globalchange  > 气候减缓与适应
DOI: 10.1007/s10584-015-1511-2
Scopus记录号: 2-s2.0-84944523974
论文题名:
Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements
作者: Hannam P.M.; Vasconcelos V.V.; Levin S.A.; Pacheco J.M.
刊名: Climatic Change
ISSN: 0165-0009
EISSN: 1573-1480
出版年: 2017
卷: 144, 期:1
起始页码: 65
结束页码: 79
语种: 英语
Scopus关键词: Carbon dioxide ; Climate models ; Game theory ; Greenhouse gases ; International cooperation ; Building blockes ; Evolutionary games ; Game-theoretic ; Global public goods ; International relations ; Model results ; Nuclear non-proliferation ; Trans-boundary air pollutions ; Climate change ; atmospheric pollution ; carbon dioxide ; climate change ; game theory ; greenhouse gas ; incentive ; international agreement ; international cooperation ; international relations ; public goods ; trade liberalization ; transboundary pollution ; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
英文摘要: Case study and model results lend some optimism for the potential of small coalitions with partially excludable public goods to substantially deepen international cooperation on energy and climate issues. Drawing motivation from other issue areas in international relations ranging from nuclear non-proliferation, transboundary air pollution and liberalized trade, we use an evolutionary-game-theoretic model to analyze regimes that yield domestic incentives to contribute to public goods provision (co-benefits). Co-benefits may be limited, but can create a nucleus for formation of coalitions that grow while deepening provision of global public goods. The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) is a prime example of an agreement that employs partially excludable club benefits to deepen cooperation on non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Our game-theoretic results support two important insights for the building blocks approach to addressing climate change: sustained cooperation in club agreements is possible even when public goods are not entirely excludable and some members of the population free-ride; and second, cooperation in small club configurations yields larger non-excludable public goods benefits than cooperation in more inclusive forums. This paper lends positive support that a proliferation of small agreements under a building blocks approach at the UNFCCC may be more effective (not just more likely) for deepening climate change cooperation than a fully inclusive approach. © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
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资源类型: 期刊论文
标识符: http://119.78.100.158/handle/2HF3EXSE/83930
Appears in Collections:气候减缓与适应
气候变化事实与影响

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作者单位: Science, Technology & Environmental Policy program, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, United States; Applications of Theoretical Physics Group, Centro de Matemática e Aplicações Fundamentais, Instituto para a Investigação Interdisciplinar, Lisbon Codex, Portugal; Centro de Física da Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal; Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, United States; Resources for the Future, Washington, DC, United States; Beijer Institute of Ecological Economics, Stockholm, Sweden; Centro de Biologia Molecular e Ambiental (CBMA), Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal; Departamento de Matemática e Aplicações, Universidade do Minho, Braga, Portugal

Recommended Citation:
Hannam P.M.,Vasconcelos V.V.,Levin S.A.,et al. Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements[J]. Climatic Change,2017-01-01,144(1)
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