DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2017.1317628
Scopus记录号: 2-s2.0-85020315633
论文题名: Broadening the scope of loss and damage to legal liability: an experiment
作者: Gsottbauer E ; , Gampfer R ; , Bernold E ; , Delas A ; -M
刊名: Climate Policy
ISSN: 1469-3062
EISSN: 1752-7457
出版年: 2018
卷: 18, 期: 5 起始页码: 600
结束页码: 611
语种: 英语
英文关键词: Climate change
; experiment
; international cooperation
; liability
; social dilemma
Scopus学科分类: nvironmental Science: General Environmental Science
; Earth and Planetary Sciences: Atmospheric Science
英文摘要: The 2015 Paris Agreement represents a historic deal in the form of a strong international response to address climate change. This outcome came as a surprise for some, as several controversial issues had been postponed from previous conferences, and were expected to complicate the talks in Paris. One related to the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (L&D), and potential legal remedies for L&D in the form of compensation payments. This issue had been particularly contentious with some developing countries advocating ideas for climate damage liability, which developed countries were unwilling to include in an agreement. Although the negotiations on L&D secured many positive outcomes, Decision 1/CP.21 adopting the Paris Agreement notes that there is no possibility of claiming liability and financial compensation for developing countries. This article, however, argues that, rather than triggering endless compensation claims disputes, a liability mechanism could actually serve as a commitment and reciprocity device, ultimately increasing global policy ambition. In this regard, this article reports the results of two experiments testing the effects of liability rules on the climate policy investment decisions of two players that differ in wealth and vulnerability. Results show that liability rules imposing a responsibility for precaution on both parties increase cooperation significantly, consequentially minimizing risk of L&D occurrence in the first place. Liability rules could thus not only help to address future losses, but also to drive global mitigation and adaptation ambition. POLICY RELEVANCE The research results presented in this paper suggest that policymakers would be well advised to further intensify negotiations on a climate-related compensation mechanism beyond that already committed to in the Paris Agreement. Our findings show that a compensation mechanism that implements a rather simple negligence rule makes climate cooperation more attractive and rewarding, potentially leading rich and poor nations to boost their investments in mitigation and adaptation for climate protection. Thus, far from opening up a Pandora’s box of endless compensation claims towards industrialized countries, a liability mechanism could make global climate cooperation more effective, and in the longer run also less costly. © 2017 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Citation statistics:
资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/80143
Appears in Collections: 科学计划与规划
There are no files associated with this item.
作者单位: Institute of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria; Chair of Economics, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; Center for Comparative and International Studies, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; Chair of Decision Theory and Behavioral Game Theory, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; FehrAdvice & Partners, Zurich, Switzerland
Recommended Citation:
Gsottbauer E,, Gampfer R,, Bernold E,et al. Broadening the scope of loss and damage to legal liability: an experiment[J]. Climate Policy,2018-01-01,18(5)