhouse gas emissions[J]. Nature Climate Change,2014-08-10,Volume:4:Pages:778;781 (2014).
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