globalchange  > 科学计划与规划
DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2014.965657
Scopus记录号: 2-s2.0-84952298452
论文题名:
After monetary policy, climate policy: is delegation the key to EU ETS reform?
作者: Grosjean G; , Acworth W; , Flachsland C; , Marschinski R
刊名: Climate Policy
ISSN: 1469-3062
EISSN: 1752-7457
出版年: 2016
卷: 16, 期:1
起始页码: 1
结束页码: 25
语种: 英语
英文关键词: carbon authority ; carbon central bank ; carbon price ; delegation ; EU Emissions Trading System ; market stability reserve
Scopus关键词: emissions trading ; environmental policy ; European Union ; policy reform
Scopus学科分类: nvironmental Science: General Environmental Science ; Earth and Planetary Sciences: Atmospheric Science
英文摘要: Since the crash of carbon prices in phase II of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), many have argued that the low price mirrors structural failures requiring intervention. A wide range of reform options have been suggested, including delegating the governance of the carbon market to an independent authority. This article analyses the debate by reconstructing the various arguments for or against reform. Three possible drivers of the price decline are investigated: (1) exogenous shocks; (2) insufficient credibility; and (3) market imperfections. It is argued that the extent to which a low price is problematic and warrants reform depends on the specific objectives associated with the EU ETS and the perception on the functioning of the market. A two-dimensional EU ETS Reform Space, comprising the degree of price certainty within the EU ETS and the level of delegation, is devised. Within the Reform Space, EU ETS reform options currently discussed are mapped. This descriptive structure offers a framework to clarify whether delegation responds to various concerns with respect to the EU ETS. Delegation might enhance flexibility under unforeseen circumstances, decrease policy uncertainty, and increase the credibility of long-term policy commitments. However, higher degrees of delegation face challenges including democratic legitimacy and political feasibility. Policy relevance In January 2014, the European Commission proposed a structural reform of the EU ETS characterized by a quantity triggered Market Stability Reserve, increasing flexibility in allowance supply. However, intense debate has revealed considerable differences in opinion regarding the need for and objectives of any adjustment mechanism. Other proposals, including various degrees of delegation to a rule-based adjustment mechanism or an independent authority as well as degrees of price certainty, were also suggested. This article offers a new framework, the EU ETS Reform Space, to compare reform options more systematically. This work therefore contributes to structuring the policy debate by providing a tool to better understand the merits and demerits of various reform proposals © 2014 Taylor & Francis.
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资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/80391
Appears in Collections:科学计划与规划

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作者单位: Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, P.O. Box 60 12 03, Potsdam, Germany; Technische Universität Berlin, Economics of Climate Change, Straße des 17. Juni 145, Berlin, Germany; Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Torgauer Straße 12–15, Berlin, Germany

Recommended Citation:
Grosjean G,, Acworth W,, Flachsland C,et al. After monetary policy, climate policy: is delegation the key to EU ETS reform?[J]. Climate Policy,2016-01-01,16(1)
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