DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2016.1169499
Scopus记录号: 2-s2.0-84973171127
论文题名: Rebound policy in the Paris Agreement: instrument comparison and climate-club revenue offsets
作者: van den Bergh J ; C ; J ; M
刊名: Climate Policy
ISSN: 1469-3062
EISSN: 1752-7457
出版年: 2017
卷: 17, 期: 6 起始页码: 801
结束页码: 813
语种: 英语
英文关键词: carbon import tariff
; carbon rebound
; climate agreement
; climate club
; climate negotiations
; energy efficiency
Scopus关键词: carbon emission
; emissions trading
; energy efficiency
; environmental economics
; environmental policy
; international agreement
; negotiation process
; pollution tax
Scopus学科分类: nvironmental Science: General Environmental Science
; Earth and Planetary Sciences: Atmospheric Science
英文摘要: It is argued that without an international climate treaty, or with a soft treaty in the form of voluntary pledges, well-intended local and national climate strategies will seriously rebound in terms of energy use and CO2 emissions. I unravel the complexity of rebound in an international context, for which purpose the distinction between national and international rebound is introduced. The main climate–energy strategies and policies are assessed based on their capacity to control rebound, with carbon pricing–especially cap-and-trade–appearing to be the best approach. It is argued that motivations for further negotiations on amendments to the recent Paris climate agreement, namely on national policy coordination, can be strengthened by rebound concerns. As part of this, a new suggestion is to complement carbon equalization tariffs on carbon-intensive goods imported from countries with weak or non-existent climate policies with ‘revenue-recycling offsets’. These offsets would ease the political way to implementing carbon equalization tariffs, in turn creating pressure on countries to sign an effective climate treaty–a requirement to achieve consistent and serious carbon pricing worldwide. To support these arguments, the empirical patterns of rebound estimates are broadly outlined. Policy relevance Rebound is given scant attention in both IPCC documents and UNFCCC climate summits, where climate agreements are negotiated. This article argues that without an international climate treaty, or with a soft treaty in the form of voluntary pledges, as characterizes the recent Paris climate agreement, well-intended local and national climate strategies will seriously rebound in terms of CO2 emissions. This means that the motivations for climate negotiations can be strengthened by drawing attention to rebound concerns. The major current climate–energy strategies and policies are assessed on the basis of their capacity to control rebound, with carbon pricing–notably cap-and-trade–revealed to be the best approach. Further analysis and discussion of this is welcome, especially as rebound is neglected in the comparisons of carbon tax and emissions trading solutions to global warming. In particular, rebound should be added to the set of core criteria for judging and comparing instruments of climate policy. In addition, a new suggestion offered is to complement a climate club with carbon equalization tariffs on carbon-intensive goods imported from countries lacking strong climate policy with ‘revenue-recycling offsets’. This would make the implementation of such tariffs more politically feasible as well as creating pressure on countries to sign an effective climate treaty. © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Citation statistics:
资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/80261
Appears in Collections: 科学计划与规划
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作者单位: ICREA, Passeig de Lluís Companys 23, Barcelona, Spain; Institute for Environmental Science and Technology, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici Z, Bellaterra, Spain; Faculty of Economics and Business Administration & Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1105, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Recommended Citation:
van den Bergh J,C,J,et al. Rebound policy in the Paris Agreement: instrument comparison and climate-club revenue offsets[J]. Climate Policy,2017-01-01,17(6)